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This dissertation examines the politics of local social policy making following 
Brazil’s re-democratization.  Decentralization in Brazil granted municipalities 
responsibility to design and tailor social policies to meet local demands.  Yet instead of 
developing their own programs many governments chose to adopt those made famous 
elsewhere.  What accounts for the diffusion of innovations across Brazil?  This 
dissertation tests three approaches for understanding policy makers’ emulation decisions: 
political incentives, ideology, and socialized norms.  Each of these three motivations 
reflects a different paradigmatic response to the question, what drives political behavior?  
A conventional political incentives approach follows a rational choice framework that 
incorporates neoclassical behavioral assumptions and posits people will behave 
strategically to further their own self-interest.  The classic assumption in this vein is that 
 viii
politicians will seek to win re-election.  On the other hand, scholars who adopt an 
ideational approach examine the way people make choices because of their ideological 
convictions.  Rather than seek their own political self-interest, actors can make decisions 
in spite of themselves or others because of deeply held beliefs about what is right and 
how to enact social change.  Lastly, a sociological approach examines how individuals 
conform to shared norms and seek legitimacy in the eyes of their colleagues.  
To test these motivational approaches I examine the diffusion of Bolsa Escola, an 
education program, and Programa Saúde da Família, a family health program.  Evidence 
for my argument is based on statistical event history analysis and qualitative case study 
research from four exemplary cities.  The electoral incentives approach offers a 
surprisingly weak explanation for the diffusion of innovative social policies.  Rather, 
diffusion occurs when elected executives feel ideologically compelled to replicate 
programs and when policy professionals engaged in relevant networks seek to 
demonstrate their adherence to professional norms.  Both ideology and social networks 
can work together in mutually reinforcing ways to promote diffusion.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation analyzes what motivates people to emulate “innovative” policies 
that address poverty and social inequality.  It is also about the politics of social policy 
provision and the reason why it is difficult, or by contrast easy, for social policies to 
spread.  Although these concerns are relevant for many countries, they are especially 
important for Brazil, which has a decentralized federal structure, where local 
governments have responsibility for social policies and where the stakes are high for 
addressing the needs of the poor. 
The politics of social sector reform in Brazil have undergone profound 
transformation since redemocratization in the late 1980s.  The democratic constitution 
(1988) established new social rights (Title I, Chapter 2, Article 6), including the right to 
education1 and health.2  At the same time, the constitution also laid out a new set of 
institutional mechanisms to carry out these social rights.  Municipalities would serve as 
an independent third tier of government with considerable political, fiscal, and policy 
autonomy, responsible for providing social services.  This newfound authority for local 
                                                 
1 According to the Constitution (1988) education is the right of all and duty of the State and of the family; 
free public education shall be provided with equal conditions of access (Title VIII, Chapter 3, Section 1, 
Article 205 and 206). 
2 According to the Constitution (1988) “[h]ealth is a right of all and a duty of the state and shall be 
guaranteed by means of social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other hazards 
and at the universal and equal access to actions and services for its promotion, protection and recovery” 
(Title VIII, Chapter 2, Section 2, Article 196). 
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control contributed to significant changes in Brazil’s policy landscape, as these 
institutional arrangements led to the inclusion of different actors in the policy process.   
In theory, decentralization could bring about greater flexibility and efficiency, and 
allow local governments to tailor their social policies according to the diverse needs of 
their constituents (Rueschemeyer and Evans 1985: 55-57).  After all, Brazil is home to 
over 5,500 municipalities that lie between the southern plains and the northern Amazon.  
In principle, as municipal governments would claim their authority to develop social 
policy, they would design programs according to local realities.  Local governance would 
also allow for better civil society participation, as cities followed constitutional mandates 
for the creation of participatory mechanisms for citizens to engage in policymaking 
through local councils.  
Throughout much of the late 1980s and 1990s, many states and municipalities 
embraced their newfound flexibilities and operated as policy “laboratories” by 
experimenting with new administrative and social policies (Abers 2000; Tendler 1997; 
Wampler and Avritzer 2004; Wampler 2004).  Innovative programs abound as cities 
instituted programs such as participatory governance (e.g. Orçamento Participativo, 
Participatory Budgeting), income generating cooperatives, and recycling programs, to 
name just a few (Spink et al. 2002).  That a number of sub-national governments would 
become the vanguard of social policy in Brazil was particularly notable given that the 
federal government was home to highly specialized technocrats, and that social reforms 
at the federal level took place at a snail’s pace (Ames 2001; Weyland 1996).  
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THE PUZZLE: SOCIAL POLICY DIFFUSION IN BRAZIL 
While sub-national governments did bring a diversity of tailored social policies to 
fruition, during this time period another phenomenon was also taking place: policy 
replication and diffusion.  Simply put, many city governments across Brazil chose to 
copy policies from elsewhere rather than customize their own programs. The extent of the 
replication is surprising because municipal governments faced dramatically different 
political cultures, social inequalities, and levels of poverty.  Two programs that are 
illustrative of the trend toward policy diffusion are Bolsa Escola/Renda Mínima,3 an 
educational grant program,4 and Programa Saúde da Família (PSF), a family health 
program.  
Bolsa Escola/Renda Mínima started in 1995 in two cities, Brasília (the federal 
district) and Campinas (in São Paulo state).  These programs provide mothers of low-
income children with cash-grants on the condition their children regularly attend school.   
The goal of the program is to improve educational attainment by reducing school 
absences and repetition, often caused by the high opportunity cost for poor children to 
attend school.  The Bolsa Escola program quickly spread across municipalities; within 
two years approximately 88 cities had adopted the program (Araújo and de Souza 1998).  
By 2001, over 200 cities had municipal Bolsa Escola programs (Villatoro 2004).  That 
same year, and on the eve of presidential elections, the federal government created a 
national Bolsa Escola program that was similar in design but which by-passed 
                                                 
3 I treat both Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima programs as comparable as they share similar policy designs 
and programmatic goals.  
4 This program is also known as a conditional cash transfer program.  
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municipalities5.  This study focuses only on municipal program diffusion, which requires 
budgetary and administrative obligations on the part of cities.   
 Programa Saúde da Família is a family healthcare program that draws on several 
local initiatives, including a family doctor program in Niterói (in Rio de Janeiro state) 
and other basic community-based health programs established in the rural northeast 
(Viana and dal Poz 1998).  The goal of the program is to improve prevention and basic 
health by working directly with families through home visits.  To facilitate linkages to 
communities healthcare workers operate within designated territories and in teams 
comprised of a doctor, nurse, nurse’s aid and several community health agents who reside 
in the neighborhood they serve.  This program started in 1994 with the support of the 
Ministry of Health, initially in small rural towns in the northeast.  Over time this program 
gained wider visibility and credibility, spreading dramatically from 55 cities in 1994 to 
4,944 municipalities by 2003.  
Brazil, like other federal countries with decentralized systems, has experienced 
significant policy diffusion.  Yet, there are some unique features of Brazilian diffusion 
that are worth noting.  First, it has taken place across thousands of municipal 
governments.  In most single-country diffusion studies of federal systems, scholars have 
focused on state-level (or provisional-level) policy replication because states assume 
primary jurisdictional responsibilities; a natural consequence is that those studies tend to 
have a smaller number of cases, such as the fifty U.S. states.  Second, policy replication 
                                                 
5 The federal government had a limited experiment with Renda Mínima in 1997, where it provided select 
cities with matching grants if they established the program. This program was short-lived and is widely 
viewed as a policy failure. 
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has occurred in a country that is well known for its regional contrasts rather than its 
similarities.  That a mega-city such as São Paulo with elaborate health networks would 
adopt a healthcare model that owes its origin to poor small cities in the rural northeast is 
remarkable.  Similarly, it is surprising that a city like Salvador, with high rates of poverty 
and poor educational infrastructure, would implement a school-grant program developed 
for wealthy cities with some of the highest rates of human development inside Brazil 
(Martins and Libânio 2005). The spread of the same policy models across such diverse 
settings is puzzling and worthy of explanation. Before embarking on this study of social 
policy diffusion, it is necessary to clarify some concepts and terms. 
What is Diffusion? 
Diffusion phenomena are all around us and have managed to capture the attention 
of a wide range of scholars in the social sciences.  Diffusion evokes images from the 
natural sciences, such as the spread of a virus across space.  But social science disciplines 
as diverse as sociology, economics, political science, agriculture, and business have also 
sought to explain socially created events that occur in their respective domains of inquiry.  
Some occurrences seem to “make sense” as people learn about innovations and quickly 
adopt them.  One classic example in this vein is the spread of hybrid corn among farmers 
in Iowa, who rapidly embraced the usage of hybrid seeds in the 1940s.6  Yet, there are 
also trends that are harder to explain.  For instance, the QWERTY keyboard for 
typewriters and computers has been widely recognized as an inefficient layout for typists.  
                                                 
6 The spread of hybrid corn in Iowa is one of the most influential studies on diffusion (see Ryan and Gross 
(1943); Gross (1942) and Ryan and Gross (1951).   
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Yet, it became an entrenched worldwide standard even though manufacturers could have 
produced a more efficient alternative.7  The realm of politics has also yielded numerous 
examples of diffusion, such as the spread of pension systems across Europe, charter 
schools in the United States, or even democracy around the world (for some recent 
examples see Brinks & Coppedge 2006; Karch 2007; Mooney 2001; Orenstein 2003; 
True & Mintrom 2001).     
For social scientists interested in explaining the world around them, diffusion 
events spark a plethora of research questions.  Some relate to innovations and the 
attributes of innovation.  What makes an idea “innovative”?  Why do some ideas spread 
while others do not?  Why are some actors more innovative than others?  Another line of 
inquiry focuses on diffusion processes.  How and why do innovations spread?  Why are 
some jurisdictions quick to adopt innovative practices while others are slow?  What role 
do policy entrepreneurs play in the spread of their ideas?  Lastly, some scholars focus on 
normative considerations such as functionality.  Do actors adopt innovative practices 
because they fulfill an identified need?  To what extent is replication logical or 
“rational”?  While each of these questions pursues distinct dimensions inherent in the 
spread of innovations, altogether they contribute to a broad literature on diffusion.   
While diffusion research has enjoyed great revival in the social sciences, the 
diversity of questions and approaches has produced tremendous conceptual murkiness.  
What is diffusion precisely? Scholars use such diverse metaphors as “contagion”, 
                                                 
7 The QWERTY keyboard was first developed for typewriters and was designed to limit jamming.  It is 
less efficient than an alternative keyboard designed by Professor August Dvorak in 1932.  Although the 
Dvorak keyboard is more efficient, it never caught on (Rogers 2003: 8-11).   
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“waves”, and “transfer” to describe diffusion events (see for instance, Burt 1987; Stone 
1999; Walt 2000).  But are they the same?  This definitional question underscores the 
need to clarify relationship between the actors and emulation decisions.  Diffusion 
implies autonomous decision-making while also accounting for potential interdependence 
between actors.  Political actors may learn about an innovation from a neighboring 
government or international meeting, and choose to copy those innovations in their own 
countries.  Sometimes the impetus to emulate can come from peer influence (horizontal), 
reflect internal demands (bottom-up), or external pressures (vertical).  These inducements 
need not reflect benign forces but can include coercion or other stimuli for cooperation. 
For a visual illustration of the potential influences driving diffusion effects, see Figure 
1.1.  
Definition: This study broadly defines diffusion to include processes that affect the 
likelihood that a reasonably autonomous jurisdiction will adopt an “innovative” policy 
developed by another such unit, at some point in time.  Various members of a social 
system can trigger a unit’s emulation mechanisms and increase the probability of 
adoption, including the originating jurisdiction that promotes the innovation, similar 
decision-making units, as well as those who reside outside of the decision-making unit 






Figure 1.1: Multiple Directions of Diffusion Effects  
Source: Modified figure from Levi-Faur (2005:26) 
 
Policy diffusion thus captures a process of decision making that involves some 
degree of learning, emulation, or mimicry.  If separate jurisdictions were to enact the 
same policy because they share similar conditions (e.g. economic shocks, levels of 
development, or institutional similarities) but were otherwise isolated from one another, 
this would not constitute an instance of diffusion.  The key here is that diffusion 
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emphasizes the interactive process that leads to replication (i.e. the spread), not just the 
outcome (i.e. policy adoption).8   
The conceptualization of diffusion employed in this study is particularly relevant 
for policy diffusion because the politics of policy making requires that actors advocate 
for their positions when they choose to emulate an innovation within their jurisdictions.  
Policy does not lend itself to “automatic” adoption because instituting new programs 
generally requires the establishment of guidelines, new administrative procedures, and 
budgetary commitments; all of which require decisive action.  Thus, this study 
emphasizes processes as well as outcomes, including the mechanisms that drive adoption, 
non-adoption, and reversal.  Last, in classifying diffusion outcomes, I consider that a 
policy has spread when a jurisdiction enacts a policy that shares a similar policy design as 
the original.  Some scholars distinguish between “emulation” and “adoption” as distinct 
from one another; constructivist scholars tend to use “emulation” to emphasize the 
importance of epistemic communities whereas “adoption” does not imply a similar 
meaning.  Since epistemic communities are central to theoretical questions on the role of 
social networks, I make no prior assumptions here in selecting terminology to describe 
diffusion outcomes.  As such, I use emulation, adoption, and replication interchangeably.   
Why would governments that face different problems, priorities, and political 
conditions decide to adopt the same policy?  Although policy diffusion research is new to 
                                                 
8 For a review of different treatments of the concept of diffusion – process versus outcome – see especially 
Elkins and Simmons (2005:36-38). 
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Brazil and relatively under-explored in the developing world, scholars of American9 and 
international politics have long taken up a diffusion lens to understand the spread of 
public policies.  Research has examined such disparate issues as abortion regulation, tax 
reform, charter schools, pension systems, and women’s bureaucracies (Berry and Berry 
1992; Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Mooney and Lee 1995; Orenstein 2003; True and 
Mintrom 2001).  In Latin America the spread of pension privatization and the shifting 
economic agenda towards neoliberal economic reforms has been a prominent theme 
(Brooks 2002; Madrid 2003; Weyland 2005).  The popularity of diffusion as a scholarly 
topic has only been matched by the potpourri of explanations, approaches, and theoretical 
frameworks scholars have employed (for full review see Rogers 2003).  Scholars have 
attributed diffusion to such diverse factors as the nature of the policy itself, policy 
entrepreneurship, geographic proximity, state competition, political opportunity, resource 
competition, federal transfers, and transnational networks, to name just a few (Berry and 
Berry 1992; Derthick 1970; Finnemore 1993; Gray 1973; Mintrom 1997; True and 
Mintrom 2001).  In explaining their findings, scholars turn to both structural 
explanations, such as federalism and geographic proximity, as well as agent-based 
explanations, such as individuals’ ability to learn or “policy entrepreneurship” (Mintrom 
1997; Mooney 2001; Rogers 2003; Walker 1969).  The result is that the literature 
                                                 
9 Institutional similarities between the United States and Brazil make it possible to draw on the American 
Politics diffusion literature. Both countries share a similar federal structure. They also share presidentialism 
and the executive control over the bureaucracy.  The most substantial distinction between the two countries 
is that Brazil, unlike the United States, explicitly recognizes the role of municipalities and creates a three-
tier federal government.  Brazilian municipalities also have clear mandates to address social policy 
provision in the constitution (1988). 
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provides a laundry-list of possible explanations for policy diffusion, without offering 
theoretical coherency or a systematic approach for addressing the causes of diffusion.  
Rather than test a host of internal prerequisites versus external pressures for 
policy emulation, this dissertation takes an alternative approach to examining the 
diffusion of social policy.  It does so by opening up the “black box” of policymaking and 
asking what motivates policymakers on the ground, to make emulation decisions.10  One 
of this dissertation’s main contributions is that it offers a theoretical framework for 
understanding the mechanisms that drive diffusion, by uncovering the actors’ motivations 
for adopting social policies.   
THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF 
This dissertation contrasts and tests three approaches for understanding 
individuals’ motivations for adopting innovative social policies: political incentives, 
ideology, and socialized norms. Each of these three motivations reflects a different 
paradigmatic response to the question, what drives diffusion?  A conventional political 
incentives approach typically follows a rational choice framework that incorporates 
neoclassical behavioral assumptions and posits people will behave strategically to further 
their own self-interest.  The classic assumption in this vein is that politicians will seek to 
win re-election.  On the other hand, scholars who adopt an ideational approach examine 
the way people make choices because of their ideological convictions.  Rather than seek 
                                                 
10 As Rogers notes, most studies of diffusion have not asked such ‘why’ questions about actors’ 
motivations (2003: 115).  Recent examples of researchers who are filling this void include (Finnemore 
1998; Weyland 2007; Mossberger 2000).  
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their own political self-interest, actors can make decisions because of deeply held beliefs 
about what is right and how to enact social change.  Sometimes these ideological 
commitments can even lead actors to make decisions that counter their political self-
interest.  Lastly, a sociological approach examines how individuals conform to shared 
norms and seek legitimacy in the eyes of their colleagues.  In this case, policy makers’ 
motivation to initiate change would be to demonstrate to their peers that they have kept-
up with their profession’s norms.  
 This study reveals that a political incentives approach offers a surprisingly weak 
explanation for the diffusion of innovative social policies.  Traditional incentives such as 
electoral competition rarely explain variation across municipalities and policymakers’ 
decisions to implement programs like Bolsa Escola and Programa Saúde da Família.  Nor 
do political incentives explain the variation in the adoption over time.  Rather, two 
different but complementary approaches explain diffusion: ideology and socialized 
professional norms.  First, I find that ideology does serve as a foundation for many 
individuals in guiding them to action and helping them filter their policy choices.  In the 
Brazilian case, policymakers who self-identify as being on the left or left-of-center are 
consistently more eager to adopt innovative social policies.  Second, socialized norms 
matter as policy professionals reveal they want to demonstrate to their peer networks they 
understand and follow new professional norms.  Professional associations and informal 
networks play a central role in shaping norms around policies such as Bolsa Escola, 
Renda Mínima and Programa Saúde da Família.  The extent of policy diffusion is 
determined by the density of professional associations; the more a sector has dense and 
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overlapping associations, the more likely a program will diffuse.  In some instances, 
ideology and networks can work together in mutually reinforcing ways by convincing 
actors that policies are in-line with their ideological commitments. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This project relies on a mix of methodological approaches to capture the diffusion 
of social policies in Brazil: it draws on surveys, interviews, and statistical analyses to 
answer the question of what motivates policymakers to emulate social policies that are 
designed for other cities.  
An important feature of this study is the comparison of two social policies that are 
situated in distinct sectors – education and health – and that diffuse at different rates.  As 
Rogers notes, one of the shortcomings of diffusion research is the propensity to study 
“successful” instances of diffusion (2003: 110).  In other words, scholars tend to have a 
“pro-innovations bias” in focusing on policies that have spread dramatically across 
jurisdictions.  Another component of a pro-innovations bias is that researchers tend to 
focus on policies they believe are “good” and should spread.  This project aims to 
alleviate some of this bias by selecting two markedly different programs.  Although both 
Bolsa Escola and PSF won “innovations” awards,11 as this dissertation will uncover, 
these policies are not perceived as universally “good” or desirable for all jurisdictions.  
Since awards for these programs are based on a single city’s experience, it is entirely 
possible that the same program, when adopted elsewhere, can fail to address the 
                                                 
11 Cities that administer Bolsa Escola and PSF have won good governance awards from the Gestão Publica 
e Cidadania program in São Paulo.   
 14
emulating city’s most pressing problems.  As this study uncovers, some policy makers 
endorsed these policies and believed they “should” spread while others disagreed.     
There are numerous benefits to conducting a large-N event history analysis.  First, 
increasing the number of observations provides greater leverage for causal inference 
(King et al. 1994).  Second, an event history model, which involves annual observations 
for each jurisdiction, addresses the problem of potential interdependence among 
jurisdictions and thus allows for better analyses of internal and external determinants of 
diffusion (Berry and Berry 1990, 1992; Collier and Messick 1975).  Advanced statistical 
methods, such as event history modeling, also allow for a probabilistic interpretation of 
whether cities are likely to adopt innovative social policies. 
In order to understand larger trends across Brazil and map the pattern of Brazilian 
social policy diffusion, I use an event history analysis to statistically test the impact of 
political incentives, ideology and social networks on diffusion for Brazil’s largest cities. 
To conduct such an analysis, I created a database on social policies for all 224 cities that 
had populations over 100,000 in the census year 2000.  This original database draws on 
information related to electoral politics, socio-demographic data, and social network 
connectivity.  It also includes information on the adoption patterns of Bolsa Escola, 
Renda Mínima and Programa Saúde da Família.  Due to limited data access and in order 
to access the spread of Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima, I administered a phone survey of 
education and social welfare administrators for the entire sample.  For a list of cities 
included in the sample, see Appendix A.   
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The focus of this study is to uncover the motivations behind social policy 
emulation decisions in Brazil.  Yet, this task is a complicated one that requires multiple 
approaches.  First-order analysis can start from observable data and implications, such as 
information on electoral competition, politicians’ partisan affiliation, and the presence of 
professional networks in a given community.  With this information we can draw 
inferences and make conclusions.  Also important, however, is how actors themselves 
interpret these programs and explain their own role in the decision-making process.  As 
Taylor notes, in order to assess meaning, we must pay attention to the stories people tell: 
A person’s understanding of her own life, the story she tells (constructs and 
reconstructs) about herself, which itself of course becomes part of her life, 
endows events with meaning, with significance for us. For most of us want to see 
things we have done and events in our lives as having some meaning (2006: 33). 
 
As such, in order to assess whether an actor’s motivations for emulating an innovative 
policy are driven by political self-interest, ideology, or socialized norms, we must ask 
individuals to tell a story.  Their narratives will frame the way they understand the event 
and the meaning it held for them.   
The case study research occurred between 2003 and 2004, when I conducted 
interviews of one hundred twenty Brazilian policymakers involved in health and 
education policymaking at the local level, elected officials, technocrats, community 
activists, and leaders in non-governmental organizations.  I also interviewed a select 
number of policymakers at the federal level, who are in charge of setting the federal 
policy agenda. (For a full list of interviewees, see Appendix B).  During face-to-face 
interviews, respondents discussed their motivations for adopting or advocating for Bolsa 
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Escola/Renda Mínima and Programa Saúde da Família, and reflected on the policy 
process in general. In instances where local governments did not have the programs or 
the programs were dismantled, we discussed why this was so.  I conducted interviews in 
four municipalities in Brazil: Belo Horizonte (in Minas Gerais state), Brasília (in the 
Federal District), Salvador (in Bahia state), and São Paulo (in São Paulo State), and 
captured actors involved with three municipal administrations, from 1994 to 2003.  The 
qualitative evidence allowed me to identify the mechanisms by which diffusion occurred, 
by including thorough process tracing.  
Table 1.1: Adoption of BE/RM and PSF by Local Government and Administration 
 Bolsa Escola/ Renda 
Minima 
Programa Saúde da 
Família 
Brasília (DF)*   
1990-1994 - No 
1994-1998 Yes Yes 
1998-2002 No/Yes** No/Yes** 
Belo Horizonte (MG)   
1992-1996 No No 
1996-2000 Yes No 
2000-2004 Yes Yes 
Salvador (BA)   
1992-1996 Yes No 
1996-2000 No No 
2000-2004 No Yes 
São Paulo  (SP)   
1992-1996 No No 
1996-2000 No No 
2000-2004 Yes Yes 
* The Federal District, Brasília, operates under the gubernatorial electoral calendar. 
** The program was suspended or discontinued and then reintroduced under new names. 
 
Several criteria guided selection of the research sites.  First, the four cities in this 
study adopted Bolsa Escola and PSF at different points in time and in a few instances 
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even experienced policy reversal (see Table 1.1). The variation in program adoption over 
time is important, because there would otherwise be a potential for selection bias (Geddes 
1990, 2003; King et al. 1994: 129-137).  Second, these municipalities were selected to 
allow for variation in partisan politics.  These local governments had mayors who 
affiliated with eight different political parties and represented ideological leanings from 
across the political spectrum, from staunch rightists to leftists; no single party dominates 
and all major political parties are represented (see Table 1.2 below).  Third, the case 
study cities also face different levels of socio-economic development and are 
geographically dispersed.  Fourth, in the context of health policy, these cities had great 
flexibility in determining their basic health models.  Not only did they enjoy fiscal 
autonomy because of their potential to generate revenues through their local tax base, but 
they also had a sophisticated health infrastructure, and had a large number of health 
professionals.  In other words, these municipalities had the administrative flexibility to 
tailor health policy and emulation of PSF was far from automatic or a forgone 
conclusion.  Despite these important differences, these cities share characteristics that 
make comparison possible; all are state capitals and face similar institutional tensions 
between local, state and national-level policymaking.  The only exception is Brasília, 
which has a unique status as the federal district.  
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Table 1.2: Local Government Partisan and Ideological Divide 




Brasília (DF)b    
1990-1994 Joaquim Roriz PTR Right12 
1994-1998 Cristovam Buarque PT Left 
1998-2002 Joaquim Roriz PMDB Center 
Belo Horizonte (MG)    
1992-1996 Patrus Ananias PT Left 
1996-2000 Célio de Castro PSB Left 
2000-2004 Célio de Castro 
Fernando Damata Pimentel (PT)c
PSB Left 
Salvador (BA)    
1992-1996 Lídice da Mata PSDB Center 
1996-2000 Antônio José Imbassahy PFL Right 
2000-2004 Antônio José Imbassahy PFL Right 
São Paulo  (SP)    
1992-1996 Paulo Maluf PDS Right 
1996-2000 Celso Pitta PPB Right 
2000-2004 Marta Suplicy PT Left 
a Mayor’s partisan affiliation at the time he or she ran for office. 
b The Federal District, Brasília, operates under the gubernatorial electoral calendar. 
c Fernando Damata Pimentel (PT) assumed office in November 2001, after Célio de Castro suffered a 
stroke. 
 
In using both large-N statistical analyses and small-N case studies, this project 
bridges two research traditions on diffusion.  Scholars who frame their work along the 
lines of “learning” and “policy transfer” typically focus on micro-processes, actors, and 
employ qualitative methods (see for example Bennett 1991; Rose 1993; 2004).  By 
contrast, those who employ statistical analyses of broader diffusion phenomena typically 
seek the leverage a large number of cases can offer for generalizability of causal analysis 
(see for example Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).  Employing both methods enables 
comparison between this study’s findings and those from existing research.  
                                                 
12 Mainwaring, Meneguello and Power (2000: 180) inform this designation.  The PTR is not classified in 
Coppedge (1996).   
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By drawing on both qualitative and quantitative studies, this work also overcomes 
some of the shortcomings that single-method studies face (see especially Brady et. al. 
2004).  For instance, a correlate to diffusion can include such factors as “economic 
development”.  Yet, this variable alone cannot explain why a jurisdiction’s level of 
development matters in terms of politics, only case analysis can explain the relationship 
for meaningful inference. Statistical methods can also obscure causal heterogeneity in 
emulation decisions, thus limiting understanding of the complex and varied mechanisms 
that lead to policy emulation (Mahoney and Goertz 2006).  Large-N statistical studies can 
contribute to an under-accounting of ‘causal complexity’ by making interpretation of the 
underlying relationship between indicators and concepts difficult (Meseguer and Gilardi 
2005).  Thus, qualitative research can help uncover both the mechanisms that drive 
diffusion and also clarify whether jurisdictions undergo similar causal processes.  Lastly, 
an important analytical advantage to using both methods includes the ability to examine 
the politics of not only policy emulation, but also explore why policy reversals occur.  
Implications 
Decentralization in Brazil has contributed to a new era of social policy reform 
where policy diffusion is increasingly prevalent.  To date however, scholars of Brazilian 
politics have largely ignored diffusion as either an outcome or theoretical framework for 
understanding significant changes in the policymaking process.  Instead, country-specific 
studies of diffusion remain largely relegated to analyses of advanced industrialized 
nations with federal structures, especially the U.S.   For this reason, one of the 
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contributions of this study includes the application of a diffusion approach to understand 
the politics of a developing democratic country.    
Research on Brazil also creates an opportunity to advance the existing literature 
on diffusion, which has generally underspecified the motivational factors that drive 
politicians to emulate innovative policies. This dissertation’s main contribution is that it 
furthers previous understandings of diffusion with a new conceptual framework that 
focuses on individuals’ motivations to replicate policy models developed in other 
settings. Through a mixed-method approach, it is possible to identify how political 
incentives, ideology, and social networks affect the decision-making process. By 
exploring contrasting motivations for political action, this work assesses three theoretical 
approaches that are often examined in isolation from one another. 
SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
 This brief overview of the dissertation serves as a road map for the rest of this 
work, and each of the subsequent chapters will address the questions first introduced 
here. The next chapter will provide a more thorough discussion of public policy making 
and the conventional approaches used to understand policy choices.  While traditional 
approaches, such as policy studies and historical institutionalism, are useful for 
understanding the particularities of policy arenas and the structural constraints for social 
sector reform, I argue that the diffusion lens is the most appropriate for explaining the 
dynamic policy changes taking place in Brazil.  As such, the chapter offers a framework 
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for examining social policy emulation across municipalities, which focuses on actors’ 
motivations to replicate policies designed for other cities.  
Chapter 3 provides a bird’s-eye view of the diffusion of Bolsa Escola/Renda 
Mínima and Programa Saúde da Família, though an analysis of these programs throught 
the country.  The chapter draws primarily on survey data collected for the country’s 
largest cities.  After contextualizing the trends in Bolsa Escola and PSF, it presents an 
event history model, a discrete time logit model to statistically test theoretically driven 
variables related to political incentives, ideology, and social networks.  One of the 
benefits to the event history analysis is that it can facilitate interpretation of time and 
probability of adoption.  
Chapter 4 on Bolsa Escola/Renda Mínima provides an in-depth look at the politics 
of education reform in Brazil.  The chapter situates locally driven innovations to address 
educational access and attainment in the context of stalled efforts for reform through 
much of the late 1980s and 1990s at the national level.  The chapter explains the 
emergence of conditional cash transfer programs for education, such as Bolsa Escola and 
Renda Mínima, and the politics of their spread across the country.  To uncover the 
motivations that that lead to emulation decisions, this chapter draws primarily from the 
in-depth qualitative analysis of policymakers in the four case study sites and uncovers the 
ways in which political incentives, ideology, and professional norms influenced 
policymakers’ adoption decisions.  
The following chapter, on Programa Saúde da Família, discusses the emergence 
of the integrated family health program within the context of the significant 
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reorganization of health policy in the 1990s.  Unlike the education sector, national health 
policy made greater advances in reforming the sector and the federal government 
promoted decentralization with the municipalization of services.  As local governments 
took on greater administrative responsibilities, many political actors implemented the 
PSF policy.  Chapter 5 focuses on actors’ decision-making processes and the extent to 
which they were responding to political, ideological, or socialized norms.  Accounts from 
key actors responsible for health care policy reveal how technocrats’ connections to 
professional associations and the presence of leftist majors drove replication in this policy 
domain.     
Lastly, chapter 6 concludes by comparing and contrasting the diffusion of Bolsa 
Escola and Programa Saúde da Família.  Both the large-N and process tracing methods 
offer a strikingly consistent account for what drives emulation decisions.  Together, they 
also provide insights into key differences between each of the policy arenas, and the 
effects that the particular effects they have on diffusion. In addition to addressing 
contrasts between actors’ interpretations of these policies, the chapter also underscores 
how the breadth and depth of networks and informal associations influences the 
socialization of professional norms.  Finally, it concludes the dissertation by examining 
the ways in which ideology and socialized norms work together to promote policy 
emulation and the implications of these findings for understanding Brazilian 




CHAPTER 2: TOWARDS A THEORY OF SOCIAL POLICY DIFFUSION 
  
Brazil faces the tremendous challenge of addressing long-standing social 
disparities, high levels of poverty, and economic inequality.  Though many scholars have 
increasingly turned their attention to determinants of social sector reform across the 
region (Grindle 2000, 2004; Kaufman & Nelson 2004; Tulchin & Garland 2000), we 
know very little about the politics of education and health reform at the sub-national 
level, where states and municipalities have considerable authority to develop and 
implement social programs (Kaufman & Nelson 2004:464).  Brazilian municipalities in 
particular have been at the forefront of social policy experimentation and innovation, yet 
the factors that drive the spread of social programs across the country remain unknown.  
The case of Brazil is especially compelling because although the federal government has 
set guidelines and directives in a host of social policy arenas, there is considerable 
variation in local governments’ willingness to follow them.  Even more importantly, 
many sub-national governments, state and municipal, have jumped to the forefront in 
developing new programs when national-level policy reforms stall.  Although programs 
have spread across the country over the last twenty years, most research has not tackled 
the spread of social policies across Brazil’s local governments.    
Research on the determinants of public policy has been integral to several 
subfields of political science, including American politics, policy studies, comparative 
politics, and Brazilian studies.  This chapter draws on these scholarly traditions to 
uncover both their contributions and limitations to explaining the spread of social policies 
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across Brazil.  The first section briefly addresses the predominant modes of analysis for 
examining social policy development, including policy studies and historical 
institutionalism.  While these modes offer useful insights on the nature of policymaking 
and the limits of decentralization, both display conceptual weaknesses for a study of 
social policy in Brazil; policy studies tend to obscure the similarities across policy 
domains and institutionalism under emphasizes local jurisdictional autonomy.  For these 
reasons, in the second section I introduce an alternative analytic lens, policy diffusion, to 
understand the replications of social policies.  The last section draws on the existing 
diffusion literature to introduce the theoretical approach of this study.  This dissertation 
employs an actor-oriented framework to uncover the motivations that lead actors to 
initiate social policy changes.  I do this by drawing on three analytically distinct 
approaches for explaining actors’ political behavior: political self-interest, ideology, and 
social networks.  
POLICY OUTCOMES: SECTORAL & INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES  
Questions about what governments do are at the heart of the political science 
discipline; they touch on issues such as the role of the state, the problems for collective 
action, and the politics of competing groups’ claims.  Given the widespread relevance of 
policy outcomes to the discipline, it is not surprising that public policy topics permeate 
numerous sub-fields and that scholarship reflects varied theoretical approaches.  Among 
scholars of American politics, policy studies emerged as its own sub-field in the 1960s 
and 1970s when scholars challenged to address the pressing social problems of the day.  
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As such, much of theory on public policy is based on American politics, its institutions, 
election cycles, and social structure.  These include an emphasis on the strong influence 
of interest groups and elites in the U.S. political system.  Scholars of comparative politics 
have been similarly pressed to explain state-society relations and redistribution; including 
explanations for such phenomena as economic development, the emergence of the 
welfare state, and social and economic reforms.  In doing so, comparativists have also 
tackled policy outcomes, albeit often from different analytic perspectives.  This section 
underscores both the analytic contributions and limitations of policy studies and 
comparative institutionalism for the study of social policy diffusion.  
Scholarship on the politics of public policies and theories of the policy process 
more generally, have tended to emphasize the unique features of each policy issue rather 
than draw similarities to build general theory.  Policy scholars have followed the dictum 
that not all policies are created equal; policy content matters in the politics of policy 
making.  Whether a policy issue is divisive, symbolic, or a response to a crisis can all 
matter in how well it is received (Gray 1973; Sabatier 1999; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 
1993; Stone 1989).  For instance, policies that are purely symbolic, non-controversial, 
and cost little to nothing (e.g. a resolution in support of “children’s day”) can be easy to 
approve and implement.  By contrast, those policies that are contentious (e.g. a plan for 
stricter gun control) or costly (e.g. an increase in healthcare benefits) can draw out bitter 
disputes that gridlock the policy process.    
Lowi’s (1964) seminal classification of public policies combined an analysis of 
policy content with their associated costs to explain why some are easier or harder to 
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pursue.  The heart of his analysis lies in the tensions between long-term policy goals and 
actors’ shorter-term political goals, contributes to his influential typology of public 
policies.  Lowi classifies policies into one of three categories: distributive, regulatory, 
and redistributive.1  Social sector policies, or “welfare state” programs, fall in the 
redistributive category and are most politically contentious because their impacts are 
broad and so clearly distinguish between the “haves and have-nots.”  Redistributive 
policies open the door to interest-group politics and so the logic holds, the extent to 
which goods are spread-out among the public.  Lowi’s framework not only helps 
compare different types of policy, such as regulartory versus distributive, but also 
assumes that in an electroral democracy with strong interest group politics, certain 
polices will be difficult to pursue.   In this logic, the prospect for social policy reform 
would reflect the nature of redistribution and interest group politics.  Many researchers 
have either explicitly or implicitly adopted Lowi’s framework when examining the 
politics of social policy in Latin America and Brazil.  
Although all welfare policies can be broadly classified as redistributive many 
scholars have gone further to disaggregate their study of social policies by focusing on 
particularities of each sector.  Castro and Musgrove (1998), for instance, argue that there 
                                                 
1“Distributive policies are characterized by the ease with which they can be disaggregated and dispensed 
unit by unit, each unit more or less in isolation from other units and from any general rule. ‘Patronage’ in 
the fullest meaning of the word can be taken as a synonym for ‘distributive’…“Regulatory policies are also 
specific and individual in their impact, but they are not capable of the most infinite amounts of 
disaggregation…the impact of regulatory decisions is clearly one of directly raising costs and/or reducing 
or expanding the alternatives of private individuals…regulatory decisions are usually disaggregable only 
down to the sector level”… “Redistributive policies are like regulatory policies in the sense that relations 
among broad categories of private individuals are involved and, hence, individual decisions must be 
interrelated…The categories of impact are [however] much broader, approaching social classes” (Lowi, 
1964 as reprinted in Theodolou and Cahn, Eds. 1995: 15-16). 
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is no “social sector” in Latin America and that comparisons across education and health 
are problematic because of the different constituencies and politics of each sector.  
Similarly, Corrales (1999) draws on a constituency-demand approach to address the 
particular challenges of education reform and notes that other social reforms that have 
broader constituencies are more likely to succeed when compared to the more narrow 
audience for education.  These underlying assumptions are among the reason that a great 
deal of scholarship on social sector reform in the Americas is sector-specific, examining 
issues such as social security, health, and education (primary vs. secondary) in relative 
isolation (Arretche & Marques 2002; Birdsall & Sabot 1996; Corrales 1999; Mesa-Lago 
1997).2  In recent years the growth of practitioner-based knowledge and policy 
evaluations has also contributed to the trend for sector specific inquiry in areas such as 
health policy, education, and social security.3  The result is that much of the 
contemporary policy scholarship on Brazil emphasizes specificity and difference rather 
than identify similarities across policy domains.  
Trends in sector specific approaches to policy studies however, may imbed too 
many assumptions that do not translate well for a study of Brazilian public policy.  First, 
much of Lowi’s framework draws on underlying assumptions about the effects of elites 
and interest groups on policy outcomes, but considerations may be less applicable outside 
of the American context.  Do elites and interest groups behave similarly across all 
country contexts?  Do actors, either individuals or groups, always assert their interests 
                                                 
2 A few notable exceptions include Weyland (1996) and Tendler (1997). 
3 Numerous practitioners and policy scholars conduct specialized policy evaluations, such as Ricardo Paes 
de Barros, Amélia Cohn, Sônia Draibe, Emerson Elias Merhy, and Sônia Rocha, just to name a few. 
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according to their economic position?  Even if we assume that in principle redistributive 
policies will be rarely enacted because they conflict with elite interests, this logic might 
not hold for the Brazilian case.  Historically, during both periods of authoritarianism and 
limited democracy, politicians have relied on populist appeals and policies to garner 
support from the poor and working class.  Starting in the 1930s, the Vargas 
administration passed numerous laws to protect workers while at the same time bringing 
union organizing into line (Fausto 1999: 200-202)4.  During this period, the federal 
government also introduced numerous laws and policies with mass appeal; among them 
was the emergence of a corporatist welfare state that favored urban workers, including 
social security and free and compulsory primary education.  Although broad 
redistribution was not the “goal” of the emerging welfare state in Brazil, in effect, it did 
offer wide protections for the working class that remain until today.5  Given that the most 
notable social programs developed by the Brazilian government have favored the 
working and middle classes over the poor, the implementation of education and health 
programs might not be as divisive as Lowi would predict.  Second, unlike the United 
States where poor and marginalized groups tend to vote less when compared to their 
middle and upper income counterparts, Brazil has mandatory voting6 for all.  Thus in 
                                                 
4 The Vargas’ administration’s main objectives, both during the early 1930 and later under the Estado 
Novo (1937), were to promote industrialization without causing major social upheavals (Fausto 1999: 217).  
Vargas accomplished this by striking a balance, for instance, by legalizing unions but repressing efforts of 
the urban working class to organize outside of the aegis of the state (Fausto 1999: 198-202). 
5 The Brazilian welfare system offers the greatest social protections to the middle and working class.  The 
poor, who tend to work in the informal sector or in rural production, were left out of the social security 
system for decades. 
6 All Brazilians over eighteen years are required to register and appear at the polls on Election Day.  
However, voters need not actually cast a valid ballot; they have the option of nullifying their ballot or 
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theory, elected officials would be more responsive and electorally accountable to Brazil’s 
sizable poor population.7  Populist pro-poor appeals remain an important feature of local 
politics as some elected officials utilize social programs to garner political support for 
their electoral campaign.  A few other politicians openly embrace patronage politics and 
vote-buying approaches through pre-election “giveaways” of land, refrigerators, kitchen 
appliances, and foodstuffs.8  These dimensions of local politics together with the historic 
patterns of social welfare policy making, raise doubts to the applicability of Lowi’s 
assumptions about the politics of redistribution for Brazil.  
Unlike the interest based framework for understanding policy outcomes, 
comparative scholars and Braziliansists have framed their understanding of policy 
outcomes within the context of institutions,9 both formal organizations and informal rules 
and procedures.  “[I]n general, institutionalists are interested in the whole range of state 
and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that 
structure their relations of power to other groups” (Thelen & Steinmo 1992: 2).  
Generally, institutions are not part of the “cause” of different outcomes, but researchers 
                                                                                                                                                 
leaving their ballots “blank”.  Registration and voting is optional for those who are illiterate and between 
sixteen to eighteen years of age (Constitution, II, IV, 14).  Citizens incur a small fine for failing to appear at 
the polls. 
7 In 2005, 30.6 percent of the population feel had family incomes per capita that feel below the poverty line 
(Ipeadata). 
8 Accounts of this type were frequently brought up by political opponents of Governor Joaquim Roriz (DF) 
during interviews in Brasília. 
9 As Thelen and Steinmo acknowledge, the study of institutions has been a longstanding enterprise with 
contributions from such scholars as Karl Polanyi, Thorstein Veblen, Max Weber in fields such as political 
science, economics, and sociology (1992: 3). The distinction is that “new” institutionalism is a response to 
the behavioral revolution in the 1950s and 60s in political science, and draws attention to the “enduring 
socioeconomic and political structures that mold behavior in distinctive ways in different national contexts” 
(1992: 1).  This category does not include the rational choice variant, exemplified by the works of Douglass 
North and Robert Bates. 
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look to them to see how they constrain and shape political outcomes.  In doing so, this 
approach seeks a mid-range analysis that can bridge macro- and micro-level variables.10 
As institutions are normally stable over time, this approach is useful in clarifying the 
differences across countries (e.g. democracy, emergence of welfare states, etc.).  
Historical institutionalist approaches are particularly well-represented in Brazilian 
scholarship as scholars draw on such diverse factors as Brazil’s social structure, historical 
legacies, the country’s political development and various policy outcomes (see for 
example, Abrucio 2002; Affonso & Silva 1996; Arretche 2000; Draibe 1985, 1994; 
Fernandes 2004).  This approach has led scholars to identify the ways that critical 
junctures, such as Getúlio Vargas’ Estado Novo (1930s) or the transition to democracy 
(1970s and 80s), have led the way to explain numerous features of Brazilian politics, 
including decentralization, the limits for social security reform, and the emergence of 
participatory governance practices.  
 The transition to democracy in Brazil created new institutional challenges for 
shared governance in the federal system.  Many scholars have undertaken research that 
explores the successes and failures of decentralization; Marta Arretche’s (2000) work is 
exemplary of this scholarly agenda.  She examines the extent to which decentralization of 
social programs has taken place following the 1988 constitution and focuses on the extent 
to which state and local capacity, such as administrative and fiscal capacity, institutional 
rules, and inter-governmental relations, have shaped decentralization.  Her work draws on 
                                                 
10 Marx, Weber, and Moore are exemplars of the macro-structural approach.  For more recent examples, 
see (Collier & Collier 2002; Skocpol 1979). 
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cases from various sectors, including urban development, primary education, health, and 
social assistance with measures of decentralization based on compliance with federal 
mandates for municipal adoption.  In education, she examines the extent to which state 
and local governments were able to follow with the requirement they “supply” primary 
education and adopt a school lunch program; in the health sector, she examines whether 
municipalities qualified for the Sistema Único de Saúde (Unified Health System) and 
medical services.  Ultimately, she finds that local policymakers11 assess the costs and 
benefits of taking on new responsibilities and only do so when they have the 
administrative and financial capacity.   
Institutionalist approaches to decentralization in Brazil, such as Arretche (2000), 
have certainly provided valuable insights on the politics of reform and policy 
administration.  Nevertheless, there are important differences of viewpoint between those 
works and the present thesis’ research focus.  First, decentralization topics have tended to 
focus on inter-governmental relations, state-level politics, and the extent to which sub-
national governments comply with federal mandates.  While the federal government 
pushed for certain institutional reforms and programs, it is also the case that several 
“bottom-up” initiatives from municipalities competed for attention in the local policy 
arena, and these initiatives were often dismissed as illustrative of decentralization.  
Second, the focus on following “mandates” misses an important feature of 
decentralization being that local governments also have the flexibility to experiment, 
                                                 
11 Arretche examines six states in her work, Rio Grande do Sul, Paraná, São Paulo, Bahia, Pernambuco 
and Ceará. 
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tailor, and occasionally deviate from federal policy.  For instance, in the 1990s several 
local governments pursued alternative healthcare models that diverge from the policy 
approach of the federal government: Niterói (in Rio de Janeiro state) and Londrina in 
(Paraná state) both undertook a Programa Médico de Família (Family Doctor Program) 
imported from Cuba and São Paulo adopted a semi-privatized model called Plano de 
Atendimento à Saúde (PAS).12  Similarly, Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima programs 
were initiated at the local level and began spreading without much attention or support 
from the federal government.  These innovations and their spread are important features 
of Brazil’s new policy making environment. In sum, a focus on intergovernmental 
relationships tends to emphasize the role of the federal government and vertical pressures 
for reform, while potentially under estimating the importance of horizontal processes 
such as learning from peer networks at the municipal level. 
The relationship between federal support for social policy enactment and 
municipal decision making opens up questions that have both empirical and theoretical 
relevance.  On the one hand, the country’s strong tradition of intergovernmental 
cooperation (Samuels 2000) suggests that the spread of these programs may simply 
reflect top-down directives from the federal government.  On the other hand, Brazilian 
fiscal and political federalism allows for municipal policy making independence; thus 
diffusion decisions may reflect “horizontal” peer emulation, rather than “vertical” 
                                                 
12 From 1995-2000, São Paulo designed and implemented the PAS, a semi-privatized system of healthcare 
for its municipal residents. This system was a radical departure from the municipal decentralization plans 
promoted by the federal Ministry of Health. As a result, the city eschewed federal funds and approval.  
Although numerous health policy experts asserted that São Paulo was failing to “decentralize” at that time, 
Paulo Elias argues that the PAS was indeed illustrative of decentralization and municipal control over 
health services (Interview 2003).   
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pressures.  Researchers often privilege either “vertical” or “horizontal” explanations 
when accounting for diffusion (for discussion on vertical versus horizontal diffusion, see 
Elkins & Simmons 2005: 35; Levi-Faur 2005: 25-27; Weyland 2005: 268-271).  In the 
case of Brazilian social policy making, the relationship between federal inducements for 
policy adoption and local policy making is far from clear, particularly for the largest 
cities which can raise revenue and resist federal pressures.  This study does not assume 
that the replication of social policies across Brazilian municipalities is a simple function 
of bottom-up pressures, horizontal or vertical processes.  Rather, this work tests various 
causal mechanisms that consider the possibility that emulation can be a function of all 
three. 
Both policy studies and institutionalist approaches provide a foundation for 
examining the politics of policy making.  Policy studies highlight the ways that a policy’s 
distinct characteristics affect its likelihood of being enacted, while institutionalist 
approaches provide important insights on intergovernmental competition and the costs of 
reform for local governments.  Yet, both these approaches have analytic shortcomings 
that are addressed in this study.  First, this project aims to reach beyond particularistic 
analysis of specific policy domains to uncover underlying similarities despite differences.  
Second, by examining the replication of similar policies across Brazilian municipalities, 
this study highlights the autonomous role of local governments and the potential for 
uncoordinated horizontal learning in policy making.  Policy diffusion accounts for both 
these dimensions, as the following section explains. 
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A TURN TOWARD POLICY DIFFUSION 
Diffusion research dates back to the late 1960s and 1970s, when scholars such as 
Walker (1969) and Collier and Messick (1975) noted that the study of policy trends and 
their adoption needed to address the methodological problem of interdependence.  
Specifically, researchers faced Galton’s problem, “that the findings based on the analysis 
of causal relation within nations (or other units of analysis) may be distorted by the effect 
of diffusion” (Collier and Messick 1975: 1300).  These early scholars posited that 
research on the spread of policies could not simply examine “prerequisite” explanations 
for policy decisions, e.g. levels of economic modernization or human capital, as tended to 
be the case with more policy studies research.  Rather, diffusion required an analysis of 
external variables that could affect internal processes, such as spatial proximity to 
innovative jurisdictions.  In other words, diffusion research needed to account for policy 
adoption across multiple jurisdictions while also controlling for their 
interconnectedness.13  By acknowledging that jurisdictions are not isolated in their 
decision-making processes, these early scholars highlighted the need to incorporate 
analyses of both internal and external pressures for diffusion.  
Although early research by Walker (1969), Grey (1973), and Collier and Messick 
(1975) created significant interest among scholars for diffusion research, this area of 
inquiry lay largely dormant until the 1990s.  Part of the renewed interest in diffusion 
research relates to worldwide political events, including the waves of democratization, 
                                                 
13 For greater elaboration on this issue, see Collier and Messick (1975) and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
(2004). 
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economic liberalization, and pension privatization (Brinks & Coppedge 2006; Madrid 
2003; Simmons & Elkins 2004; Weyland 2004).  Cross-national replication of state 
agencies, such as science ministries and women’s bureaucracies, has been notable 
because their implementation has occurred across a diverse set of countries (Finnemore 
1993; 1996; True and Mintrom 2001).  European integration has led to increasing interest 
in policy transfer and learning across the continent (Bennett 1991; Rose 1993; 2004).  
Recent trends toward devolution in the United States has also led scholars of state politics 
to examine such diverse issues as the diffusion of charter schools, welfare reform, and 
health maintenance organization regulation (Balla 2001; Karch 2007; Mintrom 1997; 
Mintrom & Vergari 1998; Mooney 2001).   
An important contributor to the resurgence of scholarship on diffusion includes 
methodological innovations that allow for better analysis of the internal and external 
pressures for policy diffusion in a large number of cases.  Berry and Berry were among 
the first diffusion scholars to apply event history analysis,14 a discrete time logistic 
regression, which tests both internally and externally driven explanations (1990; 1992).  
Many recent studies of policy diffusion have drawn on this statistical technique to test 
various explanations for diffusion related to internal prerequisites and external influences 
(Brinks & Coppedge 2006; Mooney 2001; True & Mintrom 2001).  Event history models 
can also account for different theoretical explanations for policy diffusion, including the 
relative contributions of structural factors (e.g. intergovernmental relations) as well as 
                                                 
14 Event history analysis is also referred to as “survival analysis” because it allows for assessment of “risk” 
or “failure” that an event will take place over a given period of time. 
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actor-orientated explanations (learning and membership in networks).  Scholars have 
examined such diverse factors as social norms, learning, competition, partisan ideology, 
and geography.  Most importantly, when diffusion research also relies on qualitative 
methods, it allows for a more nuanced analysis of micro-processes that lead to emulation 
decisions. 
Even though scholarship on policy diffusion is well established among scholars of 
transnational politics and U.S. state politics, diffusion research has not been readily 
applied to federal developing countries and is relatively new in the study of Brazilian 
politics.15  Institutional similarities between Brazil and the United States make it possible 
to draw lessons from the extensive literature on diffusion in the fifty states,16 where 
scholars have identified a potpourri of factors that drive policy diffusion (see Rogers 
2003 for a full review). 
 The existing literature offers a valuable starting point for examining potential 
factors that explain diffusion in Brazil.  Yet at the same time, there is a need to address 
two shortcomings of standard diffusion approaches, one conceptual and the other 
methodological.  First, diffusion research has not tackled the question of what motivates 
actors’ adoption decision.  As Rogers notes, the “why” question about adoption is seldom 
addressed by researchers, in part because of the difficulties in gathering information; 
thus, researchers tend to assume motivations are economically driven and over rely on 
                                                 
15 To date, there are no studies of diffusion within Brazil or a developing country. 
16 Both Brazil and the United States share a similar federal structure.  Both countries also share 
presidentialism and the executive control over the bureaucracy.  The most substantial distinction between 
the two countries is that Brazil, unlike the United States, explicitly recognizes the role of municipalities for 
governance and social policy provision in its constitution (1988). 
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models that are rationalistic.  In practice, this often means researchers assume adoption of 
innovation is rational17 whereas those actors who reject innovations are misguided.  Not 
only does this type of classification lead to a pro-innovations bias, but it also fails to 
account for people’s perceptions and their decision-making processes, which can be 
idiosyncratic (Rogers 2003: 115-116).   
While the efficiency bias is certainly pervasive throughout the diffusion literature, 
the question of actors’ perceptions and motivations is still largely unanswered.   
Researchers often incorporate their discipline’s approaches or their field’s dominant 
paradigms and draw on their implicit assumptions about behavior.  Political scientists 
who study diffusion often ground their explanations in notions of rationality,18 electoral 
competition, and economic competition (for example see Berry & Berry 1992; Walker 
1969).  In contrast, sociologists tend to examine learning in terms of the strength of 
relational ties and organizational networks (for example see Berry & Berry 1992; 
DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Granovetter 1973; Walker 1969).  Underlying assumptions 
about political behavior and the mechanisms that facilitate diffusion can be obscured by 
scholars’ embedded assumptions.   
Second, the most recent diffusion research has tended to draw on large-N 
statistical analyses to test for the determinants of policy replication.  The introduction of 
statistical techniques such as event history analysis does have the advantage of capturing 
                                                 
17 Rogers uses rational in relation of efficiency; e.g. “the most effective means to reach a given end” 
(2003:116).   
18 Walker uses rationality in terms of competition but also as bounded rationality where decision-makers 
use cues and short-cuts to make decisions. Rather than seek all the information possible, individuals who 
operate on limited time seek to satisfice.  Ultimately, Walker argues that researchers should aim to predict 
this behavior (1969:889).     
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both internal prerequisites and external pressures for policy diffusion (Berry & Berry 
1992, 1999; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones 2004).  Yet, even when statistical analyses offer 
insights into diffusion, Meseguer and Gilardi note, the reliance on this statistical method 
can contribute to an under-accounting of ‘causal complexity’ and difficulties interpreting 
the relationship between indicators and concepts (2005).  One solution is to elaborate on 
event history models by addressing the causal mechanisms for diffusion through 
qualitative interpretation and process tracing.  Resolution of these methodological 
dilemmas is crucial because the problems associated with causal complexity have 
important implications for theory building and generalization.  For this reason, diffusion 
research should draw on multiple methods, including qualitative analysis of the policy 
process.19  Doing so will not only uncover potential problems of causal heterogeneity but 
also lead to better causal explanation (for a useful discussion on the limits of statistical 
analysis, see Brady 2004).   
TOWARDS A THEORY OF SOCIAL POLICY DIFFUSION 
This dissertation seeks to uncover the motivating factors that lead actors to adopt 
programs designed for other cities.  To do this, it assesses the contributions that three 
broad approaches, which highlight different motivations for political behavior, can make 
to explaining emulation decisions.  Do individuals make decisions based on rational self-
interest calculations?  Or, do they make choices based on their ideological values and 
beliefs, even when faced with the prospect of political costs?  Alternatively, do 
                                                 
19 For a particularly notable example of research that incorporates process tracing and includes discussion 
of the policy process, see Kingdon (1995). 
 39
policymakers act because they are socialized into a community that defines and transmits 
shared norms?  These three questions relate to fundamental issues of whether 
policymakers act in a purely self-regarding way; in a principled way, regardless of self or 
others; or in an other-regarding, community-oriented way.  By framing the motivations 
that drive political action into three distinct categories – individual political self-interest, 
abstract ideology, and legitimation before social networks – I intend to clarify how 
individual behavior drives diffusion.20  
Conventional rational choice approaches suggest that in an electorally competitive 
environment, policymakers are driven by self-interest or political incentives as they seek 
to maintain and increase their political power.  In this view, purely self-regarding21 
instrumental rationality plays a fundamental role in regulating behavior as individuals 
seek to realize their goals (Downs 1957; Riker & Ordeshook 1973: 11).22  Applications of 
these principles have led to models where politicians make choices to maximize political 
support, typically because they desire to win re-election, win a more competitive office in 
the next election, or simply retain their partisan appointments.   
                                                 
20 As Elkins and Simmons note, research on diffusion has taken on numerous definitions each of which 
has distinct underlying assumptions about decision-makers’ behavior. This study employs their definition 
of diffusion, which considers governments as independent in terms of decision making but allows for 
uncoordinated interdependence. This definition allows for the testing of numerous causal mechanisms that 
drive diffusion (2005:25). 
21 Anthony Downs’ (1957) seminal work, which applies economic theory to explain political competition 
and government action, established many of the rationality assumptions which are later adopted by his 
successors.  His model follows the axiom that “every individual, though rational, is also selfish… [t]hus 
whenever we speak of rational behavior, we always mean rational behavior directed primarily toward 
selfish end (1957:27). 
22 Riker and Ordeshook make clear that their notions about rationality play a fundamental role in social 
science, and provide the regularity for generalization (1973:11). 
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Scholars draw clear linkages between the effects of rational calculus and public 
policymaking.  The expectation is that politicians behave strategically and choose 
policies after having assessed the political costs and benefits of various alternatives; 
particular policies are simply means for attaining political power (Carmines & Stimson 
1993; Downs 1957).  In the context of diffusion, Walker (1969) argues that when stiff 
party competition exists, there is an increased propensity for parties to initiate change and 
propose new programs in order to distinguish themselves.  Lowi also argues that new 
programs are more likely to be instituted in the beginning of a new administration (1963).  
Thus, electoral competition and frequent executive turnover contribute to the adoption of 
new policy, including emulation of external policy models.  Berry and Berry have 
extended this understanding of electoral cycles and competition in their diffusion studies, 
embedding assumptions about politicians’ rational calculus in the context of elections and 
politicians’ desire to win reelection despite enacting politically unpopular tax policy 
(1992).  They suggest for instance, that politicians time the enactment of policies based 
on the electoral cycle; politically unpopular policies might be enacted early in order to 
give the electorate time to forget the policy come election time (1992: 719).   Similiarly, 
politicians might enact popular policies just prior to an election in order to pander to the 
voters.  All in all, these scholars assume that politicians make strategic decisions 
regarding policy enactment and replications, with the ultimate goal being winning 
elections. 
Another, altogether different explanation for diffusion is that policymakers are 
driven by their ideology and emulate policies irrespective of political incentives.  
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Douglass North argues that it is important to consider the role of ideology in accounting 
for the allocation of resources because not all individual behavior can be explained 
through neoclassical behavioral assumptions alone (1981:46-47; 1990: Ch. 5).23  In other 
words, actors may make seemingly nonsensical and other-regarding choices that deviate 
from rational choice explanations but that are driven by principled commitments.  In the 
context of electoral politics this could include a politician’s supporting a public policy 
even when confronted with the significant political costs of doing so. 
Ideology, while one of the most centrally important explanations used in the 
social sciences, remains one of the most contested and vilified for its conceptual 
murkiness24.  The term has been used inconsistently among social science scholars, 
broadly falling into two categories: ideology of knowledge (e.g. ideological doctrine) and 
ideology of politics (e.g. ideological mentality) (Sartori 1969: 398).  While operating 
within this second category, North adds to the confusion by locating “ideology” as any 
seemingly “irrational” behavior that conflicts with neoclassical economic behavioral 
expectations.  But this conceptualization is also unclear; ideology is not the same thing as 
irrationality nor is irrationality a “motivation” for action.  As this study seeks to contrast 
distinct research traditions with differing views of what drives individuals’ motivations in 
policymaking, I locate ideology in terms of decisions driven by abstract maxims 
regardless of self or others.  
                                                 
23 North’s assertion is particularly remarkable as he is widely known for his application of neo-classical 
economic principles for a theory of state and institution building; he shares a Nobel Prize with Robert W. 
Fogel for their work in the field, New Economic History.  
24 See especially, Sartori (1969). 
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In this work, ideology is understood as “a pattern of thoughts and beliefs 
explaining each person’s attitude toward life and their existence in society, and 
advocating a conduct and action pattern that is responsive to such thoughts and beliefs” 
(Lowenstein 1953:52 as cited in Gerring 1997:958).25  The key for a study of 
policymaking is that ideology can compel individuals into action by providing both 
exigency and grounds for political activity.  As Mullins argues, one of the key 
components of ideology is its action-orientation in policymaking; political ideology 
provides actors with a “relatively structured and consistent conception of the causal 
forces operating in the social world, it also incorporates evaluation of what is conceived” 
(1972:508).  Thus, not only does ideology structure people’s worldviews, but it also 
shapes one’s interpretation of the consequence of action and non-action. 
Social policies are often value-laden in politics; they require that politicians 
prioritize certain groups or make difficult decisions about the distribution of their costs.  
To uncover the potential effect of ideology for policy emulation, it is necessary to 
understand to what extent political actors are driven by their ideological commitments.   
Ideology likely works in two complementary ways: First, actors must display their own 
values and then assess the extent to which policies like Bolsa Escola and PSF fit their 
worldviews.  There are observable implications for the role that ideology can play in 
emulation decisions.  Since these policies target the needy, enhance equity, and alleviate 
                                                 
25 This definition of ideology is a substantively different from Down’s view, which argues the 
development of ideologies are a means to political power by social classes or groups, rather than a 
representation of actual goals (1957: 96).  Down’s argues that in the American context, ideologies represent 
cues or short-cuts for voters who face uncertainty and information costs. Ultimately, ideologies are 
functional in that they are used by parties to obtain votes. 
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poverty, we might expect that those politicians with strong left-of-center beliefs would be 
more likely to emulate these programs.  Political actors’ own narratives about their 
ideological beliefs and the meaning26 they ascribe to these social policies can confirm the 
extent to which a left-of-center self-identification drove policy emulation.  
Sociological approaches, alternatively, suggest that change occurs as a function of 
social context and relations to others.  The premise is that human behavior is embedded 
in a matrix of organizational and informal relationships that provide fundamental filters 
through which preferences are formed (Kaufman 1999:367-368).  Networks in particular 
can play a crucial role in linking individuals with others, structuring meaning, and 
defining individual perceptions and preferences (Friedkin 1993; Kilduff & Tsai 2003; 
Passy 2003). Professional associational networks in particular, can define the scope of 
legitimate action and structure values for “modern” administrative practices. Thus, 
networks offer cognitive short-cuts and social cues, guiding policymaking (Walker 1969). 
Both formal and informal social networks can play influential roles in 
policymaking. Formal organizations, such as professional associations, link individuals 
with structurally equivalent roles who reside in different organizations but nevertheless 
pressure each other to behave in similar ways (Friedkin 1988:69-70 as cited in Kilduff & 
Tsai 2003:58). Informal networks can also exist among individuals or across 
geographical space as “neighborhood effects,” where social learning and information 
exchange travel spatially (Collier & Messick 1975; Granovetter 1973, 1983; Mooney & 
                                                 
26 Michael Taylor (2006) offers an interesting analysis that contrasts incentives-based rational choice 
explanations for human behavior with a more holistic approach to understanding people’s decisions, that 
emphasizes meaning, feelings of connectivity, and narratives; see especially chapters 2 and 3. 
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Lee 1995; Walker 1969).27  For example, newspapers can have regional circulation or 
neighboring city administrators can periodically meet to discuss common problems. The 
more actors are connected through informal and professional associations, the more likely 
they share similar values, norms, and discourse.  Thus, we could expect that professional 
norms conveyed by social networks would spur policy diffusion.  
A social network approach offers important contrasts to both political incentives 
and ideological frameworks. Social networks and the ways they structure preferences 
need not contribute to “rational” decision-making (DiMaggio & Powell 1983).  
Policymakers may simply desire to “keep up with the Joneses”, even when doing what 
the Joneses do may not be functionally beneficial for them (Weyland 2004).  For 
instance, Finnemore argues that the worldwide diffusion of science bureaucracies 
occurred even though many countries lacked a domestic demand for such institutions and 
had few resources to invest for scientific advances (1993).  In a similar vein, there was 
limited evidence to indicate that Bolsa Escola and PSF were appropriate policies for all 
Brazilian municipalities.  Additionally, social networks need not be comprised of 
individuals who share the same ideological beliefs.  This is particularly true for 
membership in professional associations, where individuals share professional norms but 
may diverge when it comes to their personal ideology.  
As this study brings motivations to the forefront to explain diffusion processes, 
this framework sets aside questions related to federal financing.  In a federal system like 
                                                 
27 Although Keck and Sikkink do not specifically address diffusion, their work on transnational advocacy 
networks offers valuable insights on how cross-border networks that link actors with shared norms, are key 
to explaining policy advocacy on issues such as human rights, women’s rights and the environment (1998). 
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Brazil, it is likely that municipal governments and local actors would find it useful to tap 
into federal fiscal resources to increase their budgets28.  Yet financing alone does not 
constitute a motivation for policy emulation, particularly when the matching grants are 
limited29.  For these reasons, the potential impact of fiscal transfers is treated as a control 
factor.   
 Each of the three approaches to understanding the motivations that drive political 
behavior, in this case, the decisions to emulate programs such as Bolsa Escola and PSF, 
can be tested empirically.  If a political incentives approach explains diffusion, we would 
expect decision-makers to use these policies to gain political power by including them in 
their campaigns for office.  In contrast, if ideology drives decision making, then 
politicians would frame adoption of these programs in terms of their ideological 
commitments and beliefs.  They would stand by their choices even if political self-
interest pointed in a different direction.  Alternatively, actors who are drawn to these 
programs because of learning through professional networks would express their 
decisions in terms of the professional norms and trends in their field.  In doing so, they 
would relate their decision-making to others, participate in the same networks, and seek 
to demonstrate how their policies reflect new conventions.  
                                                 
28 Research from the U.S. context suggests that fiscal transfers or matching funds can be influential in 
spurring local governments to participate in new social programs (Derthick 1970; Mossberger 1999; Rose 
1973; Welch & Thompson 1980). 
29 The ministries of education and health have played an inconsistent role in supporting the spread of 
municipal Bolsa Escola and Programa Saúde da Família.  None of the municipalities in this study benefited 
from federal financing to spur the adoption of municipal Bolsa Escola programs.  Funding for PSF adoption 
has changed over the time period in this study; at first very few municipalities qualified for any incentive 
rants.  
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Local level politics and regional interests have and continue to be an important 
focus for Brazilian politicians.  Historically, differences in geography, settlement, 
immigration, industry, and levels of economic development, have resulted in markedly 
different regional interests.  Since the founding of the First Republic (1889-1930), the 
country’s politics has reflected tensions between divergent local interests and the national 
government, as elites from states such as Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, 
and Minas Gerais all vied for political and economic influence.  Today, states and 
municipalities continue to exert political influence through federalism and as a result state 
and municipal politics continues to remain relevant, both locally and nationally.  More 
importantly, politicians in Brazil do not view local representation as a lesser post or 
stepping stone for more influential office with the federal government.  Rather, 
politicians readily move from municipal, state, and national office and back, as 
opportunities arise.  Mayors of state capitals are particularly influential, thus it is not 
uncommon to see a former senator or governor compete in mayoral elections (Samuels 
2003).  For instance, prior to winning the mayoral election in São Paulo in 2004, José 
Serra served as a Congressional deputy, senator, planning minister, health minister, and 
ran a competitive bid for the Presidency; today he is a leading national figure in politics.  
Unlike many Latin Americans countries where the capital city tends to dominate the 
national political arena (Myers & Dietz 2002)30, municipal-level politics in Brazil offers 
                                                 
30 There are multiple reasons for the dominance of capital cities in the political landscapes of Latin 
American countries.  Among them are simple demographics.  In many Latin American countries, nearly 50 
percent of the population resides in the capital city.  Brazil on the other hand, has many large cities 
throughout the country; at least 31 cities have populations over a half-million in the census year 2000.   
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multiple venues for high-stakes electioneering where local contests matter for politicians’ 
careers.   
Municipal races for executive office tend to be competitive and both candidates 
and incumbents campaign vigorously to win voters’ attention.  Debates, electoral 
advertisements, and direct appeals to voters by candidates via neighborhood visits are 
commonplace features of the campaign season.  When incumbents are ineligible for 
reelections, they nevertheless campaign with vigor beside their hand-picked successor.  
After all, the election of an anointed successor serves as an affirmation for the incumbent 
that she has done a well and provides her with further political capital.   While many 
contests are driven by personalism and candidates’ charisma, candidates do make 
reference to their policy positions.  Because of the socio-demographic realities of the 
country, where 46 percent of the population was classified as poor in 2000,31 candidates 
cannot afford to ignore the lower classes in majoritarian elections with mandatory voting.  
For this reason, politicians from all political parties and ideological persuasion court the 
lower classes.  While some politicians engage in unscrupulous clientelistic methods, such 
as vote-buying or patronage politics,32 most others seek to win votes by promising social 
policies that would benefit the poor.   
Politicians of all parties and ideological stripes make direct appeals to the lower 
classes.  Given that Bolsa Escola and PSF are targeted programs that benefit indigent and 
                                                 
31 See Martins 2005. 
32 The global anti-corruption watchdog organization Transparency International reports that in the March 
2001 elections, 7 percent of survey respondents in Brazil reported they were offered money for votes. 
Interestingly, their studies indicate that vote-buying is not isolated to the poor.  See: 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/corruption_politics/vote_buying 
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poor groups, it is conceivable that all politicians would find the social policy particularly 
useful.  As chapters 3 and 4 explore in greater detail, politicians who were rightists, 
centrists, and leftists all endorsed Bolsa Escola and PSF at some point in time.  For 
instance in the 1998 campaign in Brasília, Joaquim Roriz made a campaign promise to 
keep Cristovam Buarque’s well-known program Bolsa Escola if elected (Interview 
Buarque 2004).  Similarly, in the 2004 campaign season in Salvador, both rightist and 
leftist candidates sought to win voters by mentioning PSF and appealing to program 
beneficiaries.  Since Bolsa Escola and PSF are well-known award winning programs that 
can further the electoral goals of calculating politicians, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
degree of electoral competition can influence the likelihood these programs will be 
adopted.  In highly contested electoral environments, incumbents will feel the need to 
demonstrate to voters that they are doing something to secure their reelection or further 
their subsequent electoral ambitions.  Whereas in cities with low levels of electoral 
competition, incumbents can rest on their laurels and are more likely to retain their 
electoral advantage, regardless of their accomplishments. 
 While the political incentives hypothesis is intuitively appealing, there is reason to 
believe that ideology might matter when it comes to social policymaking in Brazil.  
Actors with firm ideological commitments and beliefs could respond very strongly to 
programs such as Bolsa Escola and Programa Saúde da Família.  In general, leftists have 
favored pro-poor policies that seek to overcome the historic marginalization of large 
segments of the population and guarantee full citizenship.  At the same time however, 
leftists have been wary of many features of neoliberal policy reforms, which tend to 
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emphasize features such as limited state intervention and targeting, rather than broad and 
universal programs with full social protection.  Actors to the right-of-center tend to favor 
neoliberal reforms, the retraction of the state, and pro-business policies.  In many 
respects, Bolsa Escola and PSF represent both a pro-poor and pro-citizenship approach to 
social policy while at the same time encompassing features of targeted neoliberal social 
policy.  The degree to which actors are driven by their ideological commitments and how 
they interpret these programs could very much influence emulation decisions. 
 Lastly, the social network approach also holds plausibility for understanding the 
Brazilian political scenario.  Since the abertura33 (political opening) various social 
movements, – e.g. women’s, student, public health, and labor – have all pushed for 
democratization and a constitution that would enshrine social rights in addition to basic 
political rights (Alves 1985; Alvarez 1990; Diamond 1999).  As Alvarez et al. note, the 
movements from the 1970s and 1980s have undergone a significant transformation, 
responding not only to the new political scenario under democracy but also the realities 
of globalization and the shrinking state under neoliberalism; the result has been a 
growing predominance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the ‘NGOization’ 
of movements (Alvarez et al. 1998).   Today Brazil has an abundance of associations and 
NGOs that engage in policy debates and “watch-dog” activities.34  They include now well 
established professional organizations that promote advances in education, health, and 
                                                 
33 The abertura period consisted of a slow, gradual, and insecure political liberatization begun by the 
Geisel administration in 1974.  The slow transition from military rule to democracy took over fifteen years 
to complete. 
34 The Ministry of Justice reports there are 455 organizations classified as public interest organizations in 
Brazil (Ministry of Justice Website, Downloaded February 18, 2007). 
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anti-poverty efforts.  Given the robust civil society activity throughout Brazil, we might 
expect that formal and informal organizations could be instrumental to the promotion of 
programs such as Bolsa Escola and Programa Saúde da Família. 
 The following chapters will empirically test the three competing motivational 
approaches for understanding emulation decisions.  Chapter 3 does so by taking a bird’s-
eye view of policy diffusion for Brazil’s largest cities and statistically tests the three 
motivational approaches in this study.  Chapter 4 contextualizes Bolsa Escola and Renda 
Minima policies in terms of stalled education reforms in Brazil and provides an in-depth 
analysis of how these programs were debated and interpreted by local policymakers.  
Process tracing of policymaking in four cities over the course of three different 
administrations allows for the uncovering of the mechanisms that led to emulation 
decisions.  Chapter 5 follows by framing Programa Saúde da Família within the context 
of health policy reform and decentralization in the 1990s.   It uncovers how various local 
actors involved with health policy interpreted the family health program and the factors 
that drove their replication decisions.  
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CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL POLICY DIFFUSION IN BRAZIL’S LARGEST 
MUNICIPALITIES 
 
 In the 1990s both Bolsa Escola and PSF captured the attention of policymakers 
and spread throughout the country, despite differences in scope, purpose, and unique 
challenges related to their policy venue.  One of the surprising features of Bolsa Escola 
diffusion is that cities were so quick to emulate the program.  Both Brasília and Campinas 
implemented the policy in 1995 and within two years approximately 88 cities had already 
adopted the program (Araújo & de Souza 1998).  Other cities enacted the program after 
the federal government introduced a short-lived matching grant to promote the policy’s 
expansion.1  By 2001, over 200 municipalities and seven states had adopted Bolsa Escola 
(Villatoro 2004).  On the one hand, the adoption of Bolsa Escola by municipal 
governments is notable because most cities financed the program directly out of their 
budgets, reflecting a policy commitment to prioritize the program.  On the other hand, 
given that the program had received so many accolades, both nationally and 
internationally, it is curious why so few governments among Brazil’s 5,500 
municipalities had in fact adopted it.  
The diffusion pattern for Programa Saúde da Família differed considerably from 
that of conditional-cash transfer programs.  At first, PSF operated on a small scale, with 
only a few small municipalities adopting the program.  Most of the early adopters were 
poor, rural, and concentrated in the northeast of the country.  By the late 1990s PSF 
                                                 
1 However, only cities with below their states’ average income per capita were eligible (L. Lavinas & M. 
L. d. O. Barbosa 2000). 
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gained broader credibility and visibility, both within and outside of the Health Ministry, 
spreading from 55 municipalities in the first year to 4,944 by 2003.  (See Appendix C for 
state-based information on the scope of PSF coverage, by state and population as well as 
aggregate date on PSF adoption across the country’s municipalities).   
This chapter first provides an overview of municipal Bolsa Escola and Programa 
Saúde da Família diffusion.  After tracing the diffusion patterns, this chapter also 
explains some broad tendencies among those cities that chose to adopt each of the two 
programs.  The heart of the chapter integrates that framework and tests the theoretical 
motivations for policy emulation – political incentives, ideology, and social networks – 
for Brazil’s largest municipalities, using an event history analysis.  After elaborating on 
the hypotheses and their measures, the third section presents the model results and 
interpretation of the findings.   
TRACING THE DIFFUSION OF BOLSA ESCOLA AND PSF 
Surprisingly, even though Bolsa Escola and PSF are well-known programs that 
have garnered national and international attention, there is very little systematic data on 
when and where these programs first spread.  The lack of data is due in part to the 
organic nature of their diffusion; early-on these programs traveled without coordinated 
stimulus or tracking by the national government’s ministries.  Since municipal Bolsa 
Escola programs were enacted independently from the Ministry of Education, there was 
never any systematic data collection effort to track their spread.  Although the federal 
research agency IPEA conducted a series of evaluations of these policies, these rarely 
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examined diffusion and conducted only selected case studies (Lavinas & Barbosa 2000; 
Lobato & Urani 1998).  In the case of PSF, during its earliest phase (1994-1997), the 
program was a small project tracked by a few federal civil servants and the Ministry only 
collected aggregated data by state.2  It would take four years for the Ministry of Health to 
systematically collect information on municipal adoption of PSF.   
Given the limited information on diffusion that is available on Bolsa Escola and 
Renda Mínima, this study draws on original data collection.  To map the pattern of 
diffusion, I conducted a phone survey of all the 224 cities with populations over 100,000 
in the census year 2000.  Researchers telephoned municipal civil servants in departments 
of education and public assistance to inquire whether their cities had a municipal 
education stipend program.3  If interviewees answered in the affirmative, they were asked 
what year the program was enacted, how it was administered (i.e. which agency was 
responsible for the program), and to describe the program more generally (see Appendix 
D for interview questionnaire). Ascertaining a policy’s start date is one of the most 
difficult methodological challenges for diffusion research, because researchers must often 
ask respondents to reflect back in time to identify the date of adoption; recall data is a 
characteristic weakness of diffusion research (Rogers 2003: 126).  To minimize this 
problem, interviewers prompted respondents to consider if there was any legislation or 
                                                 
2 State-based record keeping on municipal adoption of PSF from 1994-1997 is uneven; despite concerted 
efforts to retrieve information on the earliest adopters it has been impossible to obtain this information.  In 
cooperation with this study, staff members from CONASEMS initiated a state-based inquiry to retrieve this 
historic data.  Unfortunately, many states had not maintained records from that time period or had never 
systematically tracked the municipal adoption of PSF. 
3 Research Assistants, Francisco Marques, Ana Paula Karruz and Evelyn Chaves carried out phone 
interviews between November 2003 and October 2004.  In some instances, these researchers made repeated 
calls to reach those civil servants responsible for educational social programs. 
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administrative decree that would provide a clear timeline for the program’s start.  Even 
though many cities had programs with different names, if respondents reported their 
cities administered programs that shared a similar design and programmatic goals (e.g. 
cash transfers with educational conditionality) then those cities were classified as having 
Bolsa Escola.  Respondents’ answers were also cross-checked with other published 
records and municipal documents, when available.  
The response rate for the phone survey was high, with a total of 93.3 percent of 
cities participating in the phone interviews.  Most respondents were willing to discuss 
their municipality’s programs and services.  However, of the total 244 cities in the 
sample, 15 had officials who either refused to answer questions or were otherwise non-
cooperative.  While it is difficult to explain non-responses, it is also the case that despite 
nearly twenty years of democracy in Brazil, many local governments are still wary of 
providing public information.4  Those non-participating cities were dropped as “missing 
cases.”5  In total, 48 cities (22.9 percent) reported having a program similar to Bolsa 
Escola by 2003; Figure 3.1 shows the overall diffusion pattern of Bolsa Escola programs 
for the sample in this study. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Non-cooperation included instances where respondents explained they needed a supervisor’s permission 
to provide information.  Some administrators asserted they needed formal requests for information. When 
interviewers sent formal letters of inquiry with follow-up phone calls, staff still declined to provide 
information. 
5 Cities dropped as missing cases in Model 1 included: Fortaleza (CE), Abaetetuba (PA), Olinda (PE), 
Vitória de Santo Antão (PE), Parnaíba (PI), Magé (RJ), Nilópolis (RJ), Rio de Janeiro (RJ), Viamão (RS), 
Diadema (SP), Embu (SP), Franca (SP), Itaquaquecetuba (SP), Itu (SP), São Caetano (SP). 
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative Adoption of Bolsa Escola in the Sample 
 
A significant portion of the PSF data used in this study draws on information 
made available by the Ministry of Health, Department of Basic Health Services 
(Departamento de Atenção Básica).  Where possible, data on the early years of the 
program for the 224 municipalities in this study were cross-checked with secondary 
sources or deduced based on other state-wide information.6 Otherwise, the decision-rule 
was to code all cities with missing data between 1994 and 1997 as non-adopters.  This 
rule produces data that corresponds with general information about the program’s 
beginnings.  Since the program first spread to small rural municipalities in the northeast 
(Sousa 2002; Viana and dal Poz 1998), it is reasonable that very few of the cities in the 
                                                 
6 For instance, aggregate state data provided from the Ministry of Health for 1994-1998 confirmed that 
several municipalities in the study had not adopted PSF during that time period.  A few other State Health 
Departments, including Goiás and Ceará made their municipal-level data available for this study.  In 


















sample would have adopted PSF from 1994-1997.  The imputed values for PSF also yield 
an overall trend that is similar to the aggregate national data provided by the Ministry of 
Health (see Appendix C, Figure C.1).  By 2003, 89 percent of all the cities in this sample 
had adopted PSF and most of those cities which had not adopted the program were in the 
Southern region of the country.  Figure 3.2 shows the resulting diffusion trend for PSF in 
this sample. 
Figure 3.2: Cumulative Adoption of Programa Saúde da Família in the Sample 
 
Scholars of diffusion note that adoption over time typically follows an S-shaped 
curve, while a frequency distribution of the number of mean adopters per year approaches 
a bell-shaped normal distribution (Rogers 2003: 273). The S-shaped distribution rises 
slowly at first, as the first few “innovative” or risk-taking cities adopt the program; the 

















program, after which the slope decreases (Rogers 2003: 272). Figures 3.1 and 3.2 visually 
demonstrate the cumulative adoption rates of Bolsa Escola and PSF, and show some 
important differences between these programs’ trajectories. Programa Saúde da Família 
represents the classic S-shaped distribution.  While the Bolsa Escola pattern mirrors some 
of the overall S-shaped distribution, the program adoption still constituted a relatively 
rare event by 2003 and had yet to “take-off” and spread to half of the sample.  In 
comparing two programs that spread at different rates, we can determine whether these 
programs nevertheless share similar underlying explanations for their diffusion.   
The selection of Brazil’s 224 largest cities for the large-N analysis in this 
dissertation is not intended to be representative of all municipalities, but is instead based 
on several factors.  First, Brazilian municipalities vary significantly in size, from the 
smallest town with 795 residents to the largest mega-city São Paulo with over 10.4 
million people (IBGE).  In order to ensure some comparability between cities, this study 
includes all cities with similar population parameters (i.e. medium to large) in the census 
year 2000.  Second, although these cities represent a small fraction of all cities, they 
encompass over 51 percent of the total population and are distributed across all of the 26 
states and the Federal District. Thus, although the number of cities is small in comparison 
to all municipalities, it does allow for an analysis that affects more than half of the total 
population. Third, given the significant barriers in relation to data access and the data-
intensive requirements of event history modeling, feasibility precluded the inclusion of 
all cities. Since data collection included phone surveys of municipal administrators, it 
was infeasible to collect data for a larger number of cities. 
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UNDERSTANDING POLICY DIFFUSION: TENDENCIES AMONG MUNICIPALITIES  
 Having uncovered the patterns of Bolsa Escola and PSF diffusion, we can now 
ask the question: what are the main characteristics of those cities that adopted these 
policies?  And more importantly, how might electoral incentives, mayors’ ideological 
convictions, social networks, and other control factors influence policy emulation?  This 
section explains how each of the theoretical variables of interest is measured and 
provides a snapshot of each factor’s relationship to the dependent variables.  To 
accomplish this, I draw on annual observations for the year 1998 to examine simple 
cross-sectional relationships.7  The dataset for each policy issue has a different sample 
size; Bolsa Escola (n=208) and PSF (n=2238).  Thus, the following analysis differentiates 
between tendencies for Bolsa Escola and PSF.   
Political Incentives 
To uncover the potential relationship between political interests and policy 
emulation, I measure each city’s degree of electoral competitiveness, drawn from election 
results for the 224 cities in this study from 1992,9 1996, and 2000. Data for this variable 
came from the federal election bureau (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral), the 27 state election 
                                                 
7 The entire database includes annual observations for each city, from each policy’s start-year to 2003.  For 
the purposes of this analysis all cities are included in the sample (i.e. cities that previously adopted the 
program are not dropped from the dataset).  I select 1998 as it is the first year of the second administrative 
period in this study.  
8 The sample size is 223 because the municipality Timon (MA) was not incorporated in 1998.  Timon is 
included in the analysis for later years. 
9 Data for the 1992 municipal elections are very difficult to obtain. The federal government had not 
imposed guidelines for how states should collect and distribute election data. Some states, such as Minas 
Gerais, collected systematic and detailed information on election results, while other states did not. In 
subsequent elections voting was electronic, facilitating the distribution of election data. 
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bureaus (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral), the database Voto a Voto from the Fundação 
Perseu Abramo, and archival records from newspaper articles. The mayoral contests are 
classified into three categories: highly competitive, competitive, or non-competitive. 
Highly competitive races are those where the winning candidate wins with less than 45 
percent of the vote, in competitive elections the winning candidate garners between 45 to 
55 percent of the vote, and in a non-competitive race the winner garners more than 56 
percent of all votes.10  For the event history models, which require annual observations, 
the competition values for these cities were repeated until the next election cycle.  
 
Table 3.1 Electoral Competition & Bolsa Escola Adoption (1998) 
  BE Non-Adoption BE Adoption Total in Sample 
  Frequency % Frequency %  Frequency  % 
High Competition 83 83% 17 17% 100 48% 
Medium 
Competition 60 89.6% 7 10.4% 67 32.2% 
Low Competition 34 85.0% 6 15.0% 40 19.2% 
Competition 
Unknown 1 100% 0 0% 1 0.5% 
 
 
 Within the Bolsa Escola dataset, we see that nearly half the cities had highly 
competitive elections.  In fact, about 80 percent of cities had medium to high levels of 
competition, suggesting that among Brazil’s largest cities, meaningful electoral 
competition is a characteristic of local politics.  Interestingly, there are differences in 
                                                 
10 Brazilian election law requires that mayors win 50%+1 of the valid votes when cities have more than 
200,000 electors.  A few cities in this sample held second round elections for mayor. However, for even 
comparison across the cases, this measure only examined first round results. 
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Bolsa Escola adoption decisions based on cities’ competitiveness, although the trends are 
non-linear.  Cities with highly competitive elections were most likely to adopt the policy 
(17 percent), followed by cities with low levels of competition (15 percent).  
Table 3.2 Electoral Competition & PSF Adoption (1998) 
  PSF Non-Adoption PSF Adoption Total in Sample 
  Frequency % Frequency %  Frequency % 
High Competition 56 53.8% 48 46.2% 104 46.4% 
Medium 
Competition 38 50.7% 37 49.3% 75 33.5% 
Low Competition 27 62.8% 16 37.2% 43 19.2% 
Competition 
Unknown 0 0.0% 1 100.0% 1 0.4% 
 
 Like Bolsa Escola, the cities in the PSF dataset also demonstrate a variation in 
electoral competition.  Nearly half of the cities have highly competitive elections and a 
solid third fall in the medium competition category.  However, unlike Bolsa Escola, 
adoption of PSF happens most often among cities that have moderate levels of 
competition; nearly half in this category adopt the health program.  Although fewer cities 
held low competition elections, this subset emulated PSF the least (19 percent).  
Ideology 
Most Brazilian political parties fall along a left-right ideological spectrum 
(Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring et. al 2000). Following Mainwaring’s typology of 
partisan ideology (1999: xvii-xix), I group each city’s mayor into one of three mayor 
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categories: Left, Center and Right.11 Classifications are based on the candidates’ partisan 
affiliation at the time she or he filed with their local elections bureau.12  A very small 
fourth category, “Non-Aligned” captures new parties or small regional parties for which 
there is little information. 
Table 3.3 Ideology & Bolsa Escola Adoption (1998) 
  BE Non-Adoption BE Adoption Total in Sample 
  Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Leftist Mayor 42 82.4% 9 17.6% 51 24.50% 
Centrist Mayor 63 79.7% 16 20.3% 79 38.00% 
Rightist Mayor 70 93.3% 5 6.7% 75 36.10% 
Mayoral Ideology 
Unknown 3 100% 0 0% 3 1.40% 
The Bolsa Escola dataset for 1998 shows that on aggregate, these cities are 
governed by executives that represent various ideological perspectives.  No single 
ideological perspective dominates the sample.  Most cities’ mayors are centrists, followed 
closely by rightists.  Nearly a quarter of these cities have mayors from parties that fall on 
the left of the political spectrum.   One of the interesting features of Bolsa Escola 
adoption is that a greater percentage of centrist mayors adopted the program, compared to 
leftists.  Rightist rarely adopted the education cash transfer program.  
 
                                                 
11 Left Parties:  PT, PC do B, PSB, PPS, PDT, PMN and PV; Center Parties: PSDB, PMDB, PTB; Right 
Parties: PFL, PL, PDS/PPR/PPB, PRONA, PSC, PSL and PSD. The relatively new party, PV is included in 
the left category as its members are often former party members of other left parties. 
12 Party switching is relatively common in Brazil; although, mayors from well established and 
institutionalized parties (e.g. PT, PSDB, PFL, etc.) typically retain their partisan affiliations through the 
course of their term.   
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Table 3.4 Ideology & PSF Adoption (1998) 
  PSF Non-Adoption PSF Adoption Total in Sample 
  Frequency % Frequency %  Frequency  % 
Leftist Mayor 27 48.2% 29 51.8% 56 25.0% 
Centrist Mayor 37 45.1% 45 54.9% 82 36.6% 
Rightist Mayor 55 67.1% 27 32.9% 82 36.6% 
Mayoral Ideology 
Unknown 2 66.6% 1 33.3% 3 1.3% 
 
 
 The dataset for PSF, which includes a few more cities, provides a similar 
distribution along mayoral ideology: there is an equal number of centrists and rightists, 
while leftists constitute a quarter of the sample.  There are notable differences between 
leftists, centrists, and their right-of-center counterparts when it comes to PSF adoption.  
Only a third of rightists adopt the family health program, whereas over fifty percent of 
centrists and leftists adopt it.  In other words, centrists and leftists adopt PSF at similar 
rates.   
Social Networks 
Social networks for policymaking generally reflect the unique specialities of the 
professionals who work in that policy arena.  Thus, to understand the relationship 
between professional networks and policy diffusion, this study draws on data from two 
different organizations.  
In the case of Bolsa Escola, the Programa Gestão Pública e Cidadania (Public 
Management and Citizenship Program) was cited by practitioners as an influential source 
of information and convener for professionals.  The program conducts multiple activities, 
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including an annual competition on innovative public policy.  Applicants for the award 
receive information from the Gestão Pública e Cidadania program, and a select number 
later participate in the organization’s meetings and conferences.  The program also 
generates annual data on the cities that apply for an innovation award, dating back to 
1996. Interestingly, the number of applications from cities does vary by administration, 
so the annual data allows for a nuanced analysis of network connectivity.  
When it comes to primary healthcare, health professionals often cited in 
interviews that the Centro Brasileiro de Estudos de Saúde (CEBES) was an important 
professional association. This organization, which publishes the well-known journal 
Saúde em Debate, was founded by militants in the movimento sanitário (public health 
movement).  Most members are professionals engaged in public health and work for 
local, state, or federal governments. CEBES staff members provided membership data by 
municipality. Since membership and subscriptions to the journal have remained constant 
over the years, data for 2003 was used for all annual observations. Both the network 
variables were coded dichotomously, “1” for cities where at least one person was linked 
to the network/a city applied for an award, and “0” for cities where no one had any 
formal participation/had not applied for an award.13  
Given Brazil’s continental size, geographic effects can also influence diffusion 
processes as actors learn through informal social networks.  To examine the potential 
relationship between region and adoption, I classify all cities according to the Brazilian 
                                                 
13 In tracking Gestão Pública Award applications, I did not include those cities that had only applied for an 
award for a Bolsa Escola/Renda Mínima program, so as to avoid the problem of autocorrelation. 
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government’s geographic categories: North, Northeast, Southeast, South and Central 
West.14  
Table 3.5 The Gestão Pública Network & Bolsa Escola Adoption (1998) 
  BE Non-Adoption BE Adoption Total in Sample 
  Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Formal Networks             
Gestão Pública 
Network  45 66.2% 23 33.8% 68 33% 
No Gestão Pública 
Network 133 95.0% 7 5% 140 67% 
 
The Gestão Pública network permeated over a third (32.6%) of all municipalities 
in the study.  Cities that were connected to this network adopted the program much more 
often than their non-networked counterparts; only 5 percent of those cities chose to adopt 
Bolsa Escola. 
Table 3.6 Region & Bolsa Escola Adoption (1998) 
  BE Non-Adoption BE Adoption Total in Sample 
  Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Informal Networks             
South 34 89.5% 4 10.5% 38 18.3% 
Southeast 86 82.7% 18 17.3% 104 50.0% 
Central West 10 83.3% 2 16.7% 12 5.8% 
Northeast 36 87.8% 5 12.2% 41 19.7% 
North 12 92.3% 1 7.7% 13 6.3% 
 
                                                 
14 Central West: Goiás, Mato Grosso do Sul, Mato Grosso, and Distrito Federal (Brasília); North: Acre, 
Amapá, Amazonas, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima, and Tocantins; Northeast: Alagoas, Bahia, Ceará, Maranhão, 
Paraíba, Piaui, Rio Grande do Norte, Sergipe; Southeast: Espirito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and 
São Paulo; South: Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, and Santa Catarina. 
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Given the selection criteria for cities in this study, it is understandable that the 
distribution of cases is uneven across the five regions in the country.  It is the differential 
rate of adoption within each region that is most striking. Bolsa Escola adoption is rarest 
among large cities in the north.  In contrast, neighboring regions – the southeast and 
central west – display higher rates of adoption.  Not surprisingly, the cities to first adopt 
conditional cash-transfer programs were located in these regions.    
Table 3.7 Summary of Dichotomous Variables in Bolsa Escola Dataset (1998) 
  PSF Non-Adoption PSF Adoption Total in Sample 
  Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Formal Networks             
CEBES Network  78 50.6% 76 49.4% 154 69.1% 
No CEBES 
Network 43 62.3% 26 37.7% 69 30.9% 
 
 Unlike the professional network associated with Bolsa Escola, which represents a 
small share of the overall sample, the presence of CEBES is much more pronounced 
across Brazilian cities; nearly seventy percent of cities have some connection to the 
health network.  While cities with a linkage to CEBES evenly split between PSF adopters 
and non-adopters, it is notable that the rates of adoption differ between cities with and 
without a CEBES link.  In other words, municipalities without a CEBES connection 




Table 3.8 Summary of Dichotomous Variables in PSF Dataset (1998) 
  PSF Non-Adoption PSF Adoption Total in Sample 
  Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Informal Networks             
South 26 66.7% 13 33.3% 39 17.5% 
Southeast 69 61.1% 44 38.9% 113 50.7% 
Central West 7 58.3% 5 41.7% 12 5.4% 
Northeast 16 35.6% 29 64.4% 45 20.2% 
North 3 21.4% 11 78.6% 14 6.3% 
 
 Given that the family health program originated in the northeast, we would expect 
that municipalities within this region would adopt the policy at greater rates than their 
counterparts.  Almost two thirds of the municipalities in the northeast do emulate PSF; 
however it is the northern region which actually takes the lead with 78.6 percent adopting 
the policy.  A striking characteristic of PSF adoption by region is the clear geographic 
pattern that emerges; municipalities in regions furthest from the north have the lowest 
adoption rates.  Thus, the south lags farthest behind the north, with only a third adopting 
PSF.  
 Overall, these descriptive statistics provide a snapshot of Bolsa Escola and PSF 
adoption among Brazil’s largest cities.  Cross-sectional analysis of the theoretical 
variables of interest – political incentives, ideology, and social networks – reveals some 
broad tendencies.  However, logistic regression analysis is necessary to test the relative 
impact of each variable on policy adoption.  The next section details the model which 
tests three competing explanations for diffusion, while also accounting for the timing of 
adoption decisions.  
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AN EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS 
This study of policy diffusion tackles several interrelated questions.  First, what 
motivates policymakers to emulate programs like Bolsa Escola and Programa Saúde da 
Família?  Second, why did some cities quickly emulate the program while others lagged 
farther behind?  One of the important features to policy diffusion is timing.  This chapter 
examines both sets of questions by drawing on event history analysis to test the three 
competing approaches that uncover actors’ motivations for policy adoption.15   
Event history analysis is a standard statistical method used by diffusion scholars 
to parse out both internal and external determinants of policy adoption decisions.16  The 
model, which is similar to a discrete time logistic model that includes time controls, 
allows for probabilistic interpretation of “risk” or “hazards” of an event occurring.  In this 
study, each logistic model will capture the likelihood that a city will adopt Bolsa 
Escola/Renda Mínima and PSF, in any given year; Model 1 captures Bolsa Escola and 
Renda Mínima, while Model 2 analyzes the adoption of PSF. The resulting analysis will 
reveal the extent to which the independent variables – political incentives, ideology and 
social networks – increase the probability for diffusion.  To portray the time dimension of 
Bolsa Escola diffusion, this model includes annual observations for the period 1995-
2003, which corresponds to the year Bolsa Escola/Renda Minima programs were first 
introduced and the last year for which data is available. Similarly, the family health 
                                                 
15 I use a logistic model with time controls. 
16 For further details on event history methodology for the social sciences, see Allison 1984; Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones 1997, 2004. 
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program started in 1994, thus the dataset for Model 2 includes the period from 1994-
2003.  
Model Specification & Hypotheses 
The logit equation for each model produces a log-odds of an event occurring. The 
model specifications follow below: 
3.1a Model 1: Zb = ln (Pi/1-Pi) = α1 + ß1(highly competitive)I + ß 2(competitive)i  +  
ß 3(leftist mayors)i + ß 4(centrist mayors)i + ß 5(Gestão Pública network)i + 
ß 6(Lagged neighborhood effect)I + ß 7(south)i + ß 8(southeast)i + 
ß 9(central west)i+ ß 10(northeast)i + ß 11(medium pop. city)i + ß 12(large 
pop. city)i + ß 13(t1)i+…. ß 20(t8). 
 
3.2a Model 2: Zp = ln (Pi/1-Pi) = α 1 + ß1(highly competitive)i + ß 2(competitive)i +  
ß 3(leftist mayors)i + ß 4(centrist mayors)i+ ß 5(CEBES network)i +  
ß 6(Lagged neighborhood effect)i + ß 7(south)i + ß 8(southeast)i +  
ß 9(central west)i+ ß 10(northeast)i + ß 11(medium pop. city)i + ß 12(large 
pop. city)i  +  ß 13(t1)i+…. ß 21(t9). 
Dependent Variables  
  To measure the effects of political incentives, ideology, and socialized norms on 
social policy diffusion, I collected data on the adoption of Bolsa Escola/Renda Mínima 
and Programa Saúde da Família for Brazil’s largest cities.  In both cases, the dataset 
requirements included determining which cities had these programs and in what year they 
were replicated.  The dependent variables are coded dichotomously (“0” for cities 
without the program in a given year and “1” for cities that had adopted the program). 
Once the event occurs (i.e. the program emulation takes place), observations for that city 
are dropped from the dataset. 
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Independent Variables 
The two models test proxies for the three competing explanations of the diffusion 
of social programs in Brazil’s largest municipalities.  
Political Incentives 
The first school of thought to explain the underlying motivations for political 
behavior posits that individuals regularly respond to political self-interest. Walker argues, 
for instance, that the more electorally competitive the jurisdiction, the more likely policy 
replication will occur as actors compete for votes (Walker 1969). With this logic, we 
would expect that cities with competitive mayoral races would be more likely to adopt 
Bolsa Escola and PSF than those facing less contested races. 
Hypothesis 1: The stiffer the jurisdiction’s electoral competition, the more likely 
policy emulation will occur. 
Ideology 
 The second theoretical approach these models will test is whether policymakers’ 
ideological convictions influence the likelihood of program emulation.  As Mullins 
argues, ideology can influence political actors in actionable ways, as it filters their 
information, shapes their worldview, and guides their evaluation of particular policies 
(1972). In this vein, politicians with dissimilar ideological convictions would respond 
differently to particular policies. Both Bolsa Escola and PSF are programs that have 
equity-enhancing goals and aim to extend social services to marginalized and poor 
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population groups. Thus, we would expect that left-leaning progressive actors would be 
more willing than others, either on the right or center, to adopt these programs. 
Hypothesis 2: When cities have left-of-center mayors, they will be more likely to 
replicate Bolsa Escola and PSF. 
Social Networks 
 A third alternative explanation is that political actors are motivated to emulate 
programs for diffusion when they are socialized to do so through their professional 
associations (Balla 2001). Connections between individual policymakers and social 
networks could spur program diffusion for a number of reasons, including professional 
socialization, peer pressures, legitimacy considerations, or information exchange. The 
exact motivational relationship between individuals and their professional associations 
can be difficult to discern without qualitative evidence, however, statistically we would 
expect to see that those individuals with connections to networks would be more likely to 
emulate Bolsa Escola or PSF. Since these policies relate to specific arenas (e.g. health, 
education/poverty alleviation) we would expect that professionals in each sector would 
turn to distinct associations.  
Hypothesis 3a: When actors in these cities have linkages to the Gestão Pública e 
Cidadania network, the likelihood that Bolsa Escola will be adopted increases. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: When actors in these cities have linkages to the CEBES network, 
the likelihood that PSF will be adopted increases. 
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 In addition to the formal membership in professional associations, several 
diffusion scholars note that informal socialization through “neighborhood effects” can 
also drive diffusion (Mooney 2001; Walker 1969).  For instance, several researchers posit 
that learning can travel spatially across geographic territories, either because there are 
opportunities for professionals to meet regionally, or because the circulation of 
information tends to be regionally based (Mooney 2001; Walker 1969). In this logic, 
governments that are geographically proximate will be more likely to replicate a 
neighbor’s innovative program. 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the proportion of neighboring cities with Bolsa 
Escola/PSF, the greater the likelihood that a city will emulate its neighbors. 
 The measure used for “neighborhood effect” in this study was the proportion of 
municipalities (in the sample) that had adopted either Bolsa Escola or PSF in their 
respective state.  Since we would expect some time-delay between a jurisdiction’s 
decision and its influence on their neighbors, this variable is lagged by a year.   
Another measure of regional influence on diffusion is region; thus, municipalities 
are classified into one of five areas: north, northeast, southeast, south and central-west. 
Regional characteristics might matter because the policies in this study were also born in 
different parts of the country; PSF is most associated with the northeast while Bolsa 
Escola and Renda Mínima were developed in the Southeast and Central West. 
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Control Variables 
Aside from the immediate goal of winning elections, scholars also argue that 
political actors will respond to fiscal incentives when they are made available, typically 
through the federal government (Derthick 1970; Mossberger 1999; Rose 1973; Welch & 
Thompson 1980). Federal financing, through matching grants or incentive grants, 
provides politicians with resources to demonstrate their accomplishment to their 
constituents. In the case of Bolsa Escola, the only financing made available to 
municipalities was limited to those cities with below their state’s average income per 
capita.  Few, if any, of the cities in this dataset fell into this category and the program 
lasted no more than a year. For this reason, this variable is not included in Model 1.  
Although the Ministry of Health has promoted PSF through financing, including 
line-item transfers, it is very difficult to operationalize the magnitude of the funding 
because of irregular data collection and availability.17  For this reason, Model 2 will test 
the impact of federal transfers with the indirect proxy “year,” which allows us to isolate 
whether the years in which the federal government initiated changes in financing 
correspond to increased likelihoods that PSF would be replicated.  
City size is another characteristic that might matter for municipal administration 
and policy advocacy. Although Brazilian cities face similar levels of financing from the 
federal government, other factors typically associated with city-size might matter. 
Residents from smaller cities might welcome a health program that relies on home-visits 
                                                 
17 The Ministry of Health does have a sophisticated online database, Datasus, with information on health 
financing, however this data is only available for the most recent periods, from 1998-present. 
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from neighbors, whereas residents in large urban cities might shun these intrusions on 
their privacy. Larger cities also tend to have more universities and non-profit 
organizations, enabling civil society engagement in policy debates.  For the purpose of 
this analysis, cities are grouped into three categories: Small, Medium and Large Cities.18 
 Other potential factors that could influence policy diffusion are: “internal needs” 
such as levels of poverty, “internal capacity” such as resource availability, and the 
mayor’s gendered priorities.  However, none of these variables bore out in the analyses, 
and were thus dropped from the models presented below. 
Model Results  
 One of the most remarkable features of this study is that despite differences 
between Bolsa Escola and PSF, such as policy area, extent and rate of their replication, 
both policies share similar determinants for diffusion.  Models 1 and 2 offer remarkably 
consistent results for understanding the relationship between political incentives, 
ideology, and social networks on social policy diffusion, see Table 3.13.  
One of the most surprising results of the event history models is the null finding 
that electoral competition does not spur policy emulation, for either social policy issue. 
The theoretical literature on the relationship between political competition and the 
incentives they create for policy renewal and experimentation, based primarily on the 
United States (for example, Walker 1969; Lowi 1963), does not apply for the largest 
Brazilian cities included in this sample. In other words, when we control for all other 
                                                 
18 Small Cities: population less than 150,000; Medium Cities: population between 150,000 and 300,000; 
Large Cities: population greater than 300,000 (IBGE/Ipeadata). 
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Table 3.13 The Determinants of Social Policy Diffusion: Bolsa Escola and PSF 
 Coefficients (with standard error in parenthesis) 
  
Model 1 




Political Competition   
Highly Competitive -.053 (.412) -.112 (.248) 
Competitive .036 (.414) .150 (.254) 
   
Ideology   
Leftist Mayors 1.024 (.460)* .516 (.257)* 
Centrist Mayors .732 (.115) .179 (.237) 
   
Social Networks   
Gestão Pública Network 1.382 (.347)**  
CEBES Network  .502 (.219)* 
Lagged Neighborhood Effect -.213 (2.581) 1.287 (.813) 
South .659 (1.115) -2.407 (.582) ** 
Southeast 1.569 (1.069) -2.009 (.552) ** 
Central West .684 (1.272) -1.077 (.688) 
Northeast  1.180 (1.083) -.980 (.583) 
   
City-Size Controls   
Medium City .376 (.458) -.149 (.223) 
Large City 1.394 (.436)** .036 (.254) 
   
Time   
T1  - - 
T2 -.427 (.691) - X 
T3 .395 (.644) .112 (1.441) 
T4 -.110 (.709) .812 (1.225) 
T5 -1.29 (.867) 5.594 (1.047)** 
T6 -1.244 (.886) 4.176 (1.054)** 
T7 -2.290 (.741) 5.131 (1.060)** 
T8  (1.255)  4.166(1.112)** 
T9 - X 4.651(1.131)** 
T10  4.275(1.184)** 
   
Constant -6.174 (1.214) -4.648 (1.126) 
   
N 1478 1234 
Log Likelihood -176.507 -350.218 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 .166 .3614 
*p<.05. **p<.01. 
In Model 1, T1 is 1995; for Model 2 T1 is 1994.  
X The statistical program Stata dropped T9 because the model perfectly predicted non-adoption. 
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factors, cities with more electoral competition did not adopt either Bolsa Escola or PSF at 
higher rates than those with less competitive elections. 
 How does ideology fare in explaining policy diffusion? When compared with 
cities governed by the right, leftist mayors are significantly different and in the expected 
direction; they are more likely to adopt both Bolsa Escola and PSF, even when 
controlling for other factors.  Interestingly, the impact of ideology is most pronounced for 
partisans on the left, as centrists are not statistically different from their rightist 
counterparts.    
 The last set of theoretically driven variables tested in these models corresponds to 
a sociological approach for explaining diffusion. Although neither model reveals that a 
lagged neighborhood effect matters for policy diffusion, the other social networks 
variables clearly demonstrate that when cities are linked to influential professional 
networks, those cities are more likely to adopt Bolsa Escola and PSF.  In other words, 
cities with a member of CEBES are more like to adopt PSF and cities with a connection 
to the Gestão Pública e Cidadania network are more likely to emulate Bolsa Escola. 
 As expected, time, the indirect measure that captures the influence of federal 
spending confirms that PSF adoption would increase with the introduction of greater 
funding in 1998.  The likelihood of PSF adoption increases significantly from 1998 to 
2003 (T5-T10).  Obviously, the availability of resources that help defray the costs of 
program adoption facilitate diffusion. But it is noteworthy that despite this control factor, 
policy emulation still depends in large part on the ideological perspective of municipal 
mayors and ties professionals have to social networks.  
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Interpretation 
The logistic models of Bolsa Escola and PSF can tell us more than just the 
relationship between the outcome (policy adoption) and its contributing factors. Recall 
that logit equations 3.1a and 3.2a produce a “log odds” of an event occurring. Since we 
normally think in terms of probabilities of events occurring, these equations can be 
transformed mathematically to yield bounded probabilities, which are more interpretable 
(see 3.1b and 3.2b below).  
 
3.1b Probability of a city adopting Bolsa Escola/Renda Mínima = 1/(1+(exp(-1* Zb))), 
where Zb is the log-odds of Bolsa Escola/Renda Mínima. 
 
3.2b Probability of a city adopting PSF = 1/(1+(exp(-1*Zp))), where Zp is the log-odds of 
PSF.  
 
The above equations allow for an analysis of the relative impact that the variables 
of interest have on the probability of Bolsa Escola diffusion.  For instance, the modal city 
in the dataset had the following characteristics: it had competitive elections, a centrist 
mayor, was not a part of the Gestão Pública network, had a lagged neighborhood effect 
score of 0, had a medium-sized population, was located in the southeast, and adopted the 
program in 1997.  Given this scenario, Model 1 predicts that in 1997 the probability the 
modal city will adopt Bolsa Escola is 3 percent.19  Although this probability is low and 
indicates the program is rarely emulated, it is consistent with what we know about its 
overall adoption rate.  When varying certain key characteristics of cities, however, the 
                                                 
19 In the sample, 2.9 percent adopt Bolsa Escola. 
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overall probability of Bolsa Escola adoption increases significantly.  For example, when 
the modal city is governed by a leftist rather than centrist mayor, the probability of 
adoption increases by one third to 4 percent.  An even greater effect occurs when the 
modal city has both a leftist mayor and participates in the Gestão Pública network, 
increasing the predicted probability of Bolsa Escola adoption to 13 percent.  Overall the 
model predicts the lowest probability of Bolsa Escola adoption, 1 percent, for a city that 
has highly competitive elections, is governed by a mayor from the right, has a small 
population, and is located in the south.  By contrast the city with the greatest likelihood of 
emulating the program, with a predicted probability of 41 percent, would be: a large city 
located in the southeast, with competitive elections, a leftist mayor, and participation in 
the Gestão Pública network. 
Drawing on the equations above, we can uncover the relative probability of Bolsa 
Escola adoption.  Interestingly, “time” also has important effects on the likelihood of 
policy adoption.  In other words, the probability of diffusion of the modal city differs 
according to the year under consideration (see Figure 3.3). Bolsa Escola programs were 
more likely to be enacted in 1997 and 2001, which corresponds to executives’ first year 
in office.  This seemingly cyclical pattern corroborates Lowi’s argument that new 
policies are more likely to be enacted at the beginning of a new administration (1963).  
Also noteworthy is that mayors choose to adopt municipal Bolsa Escola programs in 
2001, even after the federal government institutes its own national program.  This 
commitment to the program demonstrates that some local officials still felt deeply that 
the program was an important priority for their administration.  Had mayors decided to 
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enact Bolsa Ecola at the end of their administrations’ and prior to the next elections, this 
would indicate electoral incentives drove the timing of emulation decisions.  But since 
mayors typically implemented the education program just after an election suggests that 
elected officials took advantage of the freedom for ideological decision making granted 
by their electoral mandate.  
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In the case of Programa Saúde da Família, Model 2 predicts much higher 
probabilities that cities will adopt the program, when compared with Bolsa Escola 
diffusion.  The modal city in this sample has low competition, a centrist mayor, a lagged 
“neighborhood effect” score of 0, adopted the program in 1998, has a medium-sized 
population, and is located in the southeast.  Given these characteristics, the likelihood that 
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this average city will adopt PSF (in 1997) is 37 percent.20  However, if this same city 
were to lose its linkage to the CEBES network, the overall probability would drop to 26 
percent.  Interestingly, the effect of ideology is especially strong.  Holding all other 
factors constant, if the average city elects a leftist mayor, then the predicted probability 
PSF will be implemented increases to 45 percent.  Overall the model shows that when 
different characteristics are in play, the probability of PSF adoption can vary 
considerably depending on the theoretical variables of interest.  In 1998 alone, the 
probability of adoption is as high as 73 percent for a mid-sized city in the northeast with 
medium competition, a leftist mayor, and CEBES network presence.  When that same 
city has a rightist mayor and loses its CEBES network connectivity, the probability of 
PSF adoption falls precipitously to 43 percent.  While variables such as region or city-
size can significantly affect the probability of PSF adoption, it is clear that the 
motivational variables – ideology and social networks – dramatically influence the 
likelihood that the health program will diffuse. 
There are several reasons to suspect that “time” would impact the probability of 
PSF adoption. As Figure 3.2, on the cumulative adoption of PSF in the sample 
demonstrates, there is a dramatic increase in PSF adoption in 1998.  The results in Model 
2 also indicate that the years 1998 to 2003 are statistically significant and positively 
associated with PSF adoption.  This finding reflects the history of policy development 
and mirrors other diffusion research that shows federal financing has strong effects in 
spurring diffusion decisions (Derthick 1970; Mossberger 1999; Rose 1973; Welch & 
                                                 
20 In the sample, 13.8 percent adopt PSF. 
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Thompson 1980).   For the modal city in this sample, the yearly effects are remarkable 
(see Figure 3.4).  The probability of adoption jumps dramatically after 1997, from .5 to 
37 percent.  Also noteworthy is that the annual effects are non-linear and non-cyclical. 
Unlike the timing of Bolsa Escola adoption, the timing decisions behind PSF appear 
unrelated to election cycles, thus reinforcing the findings in Model 2 that electoral 
competition bears no influence over emulation decisions.  
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CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
The event history analyses allow us to test three theoretically driven explanations 
for the diffusion of social policies for a large number of municipalities in Brazil. 
Surprisingly, the proxies for political competition provide little support for the argument 
that electoral competition and vote-seeking behavior on the part of politicians spur policy 
replication. This bucks conventional assumptions in political science that highly 
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contested elections will spur actors to emulate policies.  A particularly noteworthy 
finding in this regards is that the degree of electoral competition did not matter; 
politicians in low, medium, and highly competitive environment behaved the same.  By 
contrast, the proxies for ideology and formal social network connectivity do explain the 
likelihood that Bolsa Escola and Programa Saúde da Família will diffuse. That both leftist 
ideology and formal social networks connectivity positively influence the emulation of 
two programs that spread at different rates is quite remarkable particularly since scholars 
of education and health reform often comment that these sectors are more different than 
similar (Corrales 1999; Grindle 2004). Chapter 6 will further explore the puzzle behind 
these similar findings and will address the opportunities and limitations for generalization 
about diffusion across policy arenas.  
As King, Keohane and Verba argue, one of the benefits of quantitative analysis 
based on a large number of observations is the greater leverage garnered to test theories 
and draw causal inferences (1994). Certainly the event history models in this chapter 
reinforce the basic argument that ideology and social networks spur diffusion in Brazil’s 
largest cities. However, it is also important to acknowledge the limitations of this method. 
At the most basic level, the models used in this chapter involve basic assumptions that 
can influence our analysis. First, the models require a dichotomous categorization of 
policy adoption – cities either do or do not have a given policy. Yet, in practice, 
policymakers may modify or adapt policies for local environments. The “adaptability” of 
a program may or may not relate to its overall diffusion pattern.  Second, these models 
require dropping observations for cities once they have adopted a program. This analysis 
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certainly allows for understanding what leads up to the decision to emulate a policy, but 
assumes that policy reversal either does not happen or is irrelevant. Yet, in Brazil, social 
policies are often changed, adopted, and reversed when new elected officials take office. 
Given some of these methodological limitations, it is important to draw on qualitative 
data to elaborate on the statistical findings and clarify the causal mechanisms that drive 
diffusion. 
This chapter offers valuable insights into the relationship between the variables of 
interest and policy diffusion, yet the analysis also raises a number of questions that will 
be addressed in subsequent chapters. First, to what extent do the proxies used to measure 
political incentives, ideology, and social networks accurately reflect the real-world 
political dynamics of policy emulation? For instance, political incentives could play out 
in a number of non-electoral ways, including the use of clientelism or patronage. Are the 
findings here simply a reflection of measurement error or limited data? Second, why is it 
that leftist mayors would be so much more likely to adopt Bolsa Escola and Programa 
Saúde da Família?  While it is true both programs have equity-enhancing goals and seek 
to improve access to education and healthcare, they also appeal to a broader range of 
policymakers who like the targeting and “contract” features of these programs. In 
addition, both programs can represent socially conservative objectives that reinforce 
traditional gender roles. Thus, there is a need to clarify how these programs are 
interpreted and how ideology affects decision-making and program emulation.  Lastly, 
the statistical analysis alone cannot reveal the way in which a formal “social network 
presence” matters. What is it about network connectivity that compels emulation? How 
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do networks shape professional norms?  The following chapters, which rely on case study 
evidence from four Brazilian cities, will answer these questions.  
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CHAPTER 4: BOLSA ESCOLA: A SIMPLE IDEA CATCHES ON 
 
Why is it that a relatively simple idea, an education grant for poor families to 
increase children’s educational performance, appealed to municipal executives?  Bolsa 
Escola is not a cure-all for Brazil’s educational woes, yet many policymakers across the 
country were enamored with the program.  In what ways did the program appeal to these 
policymakers?  And what motivated municipal authorities to emulate the program for 
their own cities?  To answer these questions, this chapter first contextualizes Brazil’s 
national educational deficits and delayed reforms.  The second section addresses how 
decentralization enabled local innovation and experimentation, including the 
development of conditional cash-transfer programs like Bolsa Escola.  The third section 
draws on case study evidence to uncover the mechanisms that drove emulation decisions.  
Interviews with policymakers from four research sites reveal why they chose to emulate 
Bolsa Escola. Although Bolsa Escola lends itself to electioneering behavior, I show that 
actors chose to emulate the policy because of their deeply held ideological convictions 
and desire to keep up with their profession’s norms.   
NATIONAL CONTEXT FOR EDUCATION REFORM 
The abertura period that began in the late 1970s opened the door for discussions 
on how best to improve Brazilian society and democracy. There was little doubt that 
reform of the education sector was necessary as educational studies indicated Brazil 
among the worst in the region.  First, the system favored spending in secondary and 
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higher education, rather than prioritization of primary education.  Since most children did 
not progress to secondary or higher education, the vast majority of children were 
underserved by the system.  The socioeconomic segregation of education services also 
meant the public system favored the needs of middle- and upper-class families, which 
tended to send their children to prestigious public universities.  The structurally unequal 
spending in education contributed to inefficiencies, exacerbated by poor quality 
education, contributed to Brazil’s growing inequality, and was an important factor in 
persistent intergenerational poverty.  Second, the country’s educational deficits raised 
serious doubts as to whether Brazil could construct meaningful citizenship for all.  Could 
Brazil consolidate democracy with a population that had such low levels of educational 
attainment? 
Education policy has continued to reflect the legacies of policies that favored 
middle and upper income groups.  Families with high incomes can bypass low quality 
public primary and secondary schools, in favor of private schools which better prepare 
their children for meritocratic university exams.  While upper income families incur the 
cost of private education at the primary and secondary levels, they disproportionately 
benefit from education spending that includes free federal public university enrollment. 
Low income families must rely on inadequate public education throughout, thus their 
children encounter serious barriers to high education.  Nearly sixty percent of university 
students in Brazil belong to the top income quintile, while higher education accounts for 
over 20 percent of total education spending.  To put this figure into perspective, Brazil’s 
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expenditure for university students is nearly four times the average of countries in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2004: 7).   
 Recent figures of Brazil’s contemporary education deficits have also troubled 
policymakers.  In ten years, the country had not made significant advances in literacy and 
school completion.  In the early 1990s, the combined repetition and dropout rates for 
primary and secondary education were about 50 percent (Draibe 2004: 383).  Data from 
1994 also revealed that only 83 percent of children between ages 7 and 14 had access to 
primary education; figures for secondary school access were even more dismal with less 
than 20 percent of students with access (Draibe 2004: 383). Brazil’s low-quality 
education continues to rank it among the worst in the region.  It also places Brazil in a 
worsening position vis-a-vis its international economic competitors.  As Birdsall et.al. 
note, in the 1960s the quality of Brazil’s education system of basic education matched 
that of other countries with similar incomes.  Yet, by 1990 Brazil had fallen behind with 
lower average quality, particularly compared to high-performing East Asian economies 
(Birdsall et. al. 1996:7-8).  By the mid-1990s, it was clear that Brazil’s development 
strategies and subsequent educational deficits would have profound social and economic 
consequences for the nation and represented one of the most important arenas for reform.  
 Even though the need for education reform was clearly understood by both 
Brazilian and international development experts, the period from the mid-1980s to mid-
1990s was marked by stalled reforms.  Although the Constituent Assembly promoted the 
right to education as a fundamental social right, the constitution only laid out general 
principles for reform.  Among them was the goal of decentralizing education, specifying 
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that municipalities should focus on pre-school and primary education, and states should 
focus primarily on secondary education.  Particularly notable is the Constitutional 
requirement that states and municipalities must spend 25 percent of tax revenue on 
education; 60 percent of that sum must go to primary education (representing a minimum 
percentage of 18 percent of tax revenue) (Ministry of Education: 2004:6).  Despite the 
fiscal and administrative outlines for decentralization, much of the specifics regarding 
curricular reform, teacher training, student access, and funding equity would be left to 
future congresses to address.  Brazil’s delays in reforming the education sector at the 
national level are far from surprising.  As Corrales notes, education reform is difficult to 
undertake; there are numerous political hurdles including: the concentration of costs on a 
few actors, low incidences of policy entrepreneurship, political disengagement of 
potential beneficiaries, and that cost-bearing groups often enjoy political advantages 
(Corrales 1999: vii).  
 Institutional and historical tendencies have made education reform politically 
unattractive for many politicians.  Brazilian presidents often need to dole out cabinet 
level appointments in a quasi-parliamentary manner in order to sustain coalitions with 
other political parties.  They typically negotiate ministerial positions with allied party 
leaders who, in turn, agree to legislative unity in return for control over parts of the 
bureaucracy.  This practice has contributed to de-prioritization of certain ministries, 
among them the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC).  From 1985 to 1995 the MEC 
was led by rightist Ministers (PFL and PL affiliates) who used education for political 
patronage (Draibe 2004:380).  Thus, the strong tradition of clientelistic practices 
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remained intact throughout the period.  Even if education ministers had been committed 
to substantive reform, they would have required political insulation from the President to 
implement change.  As Corrales (1999) notes, one indicator of how political vulnerable 
ministers are is the turnover rate.  During Jose Sarney’s presidency (1985-1990), five 
ministers held posts lasting on average a year, and during Fernando Collor’s Presidency 
(1990-1992), the average duration of an education minister was 10 months.  
Another factor that likely contributed to stalled reforms was the “low demand” 
from the system’s beneficiaries. Unlike the health sector, the education sector has not 
traditionally benefited from well organized civil society advocacy.  As Draibe (2004:385) 
notes, parents, who are normally advocates for their children’s educational interests, have 
not formed or actively participated in fora such as: parent-teacher associations, city-wide 
education councils, or school councils, to demand greater educational access and 
improved quality.  Thus the beneficiaries of reform were largely absent from 
policymaking venues.  The absence of civil society organizing is in large part a product 
of traditionally low participation in this sector, as well as the fact the large segments of 
the middle-class exited from the primary education system in the 1970s, opting instead 
for private schools that offered better quality education. 
 A significant turning point for reform in education came when President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) took office in January 1995.  Unlike his predecessors, 
Cardoso retained tight control over the “social ministries,” including the education 
ministry, and appointed a fellow PSDB partisan and member of his inner circle, Paulo 
Renato Souza, to head it.  Minister Souza would have an unprecedented tenure at the 
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MEC, lasting throughout Cardoso’s two-term presidency, and benefiting from some of 
the political protection observers note is necessary to enact unpopular reforms. The 
President’s willingness to insulate the MEC is notable because “demand” for reform on 
the part of civil society had been and continues to be low.    
 The mid-1990s brought important reforms that would greatly change education in 
Brazil.  The General Law of Education (1996) and other specific laws and acts finally 
detailed the responsibilities for education in the federal system (see Table in Appendix 
E). Thus, decentralization, which had only been outlined in vague terms in the 
Constitution, gained greater specificity.  Changes included the decentralization of the 
Ministry’s own programs in primary and secondary education, specification of criteria for 
transferring resources to states and municipalities (based on a value per student), and the 
passage of FUNDEF (Draibe 2004:390).  Overall, the most significant changes would 
take place in primary education, including municipalization,1 curricular modernization, 
investment in teaching training, and decentralization of resources.   
The FUNDEF2 (Fundo de Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino 
Fundamental e de Valorização do Magistério – Fund for the Development and 
Maintenance of Primary Education and Valuing of Teachers), represented the most 
significant equalizing measure undertaken by the MEC during this period.  First, it 
altered the distribution of spending in education to prioritize primary education.  Each 
state would have its own FUNDEF-fund, comprised of 15 percent of all state and 
                                                 
1 In the case of education, municipalization involved the transfer of schools and their related administrative 
apparatus from state to municipal control.  
2 The Constitutional Amendment passed in September 1996 and went into effect on January 1st 1998. 
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municipal tax collection and constitutionally required transfers, which would need to be 
used exclusively for primary education.3  The funds would then be allocated to each 
school equally on a per capita basis.  Second, although the per capita spending could 
differ across states, the amendment ensured that greater equity across the country by 
establishing a minimum threshold for spending per pupil.4  Poor states would receive 
federal funds that were unable to meet the minimum spending requirement.   
The combination of a federal ministry of education that was intent on devolving 
programs to sub-national governments, together with increased resources for primary and 
secondary schools, went a long way toward fulfilling the administration’s goal to 
decentralize education. The new funding formulas by the MEC encouraged more 
municipalities to take responsibility for primary education from state governments, as 
they would have greater fiscal autonomy. Even low-income cities could do so, because of 
FUNDEF’s equalizing effect.  Moreover, MEC policymakers sought to create a program 
that would encourage municipalities to go after and bring-in students because the 
transfers were based on pupil enrollment rates, thus ensuring that all children were 
enrolled in school. FUNDEF thus represented the fulfillment of a campaign and political 
commitment to primary education, on the part of the administration (Interview, Sousa 
2004).  
Although the eight-year period under which Minister Souza oversaw the MEC did 
bring about significant changes to the structure of education provision in Brazil, 
                                                 
3 Up to 60 percent of the fund can be used for teacher salaries; no minimum salary is stipulated. 
4 In 2004, the minimum was R$564 per pupil in first through fourth grades and R$595 and fifth through 
eighth grades (Presidential Decree 5.299, December 7, 2004). 
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instituting a Bolsa Escola or similar grant program was not among his top priorities.  In 
Sousa’s view, the FUNDEF was the mechanism that created a “supply” for education; 
whereas policies like Programa de Garantia de Renda Mínima (PGRM) or Bolsa Escola 
created a “demand” for education, which can only take effect after a solid supply is 
available (Interview, Sousa 2004).  During the Cardoso administration, the MEC 
administered two “demand-side” programs: the PGRM and Bolsa Escola Federal, which 
replaced it, both of which drew from examples of innovations from local governments. 
These federal initiatives had “starts-and-stops” and reflected bottom-up learning based on 
municipal experimentation, rather than reflecting a “top-down” initiative developed by 
the national government.  
LOCAL EXPERIMENTATION & INNOVATION  
 Although national efforts to reform the education sector largely stalled from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, states and municipalities have been able to make 
considerable advances by experimenting with new policies.  Certainly, once 
decentralization and later FUNDEF were in place, municipalities had even greater 
resources at their disposal to experiment with new innovative education models.  The 
Gestão Pública e Cidadania Program, which sponsors an annual innovations competition 
for “good governance” practices, offers a useful vantage point from which to examine 
larger trends in education.  City administrators have submitted information on projects, 
which included: developing programs for children with special needs; reform of 
education administration and information systems; innovation of various classroom and 
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teaching methods; out of school activities to reinforce learning; programs focusing on the 
environment and local development; inclusion of local culture in the curriculum; and 
various outreach reading programs and libraries, including adult literacy efforts (Spink 
2006:17).  In general, many of these programs stayed within the standard domain of 
education by either addressing learning or curriculum development, while others 
expanded notions of teaching and education by emphasizing social inclusion or parental 
outreach.   
 The local governmental arena presented policy entrepreneurs with fertile ground 
to plant their seeds for new ideas and programs.  Interestingly, the policy entrepreneurs 
who would lead the way to enactment of innovative “education” programs were not 
strictly affiliated with the field of education.  Rather, the idea for bundling education with 
poverty alleviation goals would be developed by intellectuals, technocrats, and politicians 
who wanted to address the pernicious effects of low education outcomes on poverty and 
inequality, and the cyclical effect that poverty would have on educational attainment for 
children.  Two leading figures who served as “policy entrepreneurs” and later became 
spokesmen for their replication are: Cristovam Buarque and Eduardo Suplicy.  Making 
sense of the origins of “Bolsa Escola” or “Renda Mínima” can be a tricky task.  As in 
many cases, ideas are seldom born from a single individual and policies often undergo 
considerable adaptation before their implementation.  In addition, the perception of 
policy “success” leads many individuals to seek credit for the innovation5.  The task here 
is neither to give political credit to one individual or another, but rather to present a sense 
                                                 
5 For more on the problem of assessing the origin of ideas, see especially Kingdon 1995: chap. 4. 
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of the murky landscape in which early experimentation occurred and how these programs 
originated. 
 Since the 1970s, Brazilian economists have debated the merits and feasibility for 
a guaranteed minimum income program (Programa de Renda Mínima).6  Although these 
early intellectuals made important theoretical contributions to the debate on poverty, 
inequality, and democracy, it was not until the 1990s that such a program would make 
considerable advances in the political arena.   Eduardo Suplicy, a career politician and 
economist7 by training, has been the most vocal advocate for a national program as a 
mechanism for social redistribution of wealth and poverty alleviation.  Once elected to 
the senate in 1990, representing the state of São Paulo and affiliated with the Workers’ 
Party, he would propose legislation that would guarantee all individuals8 over 25 years of 
age, who earned less than two monthly minimum wage salaries, a cash supplement.9  
Suplicy’s proposal was heavily debated, with many technocrats and economists 
questioning the potential economic effects such a program would have on inflation and 
the economy, in general.  Others argued the program was utopian and that Brazil was not 
ready or even administratively capable of implementing it.  Others still wondered if cash-
                                                 
6 For instance, Antonio Maria da Silveira in 1975, and Edmar Bacha e Roberto Mangabeira Unger in 1978, 
published on this topic (For discussion on the contribution of these early scholars, see Fonseca 2001: 99-
109; Aguilar and Araujo 1998:31).  
7 Suplicy’s interest in a cash-based minimum income program dates back to his graduate training the 
United States, where he learned about a Milton Friedman’s ideas for a negative income tax, and policies 
such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and later the Alaskan Permanent Fund Divided 
Program.   
8 Suplicy was a firm supporter of a universal program geared towards individuals, not families. 
9 At the time, a minimum income was approximately C$ 45 thousand. The Bill specifically called for a 
supplement for the difference between 2 minimum income threshold and actual income.  In the event an 
individual had no income, the supplement would not exceed 50 percent of the threshold to encourage 
people to work. 
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grants were the proper vehicle for poverty alleviation, preferring other programs and 
approaches.  Despite these criticisms the bill gained enough traction to pass in the Senate 
unanimously on December 16, 1991, only to then stall in the house as Presidents Collor, 
Franco and Cardoso declined to support it.  Suplicy would continue to champion the 
legislation10 nevertheless and advocated for governors and majors to adopt variations of 
his legislation at the local level.11  
In the public sphere, economist Jose Márcio Camargo joined the debate on the 
merits of Suplicy’s proposal when he published an influential opinion piece in the 
respected newspaper, the Folha de São Paulo (1993).  He argued on behalf of a 
framework for a social policy that would alleviate poverty in the short-term and resolve 
multigenerational of poverty in the long term, largely supporting Suplicy’s efforts.  
However, Camargo suggested several notable modifications to the existing Bill, including 
the prioritizing families with school age children and making transfers contingent on 
families regularly sending their children to school.  These modifications would later 
become the backbone for future Renda Mínima programs.  
 Given the lack of enthusiasm for a guaranteed minimum income policy at the 
national level, local governments were a natural venue for advancement of the policy.  In 
1995 two cities simultaneously adopted minimum income programs: Campinas and 
Ribeirão Preto, both in the state of São Paulo.  The Campinas program, implemented by 
                                                 
10 An amended version of the Renda Mínima legislation was finally passed and signed by President Lula 
on January 8, 2004.  However, even at the bill’s signing, Lula and others noted they were uncertain whether 
the legislation could ever be implemented.   
11 Although local governments would take up programs with the name Renda Mínima, they often differed 
from the original proposed by Suplicy. He nevertheless “consulted” with cities and “welcomed” 
modifications, suggesting they represent a single idea (Suplicy, Interview 2003). 
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José Roberto Magalhães Teixeira (PSDB), is the more widely known of the two, having 
received awards and undergone several evaluations12 (Fonseca 2001). Although the 
program shares the name most closely affiliated with Suplicy, the program differed 
considerably from the national legislation.  First, Campinas’ Programa de Garantia de 
Renda Familiar Mínima (PGRFM) policy was not geared at individuals but rather 
prioritized families as a whole.13  Further, the program only served families in extreme 
poverty and with children between the ages of 0 to 14.14  Second, unlike the national bill, 
the local initiative required beneficiaries to ensure their children’s regular school 
attendance among other requirements.15  Notably, although the Campinas program had a 
strong educational component to the program, it was viewed more broadly to include 
social assistance. 
 Though contemporaneous to the Renda Mínima program, Bolsa Escola originated 
among participants of the Center for Contemporary Brazilian Studies at the Universidade 
de Brasília (UnB).  The interdisciplinary center, which was spearheaded by then Rector 
Cristovam Buarque, provided a venue for faculty, students, and intellectuals to meet and 
develop policy that could respond to Brazil’s most pressing problems.  Center 
participants quickly identified the problem of basic education to be an urgent issue, and 
noted the strong correlation between poverty and high dropout rates (Aguiar & Araújo 
                                                 
12 The city is also home to nationally renown Unicamp (The University of Campinas), which has a well 
known center in social policy evaluation, lending to both interest and ease for studies of the city’s 
Programa de Garantia de Renda Mínima. 
13 Lei No. 8.261, dated June 6, 1995 and regulamentado pelo Decree No. 11.471 of March 3, 1995. 
14 Families had to have a per capita income of R$35 or below to meet eligibility requirements. 
15 Heads of households signed a “Termo de Responsabilidade e de Compromisso”, which required the 
following: the children’s regular school attendance, regularized attention to healthcare, and children could 
not reside on the streets.  In addition, families were required to participate in monthly meetings. 
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2002: 38).  Based on this observation, participants concluded that that poverty and low-
educational attainment were inter-related and positively reinforcing, and Bolsa Escola 
could tackle both.  Even though education is compulsory and free in Brazil, parents must 
still provide a minimum level of resources for their children to attend school (e.g. clothes, 
shoes, and school supplies).  Furthermore, parents face an opportunity cost when sending 
their children to school (i.e. they must forgo potential labor and income their children can 
generate through informal work).  Second, Buarque argued that just as government has 
supported students through scholarship to attend institutions of high education (masters 
and doctoral degrees), it would be appropriate for children to receive scholarships for 
primary education.  Thus, the group proposed a school grant (scholarship) for families in 
poverty, but on the condition their children regularly attend school; families whose 
children failed to attend school, would lose a monthly payment.  
 When Cristovam Buarque took office in the federal district of Brasília in 1995, he 
quickly implemented a Bolsa Escola program.16  The program started small, first 
prioritizing families in the neighborhood Paranoá, which had the lowest socio-economic 
indicators in the city.  City administrators later expanded it to include more families; by 
1998, 25,680 families and 50,673 children were enrolled in the program (Aguiar & 
Araújo 2002: 43).  Eligible families included those whose income fell bellow half a 
minimum salary per capita, the monthly benefit was fixed at one minimum salary 
                                                 
16 Decree 16.270 on January 22, 1995 and regimented by Portaria 16 on February 9, 1995. 
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(R$130)17; the program raised roughly 10,000 families above the poverty line (Lavinas 
and Barbosa 2000: 449).  The city also implemented a complementary program, 
Poupança-Escola (School Savings) as an additional incentive to encourage students to 
stay in school until completion of the lower secondary school, and for those families with 
older children who stay in school.  In all, the Bolsa Escola program cost the district 
approximately 1 percent of its annual revenue. 
 Some policy specialists argue that municipal Renda Mínima and Bolsa Escola 
policies are substantially different policies because of their distinct origins, nuances in 
policy design, and names (Paulics 2004; Interview Lavinas 2004; Interview Rocha 2003).  
Table 4.1 provides an overview of both the similarities and differences between two 
exemplary municipal programs: Campinas (SP) and Brasília (DF).  While it is certainly 
the case that each program displayed unique features, I argue that these programs are 
essentially similar.   
First, both programs incorporate two objectives within a single program: to 
improve educational performance and alleviate poverty.  Interestingly, although both 
programs have important education goals, neither was conceived by education specialists, 
but rather framed within the larger context of economic and social development.  Second, 
both programs have strict eligibility requirements based on family income and make 
benefits conditional based on parents’ behavior (e.g. regular school attendance).   
 
 
                                                 
17 At the time, a minimum salary was approximately $76 US dollars.  The benefit was fixed, regardless of 
the number of children in the household. 
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Table 4.1 Characterics of the Municipal Bolsa Escola & Renda Mínima Programs 
 Renda Mínima  
(Campinas, SP) 
Bolsa Escola 
(Brasília, Federal District) 
Income Eligibility 
Threshold 
Families in extreme poverty, 
incomes per capita below R$35, 
and with children from 0 to 14 
years of age. 
Income per capita below ½ 
Minimum Salary (R$130), and 
with children ages 7 to 14 and 
matriculated in school. 
Residency 
Requirements 
Two years from date of the 
legislation 
Five year residency in Brasília. 
Conditionality Regular School Attendance 
Regular Health Check-ups 
Monthly Meetings 
Regular School Attendance 
(90% attendance rate) 
Beneficiary Head of household Mothers of Children 
Benefit Amount The difference between actual 
family income (per capita) and 
the minimum income (R$35 per 
capita). 
1 Minimum Salary (Flat) 
Administered by: Department of family, child, 
adolescent, and Social Services.  
Department of Education 
 
Third, both policies provide cash grants and parents can determine how best to spend 
those resources.  Fourth, both Renda Mínima and Bolsa Escola represent a flexible policy 
that can incorporate additional components.  For instance, Campinas’ Renda Mínima had 
healthcare requirements and Brasília added parent literacy programs; one of the important 
elements of the program was that it appealed to technocrats who wanted to have a more 
integrated approach to social services.  Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the policy 
entrepreneurs who have been most vocal in advocating for replication of their respective 
program, have acknowledged that in practice, Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima are 
essentially similar (Interview Buarque 2004; Interview Suplicy 2003).  For all these 
reasons, this project examines the diffusion of Renda Mínima and Bolsa Escola as part of 
the same phenomenon.  
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Both Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima policies received early recognition for their 
“innovativeness” and won numerous awards.  For instance, in 1996, the first year of the 
Innovations Award Program administered by the Public Management and Citizenship 
Program of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, city administrators from Brasília and Campinas 
submitted applications for their respective programs; both received awards that year.18  
Bolsa Escola in particular, became the “darling policy” of both Brazilian and 
international development policy specialists who supported assessments of the program.  
For instance, the international organization UNESCO office in Brazil produced an 
evaluation and was an early enthusiast of the program (Waiselfisz et al. 1998). In funding 
the evaluation, UNESCO introduced the program to policy professionals in the national 
and international arena.  A few other domestic and international organizations followed 
suit and produced policy papers on Bolsa Escola (Bava et. al 1999; Lavinas et al. 2001; 
Lobato & Urani 1998; Vawda n.d.).  Although UNESCO19 and the World Bank never 
directly supported the policies through financial contributions in Brazil, the program was 
consistent with their organization’s values and priorities.  This is particularly true in the 
case of the World Bank, which had been advocating for more efficient use of social 
spending and for targeting to prioritize the poorest groups rather than creation of policies 
that entailed universal coverage.  In addition, the news media took considerable interest 
in Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima programs, as cities began receiving awards.  Major 
                                                 
18 In 1996, the Campinas program received a semi-finalist award and the Brasília program received the top 
finalist award.  Bolsa Escola also won the award, Criança e Paz (Children and Peace), from UNICEF.  
19  Interestingly, of all the organizations to evaluate and support the earliest Bolsa Escola efforts, only 
UNESCO was a truly education-oriented institution; all others are generalist organizations that focus on 
“good governance,” poverty alleviation, and development. 
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news outlets, the Correio Braziliense, Jornal do Brasil, Estado de São Paulo, and weekly 
news magazine Istoé, ran articles and opinion pieces on Bolsa Escola.20 
Aside from the wide recognition that Bolsa Escola’s received, part of the 
program’s broad appeal was due to its very policy design.  Although some of the staff in 
Brasília who designed the particularities of the program had a feminist perspective on 
social policy21 – for instance having known about microcredit programs for women in 
Bangledesh such as the Grameen Bank – the program still appealed to mainstream 
Brazilians who hold more conservative views on women’s roles.  In targeting women, 
policymakers designed a program that was largely consistent with traditional gender 
norms and notions of maternity.  As Marisa Pacheco, the coordinator of Bolsa Escola 
explained, the decision to target the payments to mothers was well received and non-
controversial.  
We thought it was important to recognize the culture here in Brazil. 
Women take a more active role in the family and with their kids. We 
believe mothers are more likely to keep track of their children’s 
attendance at school, make sure they dress well, eat well, etc.  And I had a 
strong belief that women would manage the resources of the Bolsa Escola 
well (Interview Pacheco, 2004). 
 
                                                 
20 See for instance: Assunes 1997; Ibañez 1996, 1997; Dimenstein 1997; Geraldes 1999; Fernandes 2001; 
Lago 2001; Silva 1996; Steck 1997; Jornal do Brasil 1997; Villaméa 2001; Mello 2000; Correio Braziliense 
1997ª, 1997b; Rossi 1997; Husseini 1996. 
21 In practice, Pacheco and Conseição Zotta Lopes had strong theoretical and administrative reasons for 
directing the cash benefit to mothers.  In their previous work in public housing, they noticed how 
problematic it was when women were not included on deeds with their husbands. They noticed that without 
explicit attention to women’s status, they could become even more vulnerable.  In addition, there were 
practical considerations. Women were more likely to have custody of children and were often heads of 
households (Interview Pacheco 2004).  
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In this way, Bolsa Escola reinforced notions that women would be more responsible 
because of their maternal roles.  Men were perceived to be less trustworthy whereas 
women were thought to be self-sacrificing and would put their children first.  Discussions 
about “women’s roles” and “women’s work” were an explicit part of the policy design, 
which Governor Buarque was quick to use. 
One justification I used for focusing on women was that we needed to 
value the work women do as mothers and that the state had an obligation 
to support this work.  Buarque liked this idea and even pushed it a little 
further, saying that we were generating work for women. Basically, 
spinning it as a payment for women for work they already do (Interview, 
Pacheco 2004).   
 
The implications of the program’s construction of gender norms generated very little 
discussion, both in Brasília and later when it would be replicated elsewhere.  As Aguilar 
noted, the policy is attractive in part, because it does not attempt to restructure social 
relations in a radical way (Interview 2003).  Conservative segments in Brazilian society 
appreciated that the program reflected views about women’s self-sacrificing nature while 
progressive feminists remained largely silent.   
 Policy entrepreneurs such as Cristovam Buarque and Eduardo Suplicy were vocal 
advocates for the expansion of Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima programs.  One of their 
principal targets was the federal government and both men approached President Cardoso 
and his senior policy staff to get a national program off the ground (Interview Buarque 
2004; Interview Suplicy 2003; Interview Souza 2004).  Despite their efforts, the Cardoso 
administration was primarily committed to other social policy approaches, such as 
changing education financing through FUNDEF.  In a concession and despite different 
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priorities, in 1997 the federal government introduced a national program – Programa de 
Renda Mínima Vinculada à Educação (Lei 9.553, December 10, 1997).  The policy 
supported municipal efforts for Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima by providing a matching 
grant to those communities that instituted their own program; the federal program would 
cover 50 percent of beneficiaries’ payments.  However, the program was limited in scope 
and focused on the poorest cities.  Only those cities with per capita incomes below their 
states’ average were eligible to participate.   
The federal Programa de Renda Mínima Vinculada à Educação was short-lived.  
Renda Mínima and Bolsa Escola enthusiasts believed the program was doomed from the 
start and represented a half-hearted attempt to promote the program’s expansion.  Federal 
technocrats assumed that offering funding would be sufficient incentive for local 
governments to participate in the program.  But eligible cities were often smaller and 
poorer and had limited capacity to establish their own program.  In practice, a few state 
governments, such as the state of Bahia, urged their municipalities to adopt Bolsa Escola.  
But the vast majority of eligible cities never participated.  Overall, it represented an old-
fashioned design that required formalized cooperative agreements between municipalities 
and the federal government (Interview Pesaro 2004).   In 2001 the federal government 
would make a second attempt to support conditional-cash transfers through the program, 
Bolsa Escola Federal.  In this iteration, federal authorities would by-pass municipal 
governments altogether by directly paying poor mothers a school grant. (For more 
information on federal conditional-grant programs, see Appendix F).   
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Predictably the enactment of the federal program in cities that had their own 
municipal Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima programs posed especially challenging. 
Federal administrators and politicians criticized these local governments for failing to 
enact their program in a timely manner and accused politicians from opposition parties of 
political posturing and purposeful delays.22  Local officials complained of being 
railroaded by the federal government (Interview Leitão 2004).  Since they had their own 
experiences, these local officials argued they should be granted greater flexibility and 
given the option of integrating the municipal and federal programs.  Technocrats were 
especially concerned about the registration process and wanted to insure that the 
programs would extend coverage to new families rather than provide overlapping 
benefits.  In the end, cities that had already established municipal programs continued to 
operate their own programs and simply added Bolsa Escola Federal, essentially operating 
two separate programs.  In other words, municipalities across Brazil continued to design, 
administer, and finance their own Bolsa Escola programs despite the complications 
caused by the entry of a federal program bearing the same name.  
EXPLAINING THE DIFFUSION OF MUNICIPAL BOLSA ESCOLA IN FOUR MAJOR CITIES 
 Given the early enthusiasm for Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima programs, with 
awards and enthusiastic reviews from international development agencies, it is not 
                                                 
22  The politics related to São Paulo’s enactment were particularly intense as it became a battleground 
between two prominent politicians, Mayor Marta Suplicy (PT) and Education Minister Paulo Renato Souza 
(PSDB).  Each politician defended the merits of its program.  Mayor Suplicy offered a “compromise” that 
included an integrated program and the municipal governments’ logo on the Federal Bolsa Escola debit 
card.  MEC officials took that as a sign of clear partisan politics and dismissed the idea decisively.  
Billboards later went up across the city detailing how much money low-income citizens were losing 
because of the Suplicy administration delayed enactment of the Federal Bolsa Escola.    
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surprising that other cities would choose to replicate these programs.  Some cities across 
the country were so quick to adopt similar programs they did so within a year of Brasília 
and Campinas’ enactment.  For instance, Salvador emulated the program before major 
research organizations had widely distributed policy evaluations.23  That cities replicated 
the programs so quickly and before assessments of these policies established their 
effectiveness is remarkable; particularly since most of the earliest publications on these 
programs were based on case studies (i.e. usually based on one or two cities), and it was 
unclear whether cities with different socio-demographic characteristics, educational 
difficulties, or financial resources could benefit from adopting a similar program.  Thus, 
what explains why certain cities were so eager to replicate these programs?  Why were 
some cities quick in doing so?  Why did others take a slower pace to adoption?  And, 
why did other cities choose not to replicate the programs at all?   
Case Studies 
 
This chapter details case study evidence on the motivations behind decisions to 
adopt (or not adopt) Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima policies.  Table 4.2 presents a 




                                                 
23 Rocha noted that cities such as Belo Horizonte and Belém replicated the Brasília program wholesale; 
there were few adjustments made to target the particularities of their cities (Interview 2003).  
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Table 4.2 Ten Case Studies: Adoption & Non-Adoption  
 Executive in Office & Party IDa Bolsa Escola/Renda Mínima 
Brasília (DF)b   
1990-1994 Joaquim Roriz (PTR)  - 
1994-1998 Cristovam Buarque (PT) Innovatorc 
1998-2002 Joaquim Roriz (PMDB) No/Yesd 
Belo Horizonte (MG)   
1992-1996 Patrus Ananias (PT) No 
1996-2000 Célio de Castro (PSB) Yes 
2000-2004 Célio de Castro (PSB) 
Fernando Damata Pimentel (PT)e 
Yes 
Salvador (BA)   
1992-1996 Lídice da Mata (PSDB) Yes 
1996-2000 Antônio José Imbassahy (PFL) No 
2000-2004 Antônio José Imbassahy (PFL) No 
São Paulo  (SP)   
1992-1996 Paulo Maluf (PDS) No 
1996-2000 Celso Pitta (PPB) No 
2000-2004 Marta Suplicy (PT) Yes 
a Mayor’s partisan affiliation at the time he or she ran for office. 
b Brasília, the Federal District , operates under the gubernatorial electoral calendar. 
c As the originating city for Bolsa Escola, its adoption in 1995 does not constitute a case of diffusion.  
d The program was suspended or discontinued and then reintroduced under new names. 




 There are several broad patterns across the 12 cases that are worth noting at the 
onset.  First, adoption of Bolsa Escola occurs at different points in time; each city adopts 
the policy during different administrative cycles.  After Brasília’s innovation Salvador 
was the first city to replicate it, followed by Belo Horizonte and then São Paulo.  Second, 
all of the administrations to adopt Bolsa Escola were left-of center, yet not all cities 
governed by a leftist adopted the program.  For instance, Belo Horizonte (1992-1996) had 
a Workers’ Party mayor who did not adopt the policy.  This suggests perhaps that left-
leaning majors are necessary but not sufficient for emulation of this program.  Third, one 
of the most striking features of Bolsa Escola replication is that it did not necessarily 
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“stick”.  There are several instances of policy reversal – Brasília and Salvador – where 
programs were suspended following the start of a new administration.  Thus, the case 
studies provide an opportunity to examine both the determinants of policy diffusion as 
well as the reasons for policy reversal.  
Political Incentives 
A political incentives approach offers an intuitively appealing explanation for the 
spread of Bolsa Escola in Brazil. Policy advocates for Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima 
suggest these programs spread because they are politically attractive (Interviews Buarque 
2004; Suplicy 2003).  In what ways does the nature of the policy itself allow for a 
political incentives explanation of its adoption?  Does political competition drive local 
politicians’ day-to-day decision-making? Do political leaders decide to adopt these 
programs to win elections? Do political incentives explain the timing of diffusion?  
In many ways, Bolsa Escola is the type of policy that calculating politicians are 
eager to adopt in order to sustain their electoral popularity.  Given that Brazil has 
compulsory voting, Bolsa Escola, which targets poor constituencies, can be especially 
useful in electoral politics.  To contextualize the potential impact of the poor’s vote, in 
Salvador in 1991 approximately 35 percent of the population had monthly per capita 
incomes of 75 reais24 (Martins & Libâno 2005).  While figures for the other case study 
cities is less dramatic – Belo Horizonte 19 percent; Brasília 17 percent, and São Paulo 8 
percent (Martins & Libâno 2005) – this population is still substantial enough to sway 
                                                 
24 This figure represents half a minimum monthly salary (in 2000). 
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elections in competitive races.  It is only natural to imagine that families that receive the 
cash grant and rise out of extreme poverty would choose to reward the politicians that 
backed the policy.    
Even though Bolsa Escola targeted a specific group of beneficiaries and 
distinguished between the “haves” and “have nots,” the policy did not exacerbate class 
cleavages and was widely appealing across income groups.  Several factors contributed to 
its wide acceptance.  First, the school grant program was similar to other social assistance 
programs local governments have long offered to the poorest and most vulnerable.  
Municipalities have long provided poor families with school uniforms, school supplies, 
and food baskets, albeit on an ad-hoc and irregular basis.  Others liked that the program 
could empower the poor to manage household resources and take responsibility for their 
children’s education.  Among others still, there was speculation that increasing cash-
resources to local economies could have positive economic effects.  While Bolsa Escola’s 
policy design differed from previous public assistance efforts, it fit in line with historic 
municipal efforts to alleviate poverty and assist the poor.   
Electoral competition is an important feature of local politics for Salvador, São 
Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Brasília and we would expect that candidates for executive 
office and current mayors would use their policy position to attract and retain voters. 
Certainly, the pressure to win elections and distinguish oneself from one’s competitor is 
crucially important in the Brazilian municipal arena. Though personalism is still a 
characteristic of Brazilian politics, candidates do refer to their policy preferences or 
specify programs they would enact once in office.  Campaigning on the provision of 
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these social programs can offer a clear opportunity to gain votes and clarify the field 
when voters are faced with numerous candidates.  So how did Bolsa Escola come to play 
in the electoral arena?   
Despite the name recognition of the policy, few candidates actively campaigned 
on their intentions to implement program.  Those who did were leftist candidates, 
including Cristovam Buarque, Marta Suplicy, and Célio Castro.  (Lidice da Mata, who 
also implemented the program, only became familiar with the program after she was in 
office.) Their centerist and rightist counterparts however, did not, despite the potential to 
garner a similar benefit for publicly supporting the program.     
Interestingly, when the time came to implement the policy, Bolsa Escola 
administrators perceived the program to be risky.  As a coordinator of the program in 
Belo Horizonte explained: 
When executives carry out effective programs and the population views it 
favorably, it can result in votes. But, I think it was difficult at the time to 
determine what the electoral payoffs would be (Interview Leitao, 2004). 
 
There were several administrative uncertainties that gave technocrats pause.  First, Bolsa 
Escola could increase school attendance, but by incorporating previously marginalized 
and failing students into the system, other performance indicators would likely decline.  
Second, Bolsa Escola was actually disliked by teachers who were skeptical about the 
program and its benefits.25  As Marisa Pacheco noted, the BE is not a singular solution to 
education. “Once you bring children into the classroom, other problems arise, including: 
                                                 
25 Merilee Grindle offers a useful analysis on the ways in which teachers’ unions have perceived 
themselves as “losers” when it comes to education reform in Latin America (2004). 
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limited classroom space, the need to develop strategies to help students catch up, and the 
need for improved teacher instruction” (Interview Pacheco, 2004).  But the program was 
also unpopular in terms of traditional corporatist politics; teachers’ unions preferred that 
education policies enhance teacher pay and classroom supplies (Interview Aguilar 2003).  
Despite these challenges, the Buarque administration proceeded in instituting the 
pioneering Bolsa Escola program.  Mayors Célio Castro in Belo Horizonte and Lídice da 
Mata in Salvador also signed on to Bolsa Escola very early on, in spite of the risks of 
policy failure.  Only Marta Suplicy, who emulated the program in 2000 in São Paulo, 
would benefit from having a cadre of technocrats already familiar with similar municipal 
policies.26 
For these case study cities, the replication of Bolsa Escola offers some surprising 
findings.  In theory, the education stipend could have been attractive to a broad set of 
politicians.  The program could have been a natural extension of “politics as usual” 
practices, including patronage politics, clientalism, and pre-election payoffs.  But only 
left-of-center mayors choose to emulate Bolsa Escola, suggesting that politicians made 
their policy choices based on other factors.  Given that these programs cost municipalities 
their own resources and that federal incentives27 were non-existent, there must have been 
                                                 
26 Ana Fonsceca, the director of Renda Mínima in São Paulo, had conducted evaluations of similar 
programs in Belo Horizonte, Brasília, Campinas, and Salavdor.  At the time, she held an academic post at 
UNICAMP.  
27 None of the cities that adopted municipal Bolsa Escola or Renda Mínima programs benefited from 
federal funds.  Vertical diffusion – such as that caused by federal inducements through financing – was not 
a feature of municipal Bolsa Escola replication.  Belo Horizonte, São Paulo, and Salvador all created their 
own municipal programs without federal subsidies demonstrates that horizontal diffusion across cities does 
take place.  Surprisingly, even when the federal government later initiated its own program, many cities 
including Belo Horizonte and São Paulo balked at the chance to integrate their municipal program with the 
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something else that drove mayors da Mata, Castro, and Suplicy to emulate the education 
program.   
Ideology 
Traditional ideological divides between the left and the right had a particularly 
strong impact on the adoption of Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima programs.  Politicians 
to the left-of-center, from the Workers’ Party (PT), Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), and 
the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSBD), tended to emphasize social programs in 
their campaigns and policymaking. Elected officials revealed a dramatically consistent 
framing of ideological objectives and values when prioritizing issues and selecting public 
policies. Nearly every politician and technocrat from the Workers’ Party, for instance, 
justified his or her policy choices with notions of “social rights,” governmental 
responsibilities, and the need to invert spending to prioritize the poorest and most 
vulnerable sectors of the population.  
For many actors ideologically to the left-of-center, Bolsa Escola and Renda 
Mínima represented a profound transformation in the relationship between the state and 
citizens. In their analysis, public assistance programs had historically reflected traditional 
clientalistic approaches to social assistance. These programs were often administered by 
the wives of mayors who took them on as part of their charitable first-lady obligations, 
regardless of whether she had professional credentials in the field.  Thus, critics on the 
left argued that municipal-run programs that offered hand-outs, such as electronic 
                                                                                                                                                 
federal one, which would have allowed them to reduce municipal expenditures.  They also maintained their 
own municipal programs even after their cities began administering the federal program.   
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appliances or baby clothes, were more often than not vehicles for vote-buying.  
Moreover, they also failed to address the causes of poverty.  In contrast, advocates of 
Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima argued their program would give children a chance to 
get out of poverty, while also empowering mothers to decide how to spend the grant.  
Bolsa Escola program coordinators displayed remarkable convergence of ideological 
discourse around these general themes. They also expressed a desire to address social 
exclusion and a belief that education was an important component of citizenship. When 
politicians discussed why they had chosen to adopt a school grant program, they all cited 
problems like social inequality and the need to address the “social deficit.”   
Cities governed by executives from the right-of-center parties took a very 
different approach and mostly ignored Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima proposals. In 
general, right-of-center mayors emphasized policies that encouraged business interests or 
market competition and enacted policies that were framed along these conservative 
rationales. Unlike their left-of-center opponents, conservatives’ political campaigns often 
highlighted and prioritized their progress in non-social policy arenas. In campaigns for 
re-election for instance, Mayor Antônio Imbassahy in Salvador emphasized his 
administration’s accomplishments in infrastructure projects, while Governor Joaquim 
Roriz in Brasília highlighted the construction of an award-winning bridge.  
The different discourse of actors on the left and right could be easily dismissed as 
a rhetorical device were it not for the fact that left-of-center politicians were consistent in 
their follow-through and implementation of Bolsa Escola.  In the case studies, emulation 
of Bolsa and Renda Mínima occurred under left and left-of-center politicians: Belo 
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Horizonte under Célio Castro (PSB), São Paulo under Marta Suplicy (PT), and Salvador 
under Lídice da Mata28 (PSDB).  Some politicians were so committed to the ideals 
behind Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima that they implemented and defended the 
programs in ways that perplexed even their own allies.   
Longtime advisors to Governor Cristovam Buarque and Mayor Lídice da Mata 
admitted they could not logically explain the actions taken by their candidates.  For 
instance, Mayor Lídice da Mata implemented the Programa Renda Mínima Familiar in 
her last year of office even though it was clear she would lose her bid for re-election and 
understood that her successor would most likely dismantle the program once his term 
began.  She also faced criticism from her supporters and inner circle of confidants, who 
argued that a Renda Mínima program was only feasible for cities flush with resources; 
they argued Salvador faced too many deficits for this type of specialized effort.  Even so, 
she went ahead out of principle because she was personally committed to the goals of the 
program (Interview, Mata 2004).  Cristovam Buarque also deviated from instrumental 
political rationality in a way that could only be understood as grounded in his ideological 
commitments. During his campaign for re-election in 1998, he did not reach out to the 
mothers of Bolsa Escola and consistently told his audiences that the social programs 
enacted during his administration were part of the state’s obligations and constituted their 
social rights. Accordingly, he told beneficiaries of programs like Bolsa Escola that they 
did not owe him their votes and should feel free to vote for whomever they wished 
                                                 
28 According to Coppedge (1997) the PSDB is a centrist party.  Lídice da Mata’s own ideological 
dispositions place her on the left-of-center. After her term as mayor of Salvador, she joins the leftist party, 
PSB.  
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(Interviews Buarque 2004; Ibañez 2003). The Buarque campaign staff admitted his 
ideological speeches confused voters and contributed to his electoral defeat (Interview 
Aguiar 2003). These examples of seemingly irrational decision-making by Lídice da 
Mata and Cristovam Buarque confirm the hypotheses that some politicians are indeed 
driven by their own deeply held values and will make decisions that go against their own 
self-interest.   
Right-of-center politicians and their senior staff also displayed their own 
ideological tendencies when it came to the social policy development.  In general, right of 
center politicians and their politically appointed technocrats did not mention a “social 
deficit” when discussing their policy priorities.  Rather, administrators and political 
appointees associated with the Imbassahy (PFL), Roriz29 (PMDB), Maluf (PDS) and Pitta 
(PPB) administrations emphasized market-oriented priorities for economic development, 
including tourism, business development, and major public works.  Given their 
ideological predispositions, it is not surprisingly that when left-leaning mayors lost their 
bids for re-election, their successors dismantled their predecessor’s education stipend 
programs.  For instance, in Salvador, Mayor Imbassahy (PFL) simply dissolved the 
Programa de Renda Mínima Familiar.  The city’s secretary of Social Development, 
Raimundo Caires Araujo, noted that social policies were not among the mayor’s top 
priorities and the secretariat for social assistance had a limited budget (Interview 2004).  
For this reason, their projects were small and often included sponsorship from private 
                                                 
29 According to Coppedge (1997) the PMDB is a centrist party.  Joaquim Roriz’s own ideological 
dispositions place him on the right.  
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firms. In general, the city of Salvador administered federal programs (such as PETI, 
Bolsa Escola Federal, Agente Jovem), a few municipal social assistance programs30, and 
targeted projects such as a youth orchestra and small-scale cooperatives where 
participates would develop arts and crafts goods for sale (Interview Araújo, 2004).  
Mayor da Mata’s Renda Mínima program was so short lived and absent from the public 
memory that Secretary Araujo acknowledged he was unfamiliar with it.  He also admitted 
that it had not occurred to him to institute a municipal Renda Mínima program.  While 
staff in Salvador who worked on social policy were committed to their public assistance 
work, what was most striking was their rhetoric.  Or rather, what was notable was the 
absence of a “left” rhetoric.  City officials never mentioned legacies of exploitation, 
social exclusion, racism, or lack of citizenship.  Nor did they frame their work in the 
context of democratic practice or empowering the poor.    
The administration of Governor Roriz (PMDB) from 1998-2002 in Brasília offers 
a parallel account.  As in Salvador, when the right-of-center governor entered office in 
1998 after defeating left-of-center Buarque, he quickly moved to terminate the Bolsa 
Escola program.  His staff declared the program unnecessary because the district did not 
have problems with irregular school attendance but rather low academic performance.  
The district suspended enrollment of new families in the Bolsa Escola program and 
designed an alternative program, Successo no Aprender (Success in Learning), that 
provided students with school uniforms, school supplies, eye exams, and extra classes on 
                                                 
30 For instance in 2000, the city provided needy citizens with a “cesta baxica” (food basket), containing 
basic goods such as rice, beans, noodles, etc.  Shortly thereafter, the municipality began working with 
grocery stores to enable beneficiaries to use supermarket cash cards for food purchases.   
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Saturdays, eliminating the cash-grant altogether.  In other words, the administration 
returned to a more traditional mode of public assistance.  At the time, the administration’s 
decision to suspend registration into the Bolsa Escola program drew considerable 
criticism from the news media but officials pressed on with their intention to evaluate 
Buarque’s Bolsa Escola and create their own education programs31 (Interview Lima 
2003).   
In 2001, the Roriz administration provided the only instance in this study of the 
Bolsa Escola reinstatement.  The city reintroduced a school grant program under the new 
name, Renda Minha (My Income), combining elements of both Bolsa Escola and 
Sussesso no Aprender.  The director of the program, Lílian Carneiro Lima, downplayed 
the notion that politics or media pressures led to the decision to reintroduce the program; 
rather, she emphasized that their decision reflected policy evaluations and assessments of 
various programs (Interview 2003).  Unfortunately, it is difficult to disentangle these 
actors’ motivations for re-instituting a education stipend program.  Tracing the internal 
decision-making process of the Roriz administration is particularly difficult due to a lack 
of transparency.  Public officials associated with the Renda Minha program were 
reluctant to discuss internal processes, provide documents, or discuss the number of 
beneficiaries.  Several technocrats explained that unless their supervisors granted 
approval, they were barred from providing “private internal documents” as they were not 
“public.”  Higher-level officials also refused requests for interviews.  Nevertheless, it is 
                                                 
31 Officials disregarded the evaluations by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas-São Paulo, UNESCO, and the 
World Bank and commissioned their own study.  The study the Roriz administration commissioned was not 
made available.  
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possible to conclude that the decision-making process for reintroducing Renda Minha in 
2001 was considerably different from that of Bolsa Escola in 1995.  Unlike his 
predecessor, Renda Minha was not a major symbol of Governor Roriz’s administration. 
The policy had less visibility both in terms of his politics and personal discourse (e.g. in 
campaigns and in the media).  One implication of this case may be that left-of center 
ideology matters more for instances of first-time policy emulation than it does in the rare 
circumstances when policy reenactment occurs.   
Ideology offers an important lens for understanding why politicians and their 
senior staff implemented Bolsa Escola.  Politicians and their politically appointed senior 
staff shared similar dispositions and worldviews about the relative importance of social 
policy.  These individuals shared likeminded commitments to prioritize policies that 
would address the long-standing social inequalities and persistent poverty.  While left-of-
center political actors generally shared similar partisan affiliations, such as the PT, 
PSDB, and PSB, they noted that their decision-making was independent of partisan 
directives.  In fact, early adopters of Bolsa Escola noted that their emulation decision 
preceded their party’s decision to endorse the program (Interview Buarque 2004; 
Interview da Mata 2004).  As Buarque explained, the policy itself was in line with a 
subset of members of the Workers Party who favored a progressive vision of social 
policy, but in the early and mid-1990s, the party itself was reluctant to officially endorse 
the policy (2004).32    
                                                 
32 In Buarque’s assessment, in the early and mid-1990s the Workers Party was comprised of three distinct 
streams: 1) those connected via unions; 2) those who interested in economic issues; and 3) those who were 
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For most cities, the timing of Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima emulation 
coincided with changes in administration as left-of-center mayors took office.  The only 
instance where a city with a leftist administration did not adopt the program was in Belo 
Horizonte under the Patrus Ananias administration (1992-1996).  This suggests that while 
a left-of-center ideological commitment is necessary for emulation to occur, it might not 
be sufficient.  Early adoption in particular, requires that actors learn about innovations 
quickly.   In this way, decision-making might entail more than a self-regarding decision 
process by include a socializing process as well.  The next section on social networks 
explores the extent to which emulation decisions reflected a process of social networking.  
Social Networks 
Civil society organization can serve a crucial function by creating opportunities 
for formal networking and learning.  Education policy has been a central thematic interest 
among Brazilian associations; according to the Ministry of Justice, there are nearly two 
hundred public interest non-governmental organizations whose primary focus is 
education.33   Yet, one of the important features of this sector is the way in which 
traditional corporatist interests, represented by teachers’ unions, have retained their 
influence in larger policy debates.   In practice, teachers have taken a more narrow view 
of education policy, focusing on debates regarding curriculum development, pedagogy, 
                                                                                                                                                 
interested in social priorities. PT affiliates who had commitments to social issues were more interested in 
Bolsa Escola.  Since the PT has a São Paulo bias, it took a while for Bolsa Escola to garner the attention of 
the mainstream in the party (Interview 2004).  
33 The Ministry of Justice monitors public interest civil society organizations in Brazil and provides a 
directory of these organizations on this website. 
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textbooks, classroom conditions, teacher training, and teacher pay.  Education stipend 
programs challenged the notion of what constituted an “education policy,” as they 
integrated components of poverty alleviation with education goals.  In other words, 
features of the policy itself created some cognitive dissonance for educators.  But in 
addition to these conceptual policy differences, Bolsa Escola represented a political 
conflict over resources and funding priorities.  Unions generally worried that the funds 
for the program would come from allocated set-asides for primary education, which 
federal law mandates, rather than municipalities’ general operating budget.  One of the 
ironies about Bolsa Escola is that Brazil’s most internationally recognized education 
policy was hardly a central issue among education professionals.34    
Despite the low levels of interest in Bolsa Escola among education professionals, 
there were a few formal associations and avenues for learning that were important.  
Quasi-governmental associations such as Conselho Nacional de Secretários de Educação 
(CONSED) and União dos Dirigentes Municipais de Educação (UNDIME) were key 
institutions for UNESCO officials who wanted to engage in education policy 
development (Interview Cunha 2004).  An award from UNICEF in 1996 also lent 
international credibility for the policy.  Yet, one of the most important organizations to 
contribute to the spread of education stipend programs in Brazil was not specifically an 
“education” association, but a generalist policy entity: Programa Gestão Pública e 
Cidadania (Public Management and Citizenship Program), housed in the prestigious 
                                                 
34 When Cristovam Buarque lost his bid for re-election, rather than work with an existing education 
organization, he established his non-governmental organization. Missão Criança was created to promote the 
spread of Bolsa Escola in Brazil and worldwide.   
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public management school of the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo.   As a 
UNESCO official explained, it should not be surprising that Bolsa Escola would appeal 
to a generalist policy audience: 
Bolsa Escola appeals to a lot of different people… I think that as an idea, 
BE was most attractive to people in non-education sectors; people who 
work on social policy, poverty, social assistance, etc.  You see, I always 
consider education to be a very conservative field.  There are three 
conservative institutions in society: the church, the military, and the 
schools… This phenomenon of being conservative, i.e. slow to change, is 
very much present in education (Interview Cunha, 2004).   
 
The Public Management Citizenship Program emerged as a particularly important 
organization among generalist policy professionals by socializing them to follow the 
latest trends in their field.  Part of its influence relates to its very institutional design, 
which includes a dissemination strategy to publicize award winning good governance 
programs.  They also hold public awards ceremonies so that national and local press can 
provide media coverage on the finalists.  The program also has a general outreach 
component that includes working with the press, producing of videos, and developing 
materials for municipal, states, and federal use.  Since it is housed in a school of public 
management, the staff also write books and case studies based on the award winning 
entries and hold thematic conferences for practitioners and scholars alike.  From the 
perspective of public administrators, participation in the program’s activities offers 
several benefits.  First and foremost, when administrators submit entries for the annual 
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innovations competition they gain recognition and visibility for their work.35  While some 
elected officials and their political appointees encourage their staff to submit entries for 
the competition, more often policy professional themselves seek out the legitimacy the 
competition offers.  Winning the award also creates the potential that applicants’ 
programs will survive the turmoil that comes with elections and new executives.36  It also 
provides civil servants with the affirmation they seek from their peers, that their work 
meets the profession’s standards of excellence.  
Both Brasília and Campinas received Public Management and Citizenship awards 
in 1996 for their respective education stipend policies. In partnership with the NGO 
Instituto Pólis, the Fundação Getúlio Vargas- São Paulo (FGV-SP) produced publications 
describing Bolsa Escola and hosted conferences and meetings that featured officials from 
Brasília.  As Marisa Pacheco, the coordinator of Bolsa Escola in Brasília noted, the 
Department of Education received many invitations to participate in conferences to talk 
about Bolsa Escola. Those invitations were normally divided between Governor Buarque, 
Secretary Ibañez and herself.  Nearly ten years after she started directing the program, 
Pacheco recalled that some of the most important venues for disseminating information 
about the Bolsa Escola in Brasília were at the seminars held by the FGV-SP (Interview 
2004).  Civil servants in São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, and Salvador confirmed that they 
                                                 
35 All applicants receive a certificate from the program and all entries are included in a public database, 
available on the Internet. 
36 Policy continuity across different mayoral and gubernatorial administrations is relatively rare in the 
Brazilian context. 
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were familiar with the awards program, had attended a meeting, or had received 
publications from Public Management and Citizenship program.   
In addition to the opportunities for formal socialization afforded by professional 
networks, elected officials and policy professionals cited “informal” contacts as crucial 
for convincing them to initiate change, oftentimes these developed in highly idiosyncratic 
ways.  Mayor Lídice da Mata decided to implement a Renda Mínima program after 
hearing the Mayor of Campinas, a friend of hers, describe his city’s program at a 
conference (Interview Mata 2004).  The mayors knew each other well, as they were both 
in PSDB and occasionally attended the same events.  In Belo Horizonte, the first efforts 
to institute Bolsa Escola originated from the city council, when Rogério Correia (PT) 
proposed replicating it in 1996.  Correia reported that as a fellow partisan, he had been 
following Buarque’s campaign for Governor in 1995; as a fellow “educator” he took 
special interest in his education proposals (Interview 2004).  Rogério drafted legislation 
to initiate a Bolsa Escola in Belo Horizonte, emulating every feature of the Brasília 
program.37  He also invited Buarque to testify before the city council to explain the 
program (Interview Correia 2004).  As a well known politician in the Workers’ Party, 
Marta Suplicy met Buarque on numerous occasions and learned about the well publicized 
program, Bolsa Escola.  But in Marta Suplicy’s case, her informal socialization process 
                                                 
37 The legislation for Belo Horionte is a replica of the program in Brasília, including defining eligible 
families, the stipend, and targeting of women as beneficiaries.  When it came time to implement the 
program, municipal administrators retained these program features (Interview Rocha 2003; Interview 
Leitão 2004; Interview Céres 2004).    
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occurred closer to home as her husband Senator Eduardo Suplicy, had been a major 
supporter of local Renda Mínima initiatives.38  
These informal network processes were not only important for elected officials, 
but also for their political appointees and senior staff.  Horizontal learning was a major 
feature of Bolsa Escola emulation, as cities seeking to implement the policy visited 
innovating cities.  The Secretariat of Education in Brasília frequently hosted visitors from 
other cities and states (Interview Pacecho 2004; Interview Ibañez 2003; Interview 
Aguilar 2003).  Officials in Salvador for instance, traveled to Campinas to see how the 
Renda Mínima Familiar worked there.  When Belo Horizonte took up the policy, Mayor 
Celio Castro’s wife, who served as Secretary of Public Assistance, visited Campinas.  
The city’s technical staff however, visited Brasília to learn how they had determined 
eligibility for families and designed their registry (Interview Leitão 2004).  Although 
technocrats in Belo Horizonte conducted their own poverty assessment in anticipation of 
the program, they closely followed Brasília’s plan.  That decision was largely due to the 
fact that Belo Horizonte’s legislation essentially copied Brasília’s plan. When Marta 
Suplicy enacted a Renda Mínima program of her own, she tapped Ana Fonseca to direct 
the program.  As a scholar at UNICAMP, Fonseca had evaluated the Renda Mínima 
program in Campinas and was aware of similar programs in other cities (Fonseca 2001).    
In the case of Bolsa Escola, social networks served two important, albeit separate, 
functions.  First, formal and informal networks socialized actors on the latest 
developments and norms in their respective fields.  Both technocrats and politicians 
                                                 
38 The couple separated in 2001 and divorced in 2003. 
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wanted to demonstrate they were aware of the latest trends and sought to gain legitimacy 
among their peers.  Being a “follower” or “emulator” for cities such as Belo Horizonte, 
Salvador, or São Paulo was not perceived negatively.  Technocrats and politicians would 
simply emphasize their city’s unique features (e.g. high poverty rates, lower Human 
Development indicators) and accomplishments (e.g. program size and speed of 
implementation).  Second, connectivity to social networks facilitated the learning process 
by providing policymakers with cognitive shortcuts that enabled them to emulate policies 
fairly quickly and with few adjustments.  Even though the cities that adopted these 
programs had highly skilled technocrats who could have tailored these programs for local 
conditions, administrators largely engaged in wholesale replication of Bolsa Escola and 
Renda Mínima programs.     
CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS  
These case studies of Bolsa Escola adoption reveal the way left-of-center 
ideology and linkages to social networks both contributed to emulation decisions.  
Similarly, instances of administrations that failed to replicate the education grant program 
show that neither a mayor’s leftist ideology nor the presence of professional networks, 
was by itself sufficient to bring about diffusion.  Both social norms and ideology 
mattered by shaping actors’ motivations and reinforcing decision-making. 
 Implementation of the education program required that executives seek policies 
consistent with their deeply held values.  These politicians all held a desire to remedy 
long-standing inequality and prioritize programs that would enhance citizenship by 
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alleviating social exclusion.  If a leftist worldview was a prerequisite for emulation 
decisions, it certainly was not sufficient to ensure adoption.  For example, Mayor Patrus 
Ananias (PT) in Belo Horizonte chose not to implement the program in his last year in 
office, despite legislative efforts by leftist city council members.  What also mattered in 
all these cases was not only the presence of a committed politician, but also his or her 
connection to a professional network.  Municipal executives often met one another 
through formal events and informal contacts, both of which offered opportunities to share 
information about the latest development and highlight their administrations’ 
accomplishments.  
Similar network relationships matter for technical staff and high-level technocrats.  
Those individuals who worked on poverty and social development were often familiar 
with educational stipend programs and could name those cities that were ahead of the 
curve.  Yet, technocrats’ desires to demonstrate their knowledge of professional norms 
were insufficient to lead to Bolsa Escola emulation.   For instance, civil servants in the 
office of Work and Social Development in the Antônio Imbassahy administration had 
publications from the Public Management and Citizenship Office on their bookshelves. 
They also identified Porto Alegre and Campinas as cities in the vanguard for designing 
innovative social policies.39  That his administration had abandoned an education stipend 
program was not for lack of technocratic socialization or knowledge, but rather, reflected 
the absence of an ideological commitment on the part of the city’s leadership to do so.  
                                                 
39 Porto Alegre in Rio Grande do Sul, is well known for the Orçamento Participativo (Participatory 
Budgeting). 
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The central role that ideology and social norms hold for Bolsa Escola/Renda 
Mínima emulation is surprising because it conflicts with so much of what we have come 
to expect about the politics of redistribution.  Local governments in Brazil are well 
known for their history of local caciques who dominate the electoral arena through 
political patronage.  Education stipend programs like Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima 
could have had powerful electoral effects for politicians of all stripes.  It would have been 
logical for calculating policymakers to emulate these programs as a vehicle for self-
interested political behavior.  Yet, these ten case studies demonstrate that, despite the 
logic of a political incentives explanation for policy emulation, it is actors’ social justice 
commitments and connections to their peers that matter.       
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CHAPTER 5: PROGRAMA SAÚDE DA FAMÍLIA: FROM A SMALL PROJECT TO 
MAJOR REFORM 
  
Today, the Programa Saúde da Família (PSF) is widely accepted as a new model 
for basic health service provision in Brazil.  But to explain how and why it grew from a 
small project adopted by a few local governments to widespread health care reform 
across the country, this chapter explores the process by which it diffused and why 
policymakers came to emulate it.  In the early 1990s it was not at all evident that PSF 
would come to represent a useful framework for all cities.  After all, the program is based 
on innovative experiments in preventive health that were designed for rather unique 
Brazilian cities; the early precursors of PSF were community-based programs in the arid 
poor state of Ceará in the Northeast, and the large city of Niterói, which displayed high 
levels of human development.  Yet, despite the unique features of the program’s earliest 
adopters, the policy would eventually spark a tidal wave of emulations.  
To explain why policymakers came to embrace PSF and were motivated to 
emulate it in their own municipalities, this chapter first contextualizes national health 
reform efforts since the democratic opening.  Central issues during this time period 
include real advances in social rights for health care access as well as stalled efforts to 
fulfill state obligations.  Decentralization nevertheless opened the door for municipal 
experimentation in health policy in the late 1980s and 1990s.  The second section of the 
chapter provides an overview of state and local innovation, which laid the foundation for 
the family health program.  The last section draws on twelve case studies to uncover the 
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mechanisms that led to PSF emulation decisions.  Qualitative evidence from interviews 
with policymakers reveals how their decisions reflected deeply held ideological beliefs 
and desires to seek professional legitimacy by following social norms.  These findings are 
remarkable given that the provision of basic healthcare can easily contribute to rent-
seeking behavior and yield electoral payoffs for mayors. 
NATIONAL CONTEXT FOR HEALTH POLICY REFORM 
Historically, health policy in Brazil was tied to a larger public social security 
system that included old age assistance.  The origins of Brazil’s social security system 
date back to the 1920s, when the state preempted an emerging working class movement 
by granting social protections to selected sectors (Malloy 1979, chap 2 as cited by 
Weyland 1996: 89). It was later extended by the authoritarian government of Getúlio 
Vargas (1930-1945) to include more sectors of the economy into the state-corporatist 
system (Collier and Collier 1979, as cited by Weyland 1996: 89).  Like the Bismarckian 
social insurance system, the Brazilian state tied pensions and health care entitlements to 
worker and employer contributions.  This corporatist policy favored formal sectors of the 
economy, organized labor, and excluded informal and rural sectors of the economy 
(Huber 1996).  In so doing, Brazilian social policy not only left out those groups that 
were most in need of social protection, but also exacerbated social inequality.   
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During the military regime (1964-1985) the public social insurance system largely 
retained its Biskmarckian characteristics.1  The highly centralized federal agency, 
Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica da Previdência Social (INAMPS) administered 
health care benefits.  INAMPS managed public health care facilities and contracts for 
services with private hospitals, clinics, laboratories, and doctors to provide state-funded 
medical services for federal and private sector workers (Arretche 2002).  The system 
favored specialized medical services as doctors, public hospitals, and clinics were paid 
according to the type of services rendered.  This created incentives for physicians to 
maximize expensive, complex services to increase revenue (Arretche 2002:160).  Basic 
medicine was left to two entities: the federal Ministry of Health, which drew on the 
general revenue budget, and state-level health agencies, which operated independently 
with their own budgetary resources.  By the late 1980s however, the federal government 
had largely abandoned basic health care altogether.  Nearly all primary care was managed 
by state and local governments (Arretche 2002: 160-161).2 
The transition to democracy ushered in the first stage of major health care reform.  
Some advocates for change noted that the existing social insurance system was expensive 
due to its focus on curative medicine, which only benefited a select few, and called for 
                                                 
1 A notable change was the expansion of benefits to agricultural workers.  To curb the swell of rural-urban 
migration and preempt rural opposition and mobilization, the repressive government of General Emílio 
Médici (1969-1974) created a social security scheme for agricultural workers (FUNRURAL) and delegated 
its administration to the National Confederation of Rural Workers (CONTAG).  This strategy sought to 
create a positive constituency for ARENA (Stepan 1978, chap. 2-3 would call this “inclusionary 
corporatism”).  Their benefits would be subsidized by the urban sectors since these workers often lived in 
conditions of extreme poverty and could not afford a contribution scheme (Weyland 1996:90).  This 
arrangement would later lay the foundation for incorporating other marginalized workers.    
2 Sub-national governments were responsible for 93 percent of all primary care. 
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greater emphasis on prevention.  Others noted that the social insurance system had left 
out informal sectors.3  Sanitaristas, who represented a new generation of health 
professionals, local health authorities, and left-wing health experts, called for universal 
health coverage.4  The sanitary movement (movimento sanitário) successfully allied with 
other social movement mobilizations for democratization to advance progressive health 
reform.  These reformers found an audience for their advocacy at the VIII Conferência 
Nacional de Saúde (March 1986), which was convened by the presidency and the 
Ministry of Health.  Their participation at the event allowed them to substantially shape 
the conference’s final resolutions, which called for reorganization of national health care.  
It also declared it the state’s obligation to fulfill objectives such as universalization, 
participation, and decentralization.  The debate and outcomes of the conference laid the 
foundation for subsequent debates over health policy, which would take place during the 
Constitutional Assembly.   
The sanitarista movement made impressive strides in the late 1980s to enshrine 
progressive social rights in the constitutional text.5  They successfully articulated their 
vision, including universal rights to health care, prioritization of basic health, and 
                                                 
3 Not only did the INAMPS system reflect a Bismarckian contribution scheme that favord elite interests, 
but the uneven distribution of medical services across the country further exacerbated social exclusion.  For 
instance, in the mid-1960s, of the 3,972 municipalities in the country, 2,089 (53 percent) lacked a physician 
(Mello 1977:107).  Aggregate numbers however, mask regional disparities: in the southeast and south only 
36.7 percent and 40.1 percent of cities lacked physicians, respectively;  figures for the central west (66.3 
percent), North (75.7 percent) and Northeast (70.8 percent) were dramatically higher (Mello 1977:108) 
4 From 1960 to 1970, there was a dramatic increase in the number of schools of medicine; from 29 to 73, 
representing an average increase of 5 university programs per annum (Mello: 1977:179).  The 1970s was 
also an important turning point for the burgeoning field of public health.  Previously, medical schools 
emphasized social medicine (medicina social) which is conceptually different from a public health 
framework (Cohn 1989:126).   
5 According to Cohn, in formulating their political strategies, the Sanitary Movement would collaborate 
with various sectors, including other social movements (1989: 129).   
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decentralization.6  While the constituent assembly would water down some of their 
proposals, the venue proved particularly amenable to the movement’s political strategies.  
In the end, Brazil’s democratic constitution proclaimed a universal right to health and 
reinforced the state’s obligation to carry out those responsibilities through a free unified 
health system.   
Once the constitution was promulgated, however, changes in health policy would 
largely stall.  Although the constitution had articulated broad principles for progressive 
health care, many of the details on the unified health system were left unspecified and 
reforms would falter through much of the early 1990s.  Several factors contributed to 
delays in transforming the system.  First, once Congress met to institute new legislation, 
opponents of progressive health reform (medical businesses, INAMPS bureaucrats, and 
conservative politicians) successfully resisted equalizing proposals.  As a result, 
decentralization efforts that would have prioritized primary care came to a standstill. 
Efforts to shift the ministry’s resources for basic health would falter as profit-seeking 
hospitals would continue to benefit contracts for mid- and high-level complex services. 
Second, Brazil faced a fiscal crisis in the mid-1990s that made it difficult to 
increase spending for health care without cutting expenditures elsewhere.  Health 
                                                 
6 Although the SUS includes principles of universal coverage and access, the sanitaristas were unable to 
achieve the goal of a single national health policy.  Public sector expansion would take place, but Brazil 
would retain a dual system of public and private health insurance.  In practice, middle and upper class 
families have access to private health insurance.  The universality of the SUS however, means that private 
insurance carriers have few incentives to cover the most expensive medical cases, such as organ 
transplants, and well-off Brazilians return to the public for the most sophisticated high-cost care.  The 
current system amounts to an indirect public subsidy to well-off Brazilians, further contributing to inequity; 
at least 15 percent of SUS spending goes to the well-off (top three income deciles), mostly for expensive 
treatments reducing resources for less well-off (World Bank 2004:164) 
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Minister Adib Jatene lobbied extensively to increase revenue for health and won 
legislative approval for a constitutional amendment creating earmarked revenue for 
health care.  Yet, the increase in revenue for the Health Ministry would represent a short 
lived victory.  Minister Jatene lacked political clout in the cabinet; the Minister of 
Finance Pedro Malan opposed new taxes, especially those targeted for particular 
spending areas.  Thus, the finance ministry simply cut the health ministry’s resources to 
offset the gains from the new earmarked taxes (Arretche 2004:175).  This episode over 
budgetary allocations demonstrated the weakness of the Ministry of Health, which would 
suffer under politically vulnerable ministers until President Cardoso would select José 
Serra, a close political ally, in 1998.  
Third, while the sanitaristas had been effective in pushing for reforms during the 
democratic transition, their political influence diminished thereafter.  Although 
decentralization had been a major goal of the sanitary movement, to combat the influence 
of the medical industry at the national level, in practice it also had the effect of diverting 
its attention from the national policy arena.  Additionally, the sanitary movement was 
unable to sustain its broad advocacy coalition.  Not only did it lose the strength in 
partnership with other social movements, but internal coalitions began to splinter 
reflecting the divisions among the movement’s members (Cohn 1989:132).  As a result, 
many sanitaristas turned their attention to local initiatives for preventive medicine. 
Despite all the political, administrative, and fiscal challenges for health reform in 
the 1990s, Brazil did manage to enact incremental changes.  The second wave of reforms 
(1990-1995) led to the consolidation of the unified system including the 
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“municipalization” of service delivery and implementation of financial mechanisms for 
the allocation of federal funds(World Bank 2004: 157).7   The third wave of reforms 
(1996-2001) focused on the prioritization of basic care, specification of institutional 
roles, legal and regulatory changes, and the introduction of alternative payment 
mechanisms (World Bank 2004:157).8   One of the most important changes for 
municipalities was the specification of federal transfers.  Under new regulations, transfers 
would vary by program and the level of service delivered.  Cities could opt out of the 
unified health system but doing so would require that local governments finance health 
care from their own budgets. 
Overall, the movement for progressive health reform at the national level yielded 
mixed results.  Without a doubt, sanitaristas won a major victory when the Constituent 
Assembly enshrined the right to health care and made it the state’s obligation to provide 
universal access.  But other equity-enhancing efforts, such as prioritization of basic 
health, stalled under political and fiscal pressure.  The Ministry’s efforts to foster 
decentralization of health services resulted in a shift in responsibility, as sub-national 
governments would take on the substantial efforts to prioritize preventive and basic 
medicine.  In the next section, we shift our gaze away from the national context to 
                                                 
7 New administrative rules were codified in the 1993 Norma Operacional Básica (NOB), which specified 
the rules for decentralization and allowed municipalities to choose the degree of health care complexity 
they could offer.  Municipalities were required to demonstrate their capacity to deliver the level of service 
they wanted to provide, and the majority of local governments were quick to participate in health 
decentralization.  By 1997, 3127 of 4,973 municipalities would participate in decentralization (Arretche 
2004:174). 
8 These changes were codified in the 1996 Norma Operacional Básica (NOB).  Although 1996 NOB was 
published in 1996, it did not go into effect until 1998. 
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examine how sub-national governments advanced healthcare access within their 
jurisdictions.   
LOCAL EXPERIMENTATION & INNOVATION  
While the Ministry of Health sought to advance national health reform and define 
intergovernmental responsibilities, many states and municipalities forged ahead by 
designing and implementing their own health care policies. In some instances, states 
shifted spending priorities and introduced new partnerships with local governments.  In 
others, municipal governments took advantage of their newfound authority in the public 
health arena to experiment with new modes of health care delivery.  This section provides 
an overview of some innovative local experiments in health care delivery during the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  As the cases reveal, in most instances policymakers sought to 
introduce progressive health reforms that would reach historically underserved 
populations and emphasize preventive and basic health care. The experience of São Paulo 
served as a notable counterpoint.  During this period, local experimentation led to policy 
diversity and programs typically addressed the unique challenges each jurisdiction faced.  
All in all, local governments would serve as “laboratories” that experimented with 
different models of health care.  Their successes would inform and inspire the 
development of Programa Saúde da Família.   
 In the early 1990s, several Brazilian municipalities began experimenting with 
public health care models that would emphasize preventive and basic health care and 
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reverse the course of curative and doctor-centric approaches to medicine.9  One of the 
most well recognized efforts to emphasize community health occurred in Niterói, in the 
state of Rio de Janeiro, which instituted the Programa Médico de Família (PMF, Family 
Doctor Program).  At the time, this large city had strong social development indicators, 
including high literacy rates, high median household incomes, and an average life 
expectancy of 70 years.  Despite high levels of human development, aggregate figures 
masked social inequalities and pockets of deep poverty; city officials considered a quarter 
of the population to be at “social risk” and in need of specialized attention.    
In 1991, Mayor Jorge Roberto Silveira (PDT) of Niterói visited Cuba, learned 
about its world-renowned health care model, and resolved to implement a similar system 
back home.  The Cuban Health Ministry provided the municipality with technical 
assistance to implement its own Médico de Família program.  In Niterói, doctors and 
nurses aides worked collaboratively in clinics embedded in the communities they served.  
Each clinic included three or four teams (each team had a general practitioner and a 
nurse’s aide) that was responsible for a designated jurisdiction that included 200 to 250 
families.  This approach allowed PMF teams to resolve 70 percent of medical issues 
through clinical and home-based care.  Unlike the Cuban model however, officials in 
Niterói did not require that physicians, only their nurse’s aides, reside in the 
communities.  The decision to deviate from the Cuban model was due to necessity; very 
few Brazilian doctors would have been willing to live in these impoverished 
                                                 
9 These experiments inlcude Porto Alegre, Curitiba, Londrina, Marília, São Paulo, Botucatu, Fortaleza 
(Terra and Malik 1998). 
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neighborhoods (Interview D’Angelo 2004).   Today, the family doctor program is one of 
the most highly regarded municipal public health efforts in Brazil.10  
Officials from Niterói were not alone in their desire to prioritize basic health 
problems and enhance prevention.  However, Niterói was uniquely positioned to initiate a 
Cuban-inspired program; the city had the political, fiscal, and human resources it needed 
to develop a family doctor model.  Health experts in small cities in the Northeast also 
wanted to deviate from curative medicine to prioritize prevention, but lacked the human 
and physical resources to replicate the Cuban model.  The Northeast faced high levels of 
poverty and had limited infrastructure; in general the region lacked sufficient clinics and 
hospitals, and physicians were in short supply.  Given these structural challenges, 
officials sought an alternative to doctor-centric care that could emphasize community-
based health. 
In 1987, the state of Ceará in the Northeast of Brazil designed and implemented 
the pioneering preventive health program, Programa de Agentes de Saúde (PAS).  The 
program relied on two sets of actors: community health agents and nurses who would 
supervise them.  Like the family doctor program in Niterói, state officials in Ceará 
wanted to promote basic health, emphasize prevention, and build ties with local 
communities.  Health agents were selected from within communities to work directly 
with families.  After receiving training, health agents would work with nurse-supervisors 
to register families’ health care needs and encourage basic sanitary practices such as 
                                                 
10 In 1997, the Programa Médico de Família in Niterói won a national innovations award from the Gestão 
Pública e Cidadania Program housed in the prestigious Getúlio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo.  
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water filtration, proper nutrition, and the promotion of vaccinations.  Since the state also 
had particularly high levels of infant mortality, health agents also monitored the height 
and weight of children.11  
Although the state of Ceará conceived and promoted the program, implementation 
of the program still required municipal participation.  Mayors who adopted the program 
would have to find the funds to cover 15 percent of operating costs while also sharing 
administrative responsibilities with state officials.12  The adoption of PAS across the state 
took several years and depended on mayors’ willingness to opt-into the program.  But by 
1992, basic health indicators across the state had improved dramatically, infant deaths 
had declined by a third, and vaccination coverage for measles and polio had tripled 
(Tendler 1997:22).  For these and other accomplishments, the state won the prestigious 
UNICEF Maurice Pate award for child programs in 1993.  In addition to Ceará, the 
southern states of Paraná and Mato Grosso do Sul also instituted their own community 
health agent programs.  
The early experience of the PAS program stimulated the federal government to 
support its expansion in other states.  In 1991 the Ministry of Health instituted the 
Programa de Agentes Comunitários de Saúde (PACS), which largely mirrored the PAS 
program from Ceará. The objective of the PACS was to reduce infant and maternal 
mortality, primarily in the North and Northeast, by extending basic health services to the 
                                                 
11 In 1987, the rate of infant death, in Ceará was 102 per every 1000; this was double the national figure 
(Tendler 1997:21).  
12 State officials sought to minimize rent-seeking behavior and traditional clientelism on the part of mayors 
by retaining control over the hiring of community health agents (Tendler 1997: 24)  
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poorest and most destitute areas (Viana and Dal Poz 1998:18).  The Ministry of Health 
started offering federal funds to stimulate the program’s adoption across the Northeast 
and provided guidelines detailing minimum requirements for health agents and their 
duties.13 
An altogether different approach to basic health care during this time period was 
adopted by in the city of São Paulo.  Under Mayor Paulo Maluf (1992-1996), a leader of 
the right wing party PDS, city administrators sought to address several problems in public 
health services, including high costs, tremendous inefficiencies, and low quality of public 
services.  Secretary of Health Getúlio Hanashiro, who also shared Maluf’s disposition for 
market-oriented solutions to public management problems, sought to dramatically 
reconfigure basic health services.  The policy, the Plano de Atendimento à Saúde (PAS), 
integrated business sector principles into health services and represented a dramatic 
departure from mainstream public health strategies.14  Although the constitution ensured 
health care rights for all, city officials made clear their plan would prioritize service to the 
most indigent. 
Under the PAS, municipal authorities planned to create market-based incentives 
for doctors and clinics and prioritized services for the neediest groups.  Maluf proposed 
the creation of regional clinics that would serve a given area’s designated population.  To 
                                                 
13 For instance, health agents should be at least 18 years old, proficient in reading and writing, and have a 
disposition for community health. These workers are responsible for: registering families, assessing 
families’ health and living conditions, collecting updated information for a national database, conducting 
home visits, identifying children for schooling, mapping community needs and identifying at-risk areas, 
just to name a few.   
14 The World Bank has cited the PAS as an experiment with innovative forms of organization and 
management (World Bank 2004: 178).  
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encourage greater efficiency, each clinic would operate as a doctor-owned cooperative.15  
Similar to private health care providers, each cooperative would, in theory, have an 
incentive to rein in costs and maximize efficiency of operations.  The city would in turn 
provide per capita transfers for the cooperative, based on the number of registered 
beneficiaries assigned to each clinic.16  Residents of São Paulo would have their own 
health care card, similar to insurance cards provided by private insurers, and could visit 
their designated regional cooperatives for medical care.  The PAS proposal endured stiff 
political opposition but was implemented in 1996 during Maluf’s last year in office.  
Although the PAS is credited for making achievements in public management, such as 
improvements in work absenteeism, the plan has been widely discredited as financially 
unsustainable and was dismantled in 2000.    
The Programa Saúde da Família (PSF, Family Health Program) was born out of 
various community health experiences, such as the Programa de Médico de Família, 
Programa de Agentes de Saúde from Ceará, and the nationally supported Programa de 
Agentes Comunitários de Saúde.  On December 27-28, 1993, the Ministry of Health held 
a meeting of leading public health officials to discuss municipal health services and 
financing.  As Viana and dal Poz (1998) describe, the gathering was a response to 
demands from municipal secretaries of health, who sought greater financial support for 
                                                 
15 This model required that civil servants, who had been employed in municipal health care, depart from 
the public system and opt into the semi-privatized cooperative clinics.  Approximately 35,000 civil servants 
(88.3 percent of all workers) were removed from their original positions when they declined to integrate 
into PAS cooperatives.  Of those, 17,705 found positions in other municipal agencies, accepted demotions, 
or accepted positions in the municipal health secretariat (Gouveia and Palma 1999: 143). 
16 Under the plan, the municipality would pay cooperatives approximately US $15 (or R$15) per capita per 
month.  This figure was based on estimates of costs for similar services offered by the private sector (Cohn 
et. al. 1999: 19).  
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basic health care.   The meeting was sponsored by the minister’s cabinet and included 
officials representing the ministry, as well as bureaucrats from municipal and state 
secretaries of health; also present were two officials representing international 
development organizations, namely UNICEF and PAHO.17   An important feature of this 
technical meeting was that it included a broad spectrum of participants from throughout 
the country; technocrats who were involved in innovative experiences in the south and 
southeast engaged with officials from the Northeast, who worked with PACS.  The 
models from Niterói and Ceará were very influential in shaping the eventual design of 
PSF (Viana and dal Poz 1998; Interview Andrade 2004; Interview Machado 2003).  
Health professionals liked the territorial organization of health services and the potential 
to focus on prevention rather than demand-side service delivery.  They also embraced the 
role of the community health agent, but wanted to integrate other health professionals.  
To accomplish these goals, PSF would draw on a larger team of workers including: a 
doctor, nurses, nurse’s aides, and community health agents; nurses would retain their 
central supervisory role over their aides and health agents.18  In this way, the PSF 
program represented an upgrading of the PACS program; nurses were still central as 
administrators and the community health agents’ roles remained the same. 
Over the years, the staff in the Ministry of Health would nurture the Programa 
Saúde da Família, protect it from administrative upheavals, and eventually champion its 
                                                 
17 According to Viana and dal Poz (1998) meeting participants included: Eugenio Villaça Mendes 
(PAHO), Oscar Castillo (UNICEF); Halim Antônio Girade (UNICEF); Luis Odorico de Andrade 
(Municipal Secretary of Health of the city of Quixada in the state of Ceará) (1998: 19).   
18 Programmatic details were conceived at the December meeting, but were elaborated by staff from the 
Ministry of Health in 1994 (Viana and dal Poz 1998:20). 
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central role in the unified health system.  While meeting participants such as Heloísa 
Machado and Luis Odorico de Andrade had always envisioned that the program would 
become a central organizing model for basic health (Interview Machado 2003; Interview 
Andrade 2004), PSF started out with modest institutional support and limited fanfare.  
The program was one of many efforts in community health, a small project embedded 
among other ministerial programs.  In its first year of operation (1994) the ministry 
signed limited convênios (funding agreements) with states and municipalities, which 
required that sub-national governments contribute to the program’s cost.  Selection of 
eligible cities was restricted to high-priority cities based on a needs assessment conducted 
by IPEA.19  In total, 55 municipalities signed agreements and instituted PSF in the first 
year of operation. 
Over the course of several years, PSF program coordinators Heloisa Machado and 
Fátima de Sousa would defend the program internally within the Ministry.  They not only 
weathered the restructuring that would come with a constant stream of new health 
ministers, many of whom lacked the political support to initiate significant health 
reforms, but they eventually garnered the support they would need to institute and expand 
the program within the ministry.20  A turning point for PSF came in 1995, when 
prominent heart surgeon, Dr. Abib Jatene, became the health minister for the second time 
                                                 
19 The federal research agency, IPEA, produced a report Mapa de Fome, which identified the poorst cities.  
This report served as the basis for determining eligibility for PSF participation (Vasconcellos 1999: 156).  
20 Since December 1993, the Ministry of Health has been under the leadership of: Henrique Antônio 
Santillo (August 1993-January 1995), Adib Domingos Jatene (January 1995 to November 1996), José 
Carlos Seixas (November-December 1996), José Carlos de Albuquerque (December 1996 – March 1998), 
José Serra (March 1998-February 2002), Barjas Negri (February 2002-December 2002), Humberto Sérgio 
Costa Lima (January 2003 to July 2005). 
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in his career. As Jatene explained, he first learned about community health efforts and the 
role of the agentes comunitários de saúde when he was health minister in 1992.  At the 
time, they were doing a wonderful job to combat the spread of cholera in the North and 
Northeast (Interview Jatene 2003).  Upon his return to that position in 1995, he met with 
Machado and Sousa, who persuaded him that the PSF would work more broadly.  After 
visiting cities that had instituted the program, such as Camaragibe in the state of 
Pernambuco and Sobral in the state of Ceará, Minister Jatene agreed to support the 
program (2003).21  In January 1996, PSF was transferred to the Secretaria de Assistência 
da Saúde (SAS) finding a more central home within the ministry and allowing for its 
institutionalization (Viana and dal Poz 1998: 22).   
The administrative changes had several important consequences.  First, the PSF 
gained broader visibility and the staff started articulating the idea that it should move 
from an isolated project to represent an organizing principle for basic health care.  
Second, the ministry also moved towards integrating PSF with PACS and connecting it 
with the broader efforts to decentralize health and institute the SUS. 
Programa Saúde da Família sprung up at a moment when national health care 
reform was encountering some of its greatest political and fiscal difficulties.  Local 
governments on the other hand, were taking advantage of newfound authority to develop 
and implement new policies for better preventive health; these early experiments 
reflected a potpourri of approaches. As Judith Tendler observed in her case study of 
                                                 
21 Minister Adib Jatene was so enthusiastic about the program that he took it to the Presidents Cabinet, and 
introduced it to the President and first lady, Ruth Cardoso.  They traveled together to the Northeast to see it 
on the ground (Interview 2003).  
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Ceará, decentralization of health policy has entailed a mix of both central and local 
efforts (1997:23), as municipalities, states, and the federal government work 
collaboratively to deliver and finance health services.  This observation certainly holds 
true for the PSF, which benefited from early municipal health policy experimentation, 
was conceived by a broad group of experts involved in all tiers of health care provision, 
and drew on federal financing offered through the Ministry of Health.  Yet, to understand 
the evolution of the program’s spread, from 55 municipalities in primarily small rural 
towns in the North and Northeast, to extensive national adoption by 4,944 cities in 2003, 
requires more than a simple tale of vertical pressures for diffusion.  While PSF did 
provide some political opportunities for mayors, such as the potential to dole out coveted 
health agent jobs to political cronies, the program was still highly complex and required 
restructuring health care services.  Furthermore, some politicians and health policy 
technocrats would challenge the notion that PSF was a desirable policy for their cities.  In 
practice, the adoption of PSF was not always guaranteed or automatic.  Each city would 
undergo its own policymaking process related to PSF.  Thus to uncover the adoption 
decisions for PSF, we must turn to the local dimensions of policy making and open the 
black box of policymaking to uncover actors’ motivations for policy emulation.    
EXPLAINING THE DIFFUSION OF PSF IN FOUR MAJOR CITIES 
 Why did some cities adopt the Programa Saúde da Família quickly, while others 
lagged behind?  Why would health policy makers emulate the program, particularly when 
many local governments had already experimented with alternative health care models?  
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Also puzzling was that actors from large urban cities with sophisticated health 
infrastructure would emulate a program that largely drew its inspiration from cities that 
are far from typical, the poor rural Northeast (with the PACS) and Niterói (with PMF) 
with high levels of human development and incomes per capita.  
 The case studies in this chapter examine the motivations behind PSF adoption in 
four research sites over three municipal administrations.  These cities had great flexibility 
in determining their basic health models.  Some administrations would tailor health 
policy to suit the needs of their municipalities while others would adopt PSF.  In other 
words, emulation of PSF was far from automatic or a forgone conclusion.  Electoral 
competition varied across these cities and the voters selected mayors representing various 
ideological predispositions, from rightists to leftists.  In addition, health policy 
technocrats engaged in professional networking activities, but not necessarily the same 
ones.  Table 5.1 provides an overview of the case studies, when PSF adoption took place, 
and the partisan affiliations of the mayors who adopted the family health program.   
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Table 5.1 Case Studies: Adoption & Non-Adoption  
 Executive in Office & Party IDa Programa Saúde da Família 
Brasília (DF)b   
1990-1994 Joaquim Roriz (PTR)  - 
1994-1998 Cristovam Buarque (PT) Yes 
1998-2002 Joaquim Roriz (PMDB) No-Yesc 
Belo Horizonte (MG)   
1992-1996 Patrus Ananias (PT) No 
1996-2000 Célio de Castro (PSB) No 
2000-2004 Célio de Castro (PSB) 
Fernando Damata Pimentel (PT)d 
Yes 
Salvador (BA)   
1992-1996 Lídice da Mata (PSDB) No 
1996-2000 Antônio José Imbassahy (PFL) No 
2000-2004 Antônio José Imbassahy (PFL) Yes 
São Paulo  (SP)   
1992-1996 Paulo Maluf (PDS) No 
1996-2000 Celso Pitta (PPB) No 
2000-2004 Marta Suplicy (PT) Yes 
a Mayor’s partisan affiliation at the time he or she ran for office. 
b Brasília, the Federal District, operates under the gubernatorial electoral calendar. 
c The program was suspended and then reinstated. 




Health care is one of those areas of public policy that is particularly visible to the 
electorate because irrespective of age and income status, health policy affects the entire 
population.  For instance, the outbreak of infectious diseases, such as cholera, dengue, 
and HIV-AIDS can affect an entire city’s population, regardless of gender, age, and 
income.  The Programa Saúde da Família can generate considerable public attention as its 
aims include prevention and basic health care.  For beneficiaries of the program, PSF is 
also highly visible because it brings the state into the private sphere of domestic life 
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through home visits and neighborhood outreach.  In addition, communities are able to 
discern if a neighboring area has PSF while their district remains underserved.  Given the 
high visibility of PSF, it would certainly make sense for self-interested politicians 
focused on electoral politics to embrace the program.  In cities that lack PSF, candidates 
might campaign on implementing the program.  Politicians in cities that already have a 
PSF policy, might campaign on extending the program to new communities.   
In addition to the general appeal that PSF holds among the poor, the program also 
has the potential to generate rent-seeking behavior as politicians have the ability to dole 
out particularistic benefits.  Implementation of PSF involves job-creation as municipal 
health teams need local residents to serve as agentes comunitários de saúde (ACS).  In a 
context where unemployment is high and the working poor encounter tremendous 
difficulties in making ends meet, a job as a community health agent is very attractive.  
The position does not require specialized skills in primary health;22 rather the minimum 
requirements to qualify for the position include: literacy, basic schooling, and 
“leadership” skills.  In many ways, the ACS position is an extension of “women’s work” 
in the domestic (private) sphere, which helps explain why the vast majority of the 
positions go to women.23  The PSF also has the potential to generate a second type of 
political patronage.  The geographical demarcation of neighborhoods served by the 
program offers a clear benefit for politicians who want to reach out to communities for 
                                                 
22 ACS training on sanitation and preventive medicine occurs after they are hired. 
23 Women in Latin America often face a triple burden of working, family care, and community care. The 
job of an ACS blends traditional gender roles that delegate women as responsible for family life and 
domesticity as well as that of their community. 
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electoral support. In other words, mayors who adopt the program can influence voters by 
deciding which neighborhoods will be served.  This is particularly important as PSF 
typically targets economically and epidemiologically vulnerable areas, rather than 
extending the policy throughout the entire city.  In practice, politicians can deviate from 
serving the neediest areas to fulfill their electoral agenda.  For these reasons, savvy 
politicians who want to engage in traditional patronage politics can benefit tremendously 
from the family health program’s design.   
Mayors in each of the case study sites faced electoral competition and 
campaigned on issues of health care delivery.  Given the electoral potential of enacting 
PSF, we might expect all mayors, regardless of their ideology, would emulate the 
program.  In cities with low levels of health infrastructure, PSF represented an important 
extension of new services to communities with limited access to health care.  Thus, PSF 
represented the creation of new services.  For cities with existing health services already 
in place (e.g. clinics and hospitals), the PSF program offered the potential to restructure 
healthcare to work with families and communities in a more integrated fashion.24  In 
these instances, voters would benefit from better quality services, greater interaction with 
healthcare providers, and easier access. 
Despite the potential that PSF could offer given the competitive electoral 
environment in the case study cities, the qualitative evidence reveals that mayoral 
candidate did not systematically endorse the program and instead sought a diverse set of 
                                                 
24 Adib Jatene argued that even in cities like São Paulo, with sophisticated health infrastructure, PSF 
represented a new ‘add-on’services because there were terrorities of the city that were underserved by 
clinics and hospitals.  In his view, the conditions of urban poverty in the city’s periphery are similar to that 
of underserved rural communities in the Northeast (Interview Jatene 2003).    
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health policies.  Conservative politicians often advocated for market-oriented proposals 
whereas leftist politicians tended to embrace PSF.  Candidates’ approaches to public 
health issues were certainly important to their campaigns and entered into the electoral 
debates in these cities.  Of the four research sites the city of São Paulo, where the PAS 
quasi-privatized system served as a counterpoint to PSF, offers the best example that 
debates over health received widespread media attention (Cohn et. al 1999:67-94).  All 
three mayoral campaigns dedicated considerable attention to health care issues, but 
candidates differed in their vision for the city.  Some candidates like Maluf and Pitta 
argued São Paulo should institute private market incentives into its system.  It was the 
leftist candidate, Marta Suplicy, who would campaign on health reform and announced 
she would implement the PSF if elected 
Even though PSF had the potential to garner electoral votes for Marta Suplicy, her 
advisors dismissed the notion that her favorable position toward the policy during the 
campaign represented a vote-buying strategy (Interview Manfredini 2003).  The local 
media widely covered health issues in São Paulo, yet most residents were unaware of the 
technical dimensions of the various proposals under consideration.  The groups that 
might benefit most from PSF, the poor and most vulnerable populations, were unfamiliar 
with the family health program.  Once her administration moved to implement PSF, 
many citizen representatives who served on local health councils were skeptical of the 
program as they viewed clinics and hospitals, not PSF health teams, as appropriate places 
to go to for their health care needs.  Moreover, several unions expressed deep concern 
about contract negotiations under PSF (Interview Costa 2003; Interview D'Agostini 2003; 
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Interview Oliveira 2003).  In this light, Suplicy’s emulation decision appears to reflect a 
calculated administrative risk rather than a clear-cut electoral strategy to win the election. 
Brasília was the first of the case study cities to emulate PSF in the second half of 
Cristovam Buarque’s administration.  While Buarque was a staunch leftist and often 
spoke about social rights and citizenship on the campaign trail, he was not a strong 
advocate for PSF.  Rather, his focus was on Bolsa Escola and other educational social 
policies.  The decision to implement the family health program was largely delegated to 
his senior political appointees, notably his Secretary of Health, Maria José da Conceição 
(Maninha).  Although both Bolsa Escola mothers and PSF community health agents 
could have provided significant electoral support for Buarque’s reelection campaign, his 
closest advisor asserted that the governor refused to exploit beneficiaries of his social 
programs (Interview Aguiar 2003).  
In Belo Horizonte, where the political competition was concentrated to the left of 
the political spectrum, the decision to implement PSF was hotly contested among 
technocrats.  Mayor Célio de Castro was said to have embraced PSF early-on in his first 
mayoral term because of his own familiarity with the program; he was a physician by 
training.  Although he was an early enthusiast of the family health program it would 
nevertheless, take him until 2000 to implement the program in the city.  While the delay 
in emulating PSF gives the appearance of an electoral incentive, health experts in Belo 
Horizonte told a different story.  Senior health policy technocrats in the municipal health 
department opposed the mayor’s plan to emulate PSF.  In their view, PSF was not an 
appropriate strategy for Belo Horizonte (Interview F. Santos 2004; Interview Franco 
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2004).  Thus, for several years the mayor encountered opposition from senior technocrats 
who favored other types of integrated health services.  Ultimately, in order to implement 
PSF, the municipal Department of Health would need to undergo personnel changes.  
Opponents of PSF left the agency and new technocrats, who had adopted the program 
elsewhere, were brought-in to administer the program in Belo Horizonte.  
Like Belo Horizonte, Salvador was a late adopter of PSF.  It would take several 
years for Mayor Antônio Imbassahy to announce he would institute the health program.  
Health policy specialists, both inside and outside of government, explained that the 
mayor was relatively uninvolved in the decision to implement PSF in Salvador and 
delegated these issues to his Secretary of Health, Aldely Rocha (Interview Queiroz 2004; 
Interview Nossa 2004).  Technocrats in the city’s Department of Health noted that the 
mayor was skeptical of the program, preferred that it expand slowly, and expressed 
concern over the expense associated with it (Interview Queiroz 2004; Interview Nossa 
2004).  One observer of municipal health noted that it was ironic that the mayor would 
initially fail to recognize the electoral potential behind PSF and attributed the city’s 
delays to a lack of political imagination on the part of the political elite (Interview Boa 
Sorte 2004). 
In all these cases, mayors were rarely motivated to adopted PSF for electoral 
gains.  Mayors’ initial emulation decisions were largely delegated to senior political 
appointees, such as municipal secretaries of health, and technocrats, who served as civil 
servants.  Once PSF was in place however, the program was difficult to dismantle and a 
few politicians found ways to use it for political gain.  Two rightist politicians, Joaquim 
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Roriz (PMDB) from (1998-2002; 2002-2006) and Antônio Imbassahy (2000-2004), are 
exemplary in this regard.  Both are well known for their general use of political 
patronage, and those tendencies continued once PSF was enacted.   
Joaquim Roriz of Brasília inherited Saúde em Casa25 from Cristovam Buarque’s 
administration.  During his campaign, Roriz promised loyal partisans jobs as community 
health agents, a much coveted position among the lower classes, and handed out slips of 
paper that indicated they would be in line for the jobs.  Once the administration was in 
office and the health secretariat opened applications for the ACS positions, individuals 
would arrive with their letters indicating they were promised positions.  While 
bureaucrats were reluctant to admit their own participation in this hiring scheme, they had 
all heard or seen evidence to this effect.  Since the district’s health secretariat experienced 
several changes in leadership, technocrats felt free to say that their predecessors engaged 
in problematic hiring practices but that they followed proper rules.   
The allegations of unethical recruitment practices for PSF were not limited to the 
community health agent position.  One high-ranking health administrator in Brasília 
informed me that patronage was such a pervasive and engrained part of the local political 
culture that upon announcing the resumption of the PSF program he received over a 
thousand personal requests from the politically connected for jobs associated with the 
program, including positions for doctors and nurses. 26  Overall, the administration of 
                                                 
25 The Buarque administration gave the PSF program its own name, Saúde em Casa.  
26 The Federal District briefly suspended the PSF program under allegations of fraud.  The suspension 
coincided with the Federal Ministry of Health suspension of PSF funds due to inquiries of improper usage 
of health financing.  When the program resumed, it did so under new leadership and with new personnel. 
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Joaquim Roriz in Brasília was especially notorious for irregularities related to the health 
sector (including PSF).  Accusations were so pervasive that Brasília’s Ministério Público 
(Public Prosecutor’s Office), in collaboration with federal auditors, undertook 
investigations into allegations of widespread corruption and the misuse of funds.  The 
irregularities were so extensive that Jairo Bisol, a public defender with the Ministério 
Público, asserted that PSF in Brasília was synonymous with corruption (Interview 
2004).27  Both federal and district audits of PSF concluded that the program was un-
operational; hiring practices had been based on political favoritism and many personnel 
were operating with incomplete teams (i.e. they lacked nurses or doctors).    
In Salvador, technocrats reported they faced very little interference when it came 
to hiring PSF personnel.  But even so, “political interests” had impeded their ability to 
implement the family health program as they saw fit.  Prior to establishing PSF in 
Salvador, staff members in the Health Department conducted a city-wide epidemiological 
study and assessment of health services.  Results from the study had defined which 
districts should receive priority for PSF (i.e. which sanitary districts should be served and 
in which order).28  While technocrats had sought to follow their plan, they acknowledged 
                                                 
27 As Bisol (2004) explained, the entire health care system was a source of a lot of money (for services, 
medication, operational expenses, etc.) and represented an opportunity for graft. He estimates that R$ 40 
million (approximately $20 million U.S. dollars) in health funds went to the construction of the district’s 
bridge.  In 2004, the Ministério Público was planning to investigate new allegations into clientelistic 
practices with health care delivery, including a scheme where doctors on the government payroll offered 
preferential services to patients with political connections.  The new allegations involved doctors paid by 
the federal district but contracted through the Instituto Candango de Solidariedade, a non-profit association, 
which had ties to Wesliam Roriz, Governor Roriz’s wife.   
28 Initially, technocrats in the city government wanted to build off of the existing ACS program.  They also 
favored complete PSF coverage for the health district – Subúrbio Ferroviário – which has some of the worst 
health indicators.  But nearly four years after the program’s start, only about 50 percent of that district’s 
 152
that Secretary of Health Aldely Rocha, Mayor Antônio Imbassahy, and the “political 
leadership” had directed them to territorially expand PSF to include other parts of the 
city.  As such, it was not surprising that at an inaugural event for a PSF clinic in the 
neighborhood Altos dos Coutos in June 2004, the ribbon cutting event included dozens of 
the mayor’s political allies.  The mayor’s political cronies (city and state officials, city 
council members, and candidates for elective office) gave speeches to the crowds 
amassed near the health center.  
That traditional conservative politicians such as Roriz and Imbassahy would 
continue to engaged in “politics as usual” with PSF is not surprising; allegations of 
patronage and clientalism were certainly features of all their departments.  Yet, what is 
truly remarkable is that PSF emulation decisions rarely came down to these electoral 
incentives.  Most mayors who adopted the program delegated these policy decisions to 
their politically appointed senior staff.  Cristovam Buarque gave his Secretary of Health, 
Maria José da Conceição (Maninha), wide latitude to emulate PSF (Interview Conceição 
2003).  Mayor Imbahassy of Salvador was reluctant to embrace the program and only did 
so under pressure from health experts.29  Marta Suplicy of São Paulo let her technical 
advisors decide how the city should recover from the debilitating experience with PAS.30  
                                                                                                                                                 
population was covered by PSF (35 PSF teams). Rather than extend full coverage within that district, the 
city started extending PSF with teams in districts 2 (Itapagipe), 3 (São Caetano), and 12 (Cajazeiras).   
29 Health policy specialists both inside and outside of government asserted that Mayor Imbassahy was 
uninvolved in the decision to implement PSF in Salvador.  Technocrats in the city’s Department of Health 
noted that the mayor was skeptical about the program and preferred that the program’s implementation 
proceed slowly.     
30 Marta Suplicy’s supporters were themselves divided on whether to embrace PSF.  In the early stages of 
the campaign, the PT-aligned think tank Instituto Florestan Fernandes sponsored meetings for health 
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Only Mayor Célio de Castro of Belo Horizonte was in the odd position of having 
embraced the program early on, but lacked the administrative support to implement it 
(Interview F. Santos 2004).31  Given that electoral incentives for PSF emulation offer a 
relatively weak explanation for the motivations for policy enactment, we now turn to the 
two alternative explanations: ideology and social networks. 
Ideology  
Do actors’ ideological commitments drive their emulation decisions?  Do actors 
perceive this program to be “leftist” or “rightist”, and if so, does the ideological meaning 
behind the program influence emulation decisions?  While PSF does have equity 
enhancing goals and reflects a reprioritization of basic and preventive services, actor’s 
perceptions about the program and its ideological meaning changed over time.  As the 
case studies reveal, mayors’ ideological commitments mattered, as did those of their 
politically appointed technocrats and civil servants.  
Mayors in each of the administrations had clear ideological tendencies, ranging 
from leftists to rightists (see Table 5.1).  In practice, mayors’ ideological predispositions 
shaped the character of their administration. Senior appointed officials, such as municipal 
secretaries of health, were usually close political allies who shared the mayor’s 
ideological viewpoints.  Mayors also set the overall tone for their administration by 
through budgetary allocations and championing their trademark programs.   For instance, 
                                                                                                                                                 
experts to debate the merits of PSF.  Ultimately, key technocrats made the decision to endorse PSF for São 
Paulo (Interview Manfredini 2003).  
31 Mayor Célio de Castro suffered a massive stroke in November 2001; his vice-Mayor Fernando Pimentel 
served the rest of his term. Mayor Castro died prior to the start of field research.   
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left and center-left mayors all championed education-related programs and emphasized 
the need to invert social spending to prioritize the needy and enhance “citizenship”; 
Cristovam Buarque’s trademark policy was Bolsa Escola, Lídice da Mata created the 
program Cidade Mãe, and Marta Suplicy created integrated “community schools” called 
Centros Educacionais Unificados (Unified Education Centers, CEU).  Politicians on the 
right, on the other hand, emphasized business-oriented initiatives; Antônio Imbassahy 
highlighted tourism and business development, Joaquim Roriz championed construction 
of a bridge (Ponte Juscelino Kubitschek), and both Paulo Maluf and Celso Pitta defended 
the market-oriented health program PAS.   
Table 5.2 Case Studies: Mayor’s Ideology 
 Executive in Office & Party IDa Ideology  
Brasília (DF)b   
1990-1994 Joaquim Roriz (PTR) Right 
1994-1998 Cristovam Buarque (PT) Left 
1998-2002 Joaquim Roriz (PMDB) Center 
Belo Horizonte (MG)   
1992-1996 Patrus Ananias (PT) Left 
1996-2000 Célio de Castro (PSB) Left 
2000-2004 Célio de Castro (PSB) 
Fernando Damata Pimentel (PT)d 
Left 
Salvador (BA)   
1992-1996 Lídice da Mata (PSDB) Center 
1996-2000 Antônio José Imbassahy (PFL) Right 
2000-2004 Antônio José Imbassahy (PFL) Right 
São Paulo  (SP)   
1992-1996 Paulo Maluf (PDS) Right 
1996-2000 Celso Pitta (PPB) Right 
2000-2004 Marta Suplicy (PT) Left 
a Mayor’s partisan affiliation at the time he or she ran for office. 
b Brasília, the Federal District, operates under the gubernatorial electoral calendar. 
c Election data unavailable for 1992. 




While elected officials’ ideological predispositions framed the range of options 
for health care, the most rampant ideological debates surrounding PSF occurred among 
technocrats and experts in public health.  When PSF was first introduced in 1994, health 
policy specialists and activists associated with the movimento sanitário had mixed 
reactions to the policy.  Their assessment of the program reflected broader debates in the 
international public health community over prevention, access, and prioritization of 
services.  Many staunch leftists affiliated with the movimento sanitário in Brazil strongly 
embraced the goals asserted at the Alma Ata World Health Organization conference, held 
September 6-12, 1978.32  The conference declaration included the maxim, “Health for All 
by the Year 2000” and reflected an ambitious effort to transform the entire health system.  
The holistic approach at Alma Ata linked public health issues with broader questions of 
development.  It also challenged major assumptions about health care by emphasizing 
appropriate technology and calling for the training lay health professionals.  Implicitly, 
the declaration criticized advanced industrialized countries’ approach to medicine with its 
emphasis on disease-oriented technology, overly specialized care, and elitist bias.  The 
viewpoint articulated in the Alma Ata declaration strongly resonated with many of the 
sanitary movement’s goals to prioritize primary health care and engage local 
communities.   
                                                 
32 As Cueto (2004) explains, the international situation surrounding the Alma Ata conference was highly 
politicized given the context of the Cold War.  Despite early difficulties in identifying an appropriate 
location for the event, the conference included 3000 delegates from around the world, with 70 participants 
from Latin America, 97 percent of whom represented public health ministries (Cueto 2004:1867).  The 
conference and its proceedings had a lasting effect on Brazilian public health officials, who often reference 
Alma Ata goals during interviews (for example: Interview Machado 2003; Interview Andrade 2004).   
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While the Alma Ata declaration provided a framework for many public health 
professionals worldwide, the international development community diverged in its 
approach to public health.  The Rockefeller Foundation, along with UNICEF, articulated 
an alternative or “minimalist” approach to the Alma Ata declaration.  Instead of 
transforming the system, these actors favored small add-on programs.  These institutions 
supported limited, short-term, and selective strategies best known as GOBI: growth 
monitoring, oral rehydration techniques, breast feeding, and immunization (Cueto 2004: 
1869).  From these international donors’ point of view, this strategy offered the possiblity 
of tracking measurable results through program monitoring and evaluation.  Limiting 
efforts in selective primary care also helped these institutions avoid the political and the 
costs associated with the Alma Ata declaration.  In the Brazilian context, this approach 
certainly caught on; the PACS program in the Northeast reflected modest GOBI 
strategies.   
The international public health debate surrounding Alma Ata created two camps: 
one that favored major transformation for universal primary care and another that 
embraced complementary activities leading to selective primary care (Cueto 2004: 1869).  
As Brazilian public health experts debated the merits of PSF, their assessments often 
hinged on whether they saw PSF as reflecting the more radical universal primary care or 
neoliberal selective primary care.  Many staunch leftists tended to embrace the holistic 
vision of Alma Ata and contested whether PSF was compatible with the declaration.  
Early critics of the program declared PSF a “programa pobre para pobre” (a poor 
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program for the poor) and said it represented neoliberal policy (Interview Junkeira 2003; 
Interview La Forgia 2004). 
There were several reasons staunch leftists initially opposed the program.  First, 
when the Ministry of Health first introduced PSF it did so in a limited fashion, as one of 
multiple projects.  Second, the program’s design had been largely influenced by the 
PACS program – demonstrating a type of GOBI agenda - and had essentially served as an 
extension of it (Viana and dal Poz 1998:21).  Since PACS was a predecessor of PSF, the 
earliest cities to adopt the family health program were in the Northeast.  This convinced 
some that PSF was intended as a targeted, not universal approach to basic health. All this 
contributed to their belief that PSF was a “poor program for the poor.”   It would take 
years for the Ministry of Health to articulate its ambitious vision for PSF, namely that 
PSF could serve as a model to reorient primary health care for all.33   Lastly, when José 
Serra led the health ministry (1998-2002), he made efforts to obtain supplemental 
funding for PSF from the World Bank.  The implicit approval of PSF from the World 
Bank further convinced those actors that the program was a “World Bank program” 
representing Washington-consensus style social policy.34   
                                                 
33 Adib Jatene, who became health minister in 1995, would be supportive of the PSF and argue that it was 
not a “poor program for the poor”.  In 1997, the ministry would publish “Saúde da Família: uma estratégia 
para reorientação do modelo assistencial” (Family Health: a strategy for reorienting the assistential 
model).  In 2000, the ministry would frame the PSF program as the principal model for basic health (World 
Bank 2004) and encourage municipalities to hire enough PSF health teams to cover 100 percent of their 
jurisdiction’s population.  
34 This viewpoint was expressed by the researcher and state health policy analyst Virginia Junkeira 
(Interview 2003).  However, World Bank health policy program officer Jerry La Forgia asserted that the 
idea that the Bank imposed PSF was misguided; bank staff follow Brazilian government ministers’ lead 
(Interview 2004).   
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Nevertheless, other long-term public health experts associated with the movimento 
sanitário were quick to embrace the policy and argued it was compatible with the Alma 
Ata declaration.  The policy coincided with their priorities to focus resources on primary 
care, centered on basic health and prevention.  It also reflected previous sanitary policy 
and public health initiatives that sought to build close community ties, dating back to the 
1970s and 1980s.35  Also important was that decentralization had created opportunities 
for many sanitaristas to put principles into practice.  Those in the Northeast were 
especially encouraged by the outcomes of both PACS and PSF programs.  Research 
suggested that these strategies could prevent the spread of cholera and lead to dramatic 
declines in infant and maternal mortality (Lima et. al. 2001; Mendonça et. al. 2004; 
Mishima et. al. 1999; Solla et. al. 1996).  Leading participants who helped design the PSF 
also argued that the policy should be much more than an isolated program; actors such as 
Machado, F. Sousa, and Andrade wanted PSF to be the basis of a restructured primary 
health care system for all (Interview Andrade 2004; Interview Machado 2003). 
Given these “mixed” signals about the program’s broader aims, it is 
understandable that actors committed to universal primary care might balk at the PSF.  
But key actors, such as David Capistrano, Adib Jatene, and Luis Odorico de Andrade 
were crucial in convincing health experts that the program was compatible with full 
primary health coverage.  Capistrano was a highly visible public health expert with ties to 
the Workers’ Party.  When he agreed to partner with Minister Jatene to implement a 
                                                 
35 For example, the Programa de Interiorização de Ações de Saúde e Saneamento (PIASS) was first 
introduced in the Northeast in 1976 and lasted until 1979.  From 1980-1985, the PIASS was extended to 
other areas, including São Paulo. For a history of sanitary policy and community health, see Silva and 
Dalmaso (2002). 
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state-sponsored PSF program, he signaled his support for the model. In doing so, 
Capistrano would recruit and convert skeptical leftists that the program was compatible 
with their values (Interview Silveira 2003; Presentation Mattos 2003).  Although Jatene 
never affiliated with a political movement or party, he enjoyed a solid reputation among 
technocrats for his deep commitment to Brazilian healthcare.  His endorsement of the 
program carried special weight.  Luis Odorico Andrade, a self-identified sanitarista who 
had formed part of the team to design PSF and later implemented it in Quixadá and 
Sobral in Ceará, also advocated for the program.  Not only did he enthusiastically defend 
it within networks such as CONASEMS but he also created a training school for PSF and 
published the journal “SANARE: Revista Sobralense de Politicas Públicas” to showcase 
the program.36  These individuals’ activities caught many leftists’ attention and convinced 
them that PSF could represent a progressive transformation of Brazilian public health. 
Surprisingly, rightist politicians largely stayed out of the ideological debate 
surrounding PSF.  Some advocates of the program also sought to appeal to fiscal 
conservatives by suggesting that PSF could lead to greater economic efficiency given the 
rising costs of curative medicine in Brazil.  The logic is that effective prevention can be 
more cost-effective in the long term, than expensive hospital-based treatment.37  While 
publications by the World Bank (2004) support this general viewpoint, arguments for 
                                                 
36 The first volume of SANARE focuses on the PSF as strategy to restructure public health (Vol. I, No. 1, 
Oct-Dec. 1999).  
37 This line of reasoning is highly debated and longtime advocates from the sanitary movement are 
reluctant to make this appeal.  As Dr. Luis Odorico de Andrade noted, universal coverage of PSF is costly 
(Interview 2004). 
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PSF based on potential cost-effectiveness gained little traction and rightist politicians and 
technocrats were largely absent in their support of PSF.   
The development of health policy over three administrations in the city of São 
Paulo offers valuable insight into the ways ideology influenced emulation decisions.  
While most mayors delegated health policy issues to their secretaries of health, Mayor 
Maluf in São Paulo was unusually hands-on in selecting, advocating, and defending the 
PAS for the municipality.  As discussed earlier in this chapter, Mayors Maluf and Pitta 
sought to implement their own public health policy for the city of São Paulo. The semi-
privatized cooperative system was consistent with both mayors’ conservative ideology 
and Maluf held steadfast in defending the model from its earliest opponents.   
From the onset, the PAS proposal fueled considerable debate and led to both 
legislative and judicial machinations as various groups tried to block or support the 
implementation of the program.  Various sectors, including some physicians, embraced 
the logic of doctor-controlled cooperatives and saw potential for greater financial and 
professional rewards.  Others, including staunch leftists and activists in the sanitary 
movement, were immediately critical of the plan.  Not only did they prefer that municipal 
authorities seek universal coverage and access, as mandated by the constitution, but they 
argued that the nature of public health problems, such as communicable diseases, made 
private sector solutions financially unsustainable.  Another concern among PAS 
opponents related to Maluf’s electoral appeal with the public as someone who “rouba 
mas faz” (steals but gets things done).  In other words, the mayor’s widespread reputation 
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for corruption led political opponents to anticipate that his health reform plan would 
serve as a vehicle for graft as well.38    
 Mayor Maluf announced the PAS on January 17, 1995 and moved to implement 
the program through decree in April of that year.  However, the Mayor encountered 
significant resistance to the plan which delayed its start.  City council members from the 
Workers’ Party were among the most vocal opponents and sought to block the PAS 
through both judicial appeals and interventions in the city council.  Ultimately, 
implementation of the PAS would require City Council approval, which passed along 
partisan lines on September 12, 1995.39  Even though Paulo Maluf was nearing the end of 
his mayoral term and was ineligible for reelection, the city went ahead in instituting the 
PAS.  When Celso Pitta, a political ally of Maluf’s, won the 1996 election, he kept his 
campaign promise to maintain the PAS program during his administration.  
Paulo Maluf’s decision to adopt the PAS not only encountered resistance from 
actors within the city of São Paulo, but also a host of external actors who appealed for 
him to reverse course.  Minister Adib Jatene was personally interested in seeing the PSF 
program implemented in the city (Interview Jatene 2003).  Aside from the fact that the 
minister had been a resident of São Paulo and took a special interest in it, Jatene was also 
                                                 
38 Paulo Maluf has consistently asserted his innocence against accusations of corruption.  Nevertheless, in 
2005 he spent 40 days in jail on accusations of racketeering, tax evasion and money laundering.  In March 
2007, the New York City District Attorney’s office indicted him in a corrupt kickback scheme at the 
expense of Brazilian taxpayers.  According to District Attorney Morgenthau, Maluf and four co-
conspirators stole at least $11.6 million, although they are believed to have stolen more than $140 million 
as that sum passed through the New York bank account linked to Maluf (Rohter & Hartocollis 2007: A9). 
39 According to Cohn et al., votes on the PAS corresponded strictly to partisan lines:  all center-left and 
left city counselors from the PSDB, PT, PV and PC do B voted against the proposal; all partisans of the 
right-of-center parties including PPR, PTB, PL, and PFL voted in favor; of the twelve members from the 
PMDB, 1 abstained and 1 broke with their party to oppose the measure (1999:45-47).   
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convinced that the program could have positive effect; he had seen model PSF programs 
in Northeastern cities and believed parts of São Paulo faced similar difficulties.  He also 
wanted to see the program extended to the biggest metropolitan areas, such as Belo 
Horizonte, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro (Capistrano 1999).  Therefore Minister Jatene 
reached out to Paulo Maluf on at least two occasions to personally appeal to him to enact 
PSF in São Paulo; but Maluf simply turned him down, citing other plans (Interview 
Jatene 2003).   
Minister Jatene refused to give up his goal of implanting PSF in São Paulo.  
Instead, he asked the Governor of São Paulo state to install a state-run program within the 
city’s borders.  The center-left governor Mário Covas (PSDB) agreed and the State 
Secretary of Health, José da Silva Guedes, initiated a state-run PSF program within the 
city’s borders called QUALIS (Qualidade Integral à Saúde).  The program started in 1996 
in the district of Itaquera, under a partnership agreement between the federal Ministry of 
Health, State Department of Health, and the Santa Marcelina Hospital.  Over time, the 
QUALIS program expanded to include additional districts in the municipality.40  To 
shepherd QUALIS, Adib Jatene selected a trusted advocate for public health with a solid 
reputation for his commitment to primary health care – David Capistrano Filho.  The 
selection of Capistrano was especially notable because of his high profile background and 
links to the leftist Workers’ Party; he had been active in the movimento sanitário, was the 
former health secretary of the city of Bauru (1984-1986), and former mayor of the city of 
                                                 
40 For a full description of QUALIS, see Capistrano (1999). 
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Santos41 (1992-1996).  As this episode suggests, Dr. Adib Jatene was firmly committed to 
PSF and was willing to work with politicians of all ideological stripes to get the program 
off the ground.  But at least in the early years, the Minister would find much greater 
receptivity for PSF among left and left-of-center politicians.  Ultimately, it would take 
the election of a leftist, Marta Suplicy, for the municipality of São Paulo to adopt the 
family health program. 
In sum, the decision to implement PSF reflected the ideological beliefs of two sets 
of actors: mayors and their senior technical staff.  Mayors who chose to implement the 
family health program were overwhelmingly leftist or center-left and had decided that the 
programmatic goals of working directly with patients in the community and expanding 
access to primary health care were consistent with their core beliefs.  In three of the four 
cities, PSF was introduced by left-of-center administrations, including Cristovam 
Buarque (PT) in Brasília, Célio de Castro (PSB) in Belo Horizonte and Marta Suplicy 
(PT) in São Paulo.  The only non-leftist to adopt the program was Mayor Imbassahy in 
Salvador, who according to technical staff did so unenthusiastically and with uncertainty 
about the program (Interview Queiroz 2004; Interview Nossa 2004).   
A second set of key actors involved in emulation decisions were politically 
appointed Secretaries of Health and their senior technical staff.  In most instances, 
mayors selected Secretaries who shared similar ideological beliefs and commitments.  
Leftist mayors were more likely to hire health secretaries and senior staff who self-
                                                 
41 As Mayor of Santos in the state of São Paulo, Capistrano initiated several public health policies to 
address the city’s unique challenges as one of the country’s most important port cities.  Santos developed 
programs for girls and young women to reduce the incidence of prostitution and programs to curb the 
spread of HIV-AIDS.   
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identified as being part of the movimento sanitário.  Sanitaristas adhered to similar leftist 
ideologies and used consistent rhetorical framing to discuss how they approached their 
work in health policy; these actors emphasized their identities, life experiences, and 
desire to “make a difference” through their work.  They also shared how the family health 
program reflected their values and beliefs to improve equity and access to health care and 
reverse the tide of government spending that had left out the poor.  In their view, full 
democracy would require a reprioritization of social policies to address historic and 
longstanding inequality and create meaningful citizenship.  
Social Networks 
The health arena in Brazil has seen particularly robust civil society activity, which 
dates back to the mobilization efforts of the Movimento Sanitário during the 1970s and 
80s. The sanitaristas promoted the development of university public health programs 
across the country, sent doctors far into the country’s interior, published public health 
journals, promoted universal health care rights in the constitution, and advocated for 
wider civic participation in policymaking through decentralization. Though the 
movement has since dissipated as a single entity, its legacy remains in numerous health 
care organizations and professional associations it helped establish.  Given the vibrancy 
of associational life in the health arena and the central role that PSF took in primary 
healthcare debates, it is not surprising that the program would spark the attention of 
numerous associations.  Two associations created by the Movimento Sanitário, 
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ABRASCO and CEBES, have been at the forefront of the debate regarding the program’s 
quality.42 
Since the inception of PSF, health professionals in Brazilian municipalities had 
frequent opportunities to assess the policy through the sector’s numerous and 
professional associations. Technocrats had access to official publications from the 
Ministry of Health, but more often turned to other sources for the latest information in 
their field. PSF administrators for instance, consistently identified ABRASCO and 
CONASEMS as important associations and cited the journal Saúde em Debate, published 
by CEBES, as a key reference.43  The CEBES publication served as a forum for debate on 
the programs, including critiques as well as case-studies from the Northeast, where 
authors detailed the merits of PSF.  CONASEMS’s annual meetings also became an 
important meeting ground for local health officials.  When PSF was first introduced in 
the mid-1990s, most members were skeptical of the program.  Yet, within ten years most 
of the participants reported that they had adopted PSF.  This turn-around also extended to 
academic circles, and by 2003 ABRASCO’s annual meeting included 59 paper 
presentations on PSF alone.  
What brought about the turn-around of opinion on PSF?  First, these organizations 
effectively brought together individuals from across the country and provided a forum for 
                                                 
42 Associação Brasileira de Pós-Graduação em Saúde Coletiva (ABRASCO) is a membership organization 
for post-graduates in public health, which includes academics as well as government officials. Centro 
Brasileiro de Estudos de Saúde (CEBES) is a public health organization with roots in the movimento 
sanitário, and its membership comprises health care professionals both within and outside of government.   
43 Conselho Nacional de Secretários Municipais de Saúde (CONASEMS) is a national association of 
municipal health secretaries; the association publishes research and organizes national and regional 
meetings.  
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PSF enthusiasts to advocate for the program.  The regional diversity of professionals was 
crucial because so many proponents were from the Northeast and they might have 
otherwise been shut-out of policy debates typically dominated by Southeastern 
professionals.44  This Northeastern perspective was crucial because PSF had created 
obvious concrete benefits which offered convinving evidence of the policy’s merits.  
Second, the health sector and its professional associations comprised of professionals 
from different partisan affiliations, many of whom were willing to work across partisan 
lines.  A notable example of such collaboration applies to two leading figures in the 
medical profession, former Minister Adib Jatene and David Capistrano Filho; both men 
worked for administrations with very different ideological profiles, yet partnered together 
to promote a pilot PSF program in São Paulo.45  This partnership was highly influential as 
Jatene drew on his extensive network in the specialized medical field and Capistrano 
tapped his network of leftist public health officials.  Lastly, several high-profile 
administrators began to show that PSF need not represent “a poor program for the poor.”  
Several municipalities demonstrated that PSF could be an all-encompassing strategy for 
basic health services and could provide coverage for the entire population.  In these ways, 
                                                 
44 This point was made by Luis Odorico de Andrade in reference to CONASEMS (Interview 2004). 
45 Adib Jatene, a prominent cardiologist, has worked in various administrative public health positions, first 
serving as State Secretary of Health under Governor Paulo Maluf during the military regime.  Later he 
accepted the position of Minister of Health under Presidents Fernando Collor do Mello (PRN) and 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB). Dr. David Capistrano Jr. was firmly entrenched in the leftist 
Movimento Sanitário and had served as the Mayor of Santos (PT), a port-city in the state of São Paulo.  
David Capistrano not only worked across partisan lines by partnering with Adib Jatane, but he also built a 
solid relationship with José Serra of the PSDBç see for example, Serra’s warmly obituary for Capistrano 
(2000: 195-198). 
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professional associations connected individuals, filtered information to their members, 
and shaped their views and professional norms.  
Given the rich and overlapping networks associated with health policy, it is not 
surprising that administrators offered sophisticated and consistent analyses for why they 
wanted to adopt PSF.  Technocrats frequently invoked similar explanations for the 
benefits of the program, including a belief that Brazil should focus on preventive 
medicine, a determination to engage directly with communities, and the conviction that 
basic medicine should move away from doctor-centric models.  In some cases, albeit not 
all, technocrats specifically mentioned the Alma Ata conference as having articulated an 
important set of goals.  Others mentioned the ground-breaking VIII Conferência Nacional 
de Saúde, held in March 1986, which demanded that the state provide universal health 
care a basic social right.  Although a few policymakers expressed skepticism about the 
program’s applicability for their cities and even discussed the ways they tried to block the 
program, they acknowledged that in ten years the PSF model had become the 
professional norm in their field (Interview Franco 2004; Interview F. Santos 2004).  This 
helps explain why eventually cities like Salvador and Belo Horizonte adopted PSF.  In 
Salvador, city health administrators acknowledged with some discomfort that they were 
relatively “late” in adopting PSF and that several nearby cities were ahead of them in 
implementing “model” programs (Interview Queiroz 2004; Interview Nossa 2004).  The 
sheer density of health care associations and their ability to shape professional norms thus 
helps explain the phenomenal spread of PSF across the country.  
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Although formal overlapping networks tell us a great deal about professional 
socialization, it is also important to acknowledge the ways in which informal networks 
provided individual policymakers with wide-ranging connections and convinced them to 
initiate change.  Oftentimes the informal networks revolved around personal 
relationships.  For instance, Adib Jatene first met David Capistrano Filho in 1979 when 
he served as State Secretary of Health in São Paulo and Capistrano was a sanitarista 
working for the state’s public health agency (Jatene 2002).46  Over the years, Jatene had 
taken note of Capistrano’s accomplishments in Bauru and Santos, and quickly identified 
him as a natural choice for director of QUALIS.  In selecting Capistrano, Jatene chose 
someone who held tremendous influence within the political left and the movement.  
Capistrano would become an important spokesperson for the PSF program and would 
persuade many skeptical colleagues on the merits of the policy and that PSF was not a 
“poor program for the poor.”47  On an individual level, Capistrano connected informally 
with countless actors in the health policy arena and convinced them that PSF was an 
appropriate model for primary health delivery, even in the largest metropolitan areas.48  
                                                 
46 As Adib Jatene (2003) explained David Capistrano’s father was a communist and activist who had been 
persecuted by the government.  Although the military government had later issued an amnesty to political 
opponents, then Secretary Adib Jatene was under pressure to fire him.  Since there was no evidence that 
Capistrano had misused his post for political reasons, Jatene refused to do so.  Although their paths did not 
cross for many years, Jatene would take an interest in Capistrano’s later accomplishments in Bauru and 
Santos.  Dr. Jatene held David Capistrano Jr. in the highest regard for his work in public health.  He was 
especially impressed by the fact that Capistrano left both Bauru and Santos with empty pockets; in other 
words, unlike other politicians, he had not enriched himself by stealing public resources (Jatene Interview 
2003).  
47 For instance, members of his health policy team from Santos expressed deep skepticism about the PSF 
program; they thought it was a “poor program for the poor”.  But he managed to turn around Silveira and 
Mattos, who joined him in administering QUALIS (Interview Silveira 2003; Presentation Mattos 2003). 
48 Capistrano died in October 2000.  Although I was unable to interview him for this research project, 
many interview subjects in São Paulo mentioned him with fondness and his endorsement of PSF carried 
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Aside from the personal contacts that drew actors to learn about PSF, other 
informal opportunities arose for learning and socialization.  For instance, when technical 
staff at the Ministry of Health wanted to promote PSF, they strategically identified 
influential staff members in different cities and invited them to visit a “model” city.  It 
was their belief that once visitors saw how effective the program was, they would be 
motivated to adopt it in their own hometowns and would advocate for it with their 
supervisors (Interview F. Sousa 2003).  For instance, around 1995 and 1996 the ministry 
sent key actors in the Federal District to the Northeast to visit model PSF programs 
(Interview F. Sousa 2003).  One of these individuals went to Recife in the state of 
Pernambuco to see how city administrators had adopted PSF; she would later advocate 
for it to the Secretary of Heath, Maria José da Conceição (Maninha) (Interview Peixinho 
2004).  This type of first-hand experience was also crucial for São Paulo’s Secretary of 
Health Eduardo Jorge Martins Alves, who credits his enthusiasm for the program on 
having seen PSF first-hand in the Northeast as a member of Congress (Interview Martins 
Alves 2004).   
In these ways social and professional networks, both formal and informal, played 
an important role in transmitting ideas and shaping new norms.  When individuals were 
socialized to believe that a particular policy represented “the model” in their field, they 
were especially eager to adopt a similar approach, lest they fall behind their peers.  This 
dynamic was particularly true for the family health program, which was embraced by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
heavy weight (for example, Interview Silveira 2003; Interview Gouvea 2003; Interview Manfredini 2003; 
Interview R. Santos 2003). 
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densely organized health networks.  Interviews with Brazilian policymakers in all four 
cities revealed that social and professional networks prompted individuals to influence 
the policy agenda by proposing new programs.  Social network connectivity was thus a 
necessary component for policy diffusion to occur.  
Controlling for Federal Transfers 
Though the Ministry of Health had an important role in promoting the Programa 
Saúde da Família, the impact of its fiscal transfers on diffusion is mixed.  Thus, it cannot 
rightfully be seen as a motivating cause for actors’ desires to adopt PSF.  Starting in the 
mid-1990s, a few administrators in the ministry began advocating for a preventive health 
approach, represented in PSF.  Programa Saúde da Família would eventually evolve from 
a small isolated project embedded precariously in the bureaucracy to an established 
division in the Ministry that would eventually reorganize basic health care policy around 
the program’s design.  By the late 90s, the Ministry began providing line-item fiscal 
transfers for cities that chose to adopt the program.49  Yet despite the opportunity to gain 
access to resources through PSF, many mayors and city administrators refused to institute 
the program.  In São Paulo, Mayor Paulo Maluf rejected federal funds and a personal 
appeal from Minister Adib Jatene to introduce PSF (Interview Jatene 2003).  Throughout 
the 1990s, health administrators in Belo Horizonte were skeptical of the PSF model and 
refused to implement it, despite losing federal resources.  Ironically, technocrats affiliated 
                                                 
49 Fiscal transfers for PSF were calculated on a sliding scale and depended on the overall percentage of the 
population covered under the program and the number of health teams in place. The formula favored cities 
that adopted the program with expansive coverage of the population.  
 171
with both the Cristovam Buarque and Joaquim Roriz administrations in Brasília reported 
that they implemented PSF despite not having received regular earmarked funding from 
the federal government; both sets of officials claimed that political rivalries between 
officials in the federal and district governments led to irregular funding.50  As for the 
other city administrations, once they chose to adopt PSF, officials from Belo Horizonte, 
Brasília, and São Paulo all explained that they appreciated the “extra” PSF financing.  
However, they also emphasized that the program was nevertheless very expensive to 
operate; the fiscal transfers alone were insufficient to motivate them to adopt the program 
because the costs far exceeded the transfers.51  Officials from Salvador were the only 
program administrators to cite their policy choices as a reaction to “directives from the 
federal Ministry of Health”. Though part of their response was due to the transfers, they 
also acknowledged they were “behind” other neighboring cities and needed to respond to 
the new paradigm.   
CHAPTER CONCULSIONS 
Throughout much of the 1990s, when the federal government struggled to define 
health care reform, municipal governments became laboratories for experimentation and 
innovation in basic health.  Cities like Niterói and Londrina were inspired by leftist 
                                                 
50 Cristovam Buarque was affiliated with the PT, which was in opposition to then-President Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso of the PSDB. During the Joaquim Roriz (PMDB) administrations (1998-2002; 2002-
2006) Brasília officials encountered resistance from the federal government, which only intensified once 
President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) took office in 2002.   
51 For instance, officials in Salvador estimated that each PSF team has an operational costs of R$30,000, of 
which the Ministry of Health provides R$2,800 (i.e. less than 10 percent).  The Ministry also provides 
R$40,000 to for each new facility for PSF. Thus by their calculations, the financial incentives were too 
minimal for a large city like Salvador (Interview Queiroz 2004; Interview Nossa 2004). 
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primary care health models and drew on Cuba’s family doctor model.  In São Paulo, the 
mayor favored a more conservative approach that integrated public-private partnerships.  
Others still embraced a nascent model that integrated community health with integrated 
teams of health care professionals, called Programa Saúde da Família.  Most importantly, 
this period of experimentation demonstrates that for municipalities across Brazil, issues 
of basic health care delivery were far from clear or automatic.  Rather, politicians and 
technical health policy staff debated the merits of different programs and made calculated 
decisions on which policies to adopt.  
 Contrary to conventional wisdom in political science, which emphasizes neo-
classical behavioral assumptions that individuals pursue their own self-interest, the actors 
in this study did not emulate PSF for electoral gain.  In other words, there is no evidence 
that mayors adopted the family health program for the purpose of winning an election.  
Rather, most emulation decisions were delegated to politically appointed staff and highly 
specialized health experts who assessed the ideological and technical merits of the 
program.  In the few instances where rightist politicians came to embrace PSF for its 
political benefits, they did so belatedly and after staff members had initiated the policy’s 
emulation.  This finding is remarkable given that PSF easily lends itself to clientalism 
and patronage politics on the part of mayors.  
As this chapter argues, actors’ motivations to adopt PSF were largely driven by 
two factors: ideological commitments to social justice and desires to keep up with 
evolving professional norms.  While these factors were consistently important for all the 
case studies, actors’ ideological interpretation of PSF changed over time.  Staunch leftists 
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had to analyze and interpret the PSF to determine if it was consistent with their 
ideological commitments, and in many cases their assessments evolved.  Professional and 
informal social networks were often important features in these processes because they 
reinforced actors’ ideological commitments.  In other words, professional networks such 
as CEBES, ABRASCO, and CONASEMS created opportunities for professionals in 
different jurisdictions to learn about PSF and debate the program’s merits and meaning.  
Informal networks and friendship ties were also important among leftist politicians and 
technocrats.  When key opinion leaders such as David Capistrano Filho and Eduardo 
Jorge Martins Alves embraced the family health program, it served as an important signal 
for others that the policy was consistent with their leftist ideological commitments.  The 
following chapter will further explore how ideology and social norms operate together to 
spur emulation decisions, drawing on evidence from PSF and Bolsa Escola.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: EXPLAINING SOCIAL POLICY DIFFUSION IN 
BRAZIL 
 
Decentralization in Brazil creates the opportunity for thousands of local municipal 
governments to tailor social policies for their constituents.  This flexibility is particularly 
attractive because the country, continental in size, has tremendous regional inequalities.  
Despite the autonomy that local governments enjoy in policymaking, the 1990s has 
ushered in an era of tremendous policy replication as cities across the country have 
emulated program that were designed elsewhere.  The question that drives this study is: 
what motivates policy makers to emulate innovative social policy?  Are actors motivated 
by self-interested pursuits to win elections? Or are actors motivated by principled 
commitments regardless of self or others? Alternatively, are they motivated by 
community-oriented action in an other-regarding way?  In answering these questions 
about actors’ motivations, this dissertation explores how and why policy diffusion occurs, 
and explains how diffusion has been an important feature of Brazilian social policy since 
the early 1990s.  Chapter 3 provides a statistical analysis of the determinants of social 
policy diffusion for Brazil’s 224 largest cities.  Chapters 4 and 5 draw on in-depth case 
studies to uncover actors’ motivations to adopt Bolsa Escola and Programa Saúde da 
Família.   
The conclusion unifies this work by bringing together the previous chapters.  To 
accomplish this aim, the first section designs an overarching theory for social policy 
diffusion in Brazil.  As the second section explains, these findings are consistent despite 
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differences between qualitative and quantitative methodologies and the two issue areas of 
this study.  The third section addresses the implications of this study for diffusion 
research and scholarship on Brazilian politics.  It concludes by setting an agenda for 
future research. 
THE CORE FINDINGS 
 This dissertation tests three distinct approaches to understanding individuals’ 
motivations for emulating innovative social policies in Brazil.  Each corresponds to 
distinct analytic research traditions, found in political science and sociology, and their 
paradigmatic response to questions of what drives political behavior.  Do actors follow 
conventional rational choice assumptions about political self-interest and pursue social 
policies to win elections?  Or, do politicians make policy choices regardless of self and 
others and emulate policies because of their deep seated ideological commitments?  
Alternatively, do actors respond to a community of shared norms and emulate policies to 
demonstrate to their peers that they are in line with their profession’s latest trends?  To 
answer these questions, this study draws on both statistical and qualitative evidence to 
uncover the process by which actors make emulation decisions.   
Both Bolsa Escola and Programa Saúde da Família share similar causal 
mechanisms that explain why actors are motivated to emulate them.  The statistical and 
case study evidence reveals similar findings, despite differences between qualitative and 
quantitative research designs.  Figure 6.1 provides a visual representation of the 
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theoretical findings of this study.  A more in-depth analysis of each factor, as well 
evidence from Bolsa Escola and PSF emulation, follows. 
Figure 6.1 Explaining Social Policy Diffusion: A Motivational Approach 
 
 
A political incentives approach offers an intuitively appealing explanation for the 
spread of social policies in Brazil.  This rationale speaks directly to rational choice 
assumptions about actors’ determination to pursue their political self-interest and to gain 
electoral power; it thus represents both the theoretical and instinctive conventional 
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wisdom.  Within political science, the assumption of rationality is one of the principal 
ways researchers have sought the regularity necessary for generalization (Riker and 
Ordeshook 1973:11).  Given this, one of the most surprising findings of this dissertation 
is that political incentives fail to explain actors’ motivations for social policy emulation.   
As Chapters 3, 4, and 5 show politicians rarely make emulation decisions as 
vehicles to advance their electoral self-interest.  Certainly, the pressure to win elections 
and distinguish oneself from one’s competitor is crucially important in the Brazilian 
municipal arena.  Campaigning on the provision of these social programs can offer a 
clear opportunity to gain votes.  Mayors Cristovam Buarque, Marta Suplicy and Célio 
Castro all campaigned on their intentions to implement either Bolsa Escola or PSF.  Once 
in place, these programs offer other electoral benefits, including the potential to target 
benefits to voters for future municipal elections.  Mayors who adopt PSF can also 
influence voters by deciding which neighborhoods will be served by the program. Some 
executives do indeed use these electioneering strategies.  For instance, under the 
administration of Mayor Antônio Imbassahy in Salvador, the political leadership 
determined which neighborhoods should be included in the health program. Often, the 
favored neighborhoods were not those with the greatest epidemiological needs.   
For some mayors, these programs are politically appealing not because they offer 
opportunities for policy-based electoral competition, but rather because they can 
perpetuate “politics as usual” through patronage and corruption.  Since the health 
program includes the hiring of new personnel, the power behind job creation offers the 
opportunity for significant political payoffs.  The community health agent job under PSF 
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is an especially desirable position among the lower classes because it requires relatively 
little education or background in healthcare; often, the only requirements are residency in 
the neighborhood served and demonstration of leadership skills.  The administration of 
Joaquim Roriz in Brasília was especially notorious for irregularities related to the PSF, as 
investigations into widespread corruption and the misuse of funds unveiled (Interview 
Bisol 2004).  
Despite some of the electoral benefits that Bolsa Escola or PSF entail, there is a 
wealth of evidence to suggest that mayors and their staffs mostly did not seek to replicate 
these programs because of self-interested calculi for electoral or economic gains.  As the 
event history models reveal, greater electoral competition does not explain the likelihood 
that Bolsa Escola or PSF will diffuse.  Moreover, the degree of electoral competition does 
not explain differences in adoption for the 224 larges cities.  The case studies reinforce 
these findings in several ways.  Politicians in this study never considered these programs 
as responses to citizen demand.  Though Bolsa Escola received widespread media 
coverage, none of the cities had citizen groups who demanded that candidates or 
incumbent mayors adopt Bolsa Escola.  In addition, citizen delegates who served on local 
health councils rarely advocated introducing PSF; if anything they were resistant to the 
program and wary it would not result in improved services.  The poor and most 
vulnerable populations served by PSF were unfamiliar with the program and they still 
viewed clinics and hospitals – not PSF health teams – as appropriate places to go to for 
their healthcare needs.  City officials who would adopt PSF would often have to persuade 
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citizens and local health councils that the program would be an improvement.  Thus, the 
adoption of Bolsa Escola and PSF often took place in the absence of electoral “demand.”  
In fact, mayors’ decisions to adopt these social policies often entailed political 
risk that made electoral payoffs far from assured, even when technocrats were confident 
in the benefits flowing from these programs.  The uncertainties were especially high for 
administrations that decided to replicate the programs soon after the innovations garnered 
attention.  For example, Bolsa Escola could increase school attendance, but by 
incorporating previously marginalized and failing students into the system, other 
performance indicators could have declined.  The complications were even greater for 
those administrations that adopted PSF because doing so required reorganizing health 
services, updating facilities, conducting new training, and formulating new relationships 
with patients.  For many cities, adopting PSF also involved assuming responsibility for 
services that were previously in the hands of state governments.  Even after several years, 
technocrats would often report that they had not yet reached their operational goals 
because of difficulties related to training, recruiting personnel, and retaining staff. 
Despite the risks of policy failure, both Célio Castro in Belo Horizonte and Lídice da 
Mata in Salvador signed on to Bolsa Escola very early on; in São Paulo Marta Suplicy 
also committed to PSF even though very few other cities with a comparable health 
network had chosen to do so.  
A further disincentive for politicians to adopt Bolsa Escola and PSF is that they 
understood these programs would garner opposition from well-organized segments of the 
population.  Traditional corporatist sectors such as teachers, medical practitioners, and 
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civil servants disliked many elements of these social policies.  Bolsa Escola was 
unpopular with many teachers and teachers unions, who traditionally favored other 
education policies that enhanced curriculum development, school materials, and pay.  
Similarly, in nearly every case study, plans for the adoption of PSF caused conflicts with 
existing city personnel and resulted in walk-outs or work-stoppages.  Unions representing 
healthcare workers, doctors, nurses, and other city employees were often skeptical of the 
policy because it meant a substantive change in their workday and a reformulation of 
their contracts.  Given that the programmatic outcomes would be uncertain by the next 
election cycle and that politicians would face known resistance from an organized 
segment of the electorate, it was hard for elected officials to see clear political gains.   
A political incentives approach thus provides a deficient explanation for 
understanding social policy diffusion.  These cities had competitive municipal elections 
with hotly contested campaigns, but political competition did not drive the selection of 
the public policies and the speed at which policy replication occurred.  Mayors adopted 
these policies when there was little demand even knowing there was a chance the policies 
could fail to provide positive results by the next election.   
Because the political incentives approach cannot convincingly explain diffusion, 
we need to turn to other motivational explanations.  If conventional rational choice 
explanations can not account for the diffusion of social programs, what role, if any, does 
ideology play in motivating individuals into action?  Did policy innovations spread across 
cities governed by mayors on both the left and right?  Or do only individuals with certain 
ideological commitments feel compelled to adopt programs such as Bolsa Escola and 
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PSF?  Do political actors make decisions to implement programs because they are 
strongly motivated by their ideological beliefs, even when these choices appear 
politically inexpedient or “irrational”?  
As the case studies and event history analyses reveal, leftist politicians were much 
more likely to adopt Bolsa Escola and PSF; whereas both centrist and right-wing mayors 
were unlikely to do so.  Leftist ideology not only mattered to mayors, but also to 
technocrats and political appointees, such as secretaries of education and health.  Staff 
members regularly displayed their ideologically driven preferences and discussed their 
policy choices in relation to their values and beliefs.  In nearly every case of program 
adoption, technocrats, political appointees, and elected officials, who self-identified as 
leftist discussed these programs with similar rhetoric.  These individuals invoked 
comparable themes and concepts to explain program emulation; one common description 
was their desire to address a “social deficit” and prioritize funding to alleviate social 
inequality.  Another theme was the construction of “citizenship” and the view that 
education and health care were important social rights.  In other words, for these actors, 
full citizenship rights in democratic Brazil included the state’s obligation to fulfill basic 
social services.  
 While ideology played a central role in emulation decisions, ideological 
interpretations of these programs were not static.  Bolsa Escola was quickly embraced by 
left-of-center politicians who found the policy consistent with their own ideological 
convictions and priorities.  This was very different with respect to PSF; many leftist 
health policy specialists were initially skeptical about the program and wondered whether 
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the PSF was really aligned with their ideological commitments.  In this case, many health 
policy experts consistently expressed their leftist beliefs but it would take time for them 
to assess whether PSF could be consistent with their commitment for universal primary 
care.  
As Chapter 5 explores, health policy specialists on the left found PSF’s mission 
laudable but they had to reconcile its potential with other information that caused 
cognitive dissonance.  For instance, while the program sought to advance health care 
access for the poorest, most vulnerable, and socially excluded groups, other features of 
the policy seemed to be inconsistent with leftist values.  Some actors identified signals 
that the policy might reflect more conservative neoliberal values.  Since the family health 
program had followed in the footsteps of an earlier program targeted to the poor rural 
Northeast, some leftists coined PSF a “poor program for the poor.”  During Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso’s administration, Health Minister José Serra had also approached the 
World Bank about financing for the program.  That the World Bank was open to 
supporting the program’s expansion served as evidence to some that the policy was a 
“Washington consensus” project.  On the other hand, well-known leftist David 
Capistrano Filho supported PSF by prominently advocating for it.  Many progressive 
health policy advocates would have to sort through these mixed messages and interpret 
the policy for themselves.  In practice, this meant the PSF program was subject to a 
longer review process by politicians and their technical advisors to determine whether it 
was consistent with their ideological beliefs.  Left-of-center ideological commitments 
mattered for both policy domains and were consistently important.  Yet actors’ leftist 
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ideology alone fails to account for an all-inclusive explanation of social policy emulation.  
Rahter, networks were crucial in making leftists see PSF as compatible with their 
ideology.  To uncover how education and health policy experts came to embrace the 
program, we now turn to the role that social networks played in shaping professional 
norms, socializing actors, and motivating them to seek legitimacy in relation to their 
peers.   
Social networks played an important role in motivating actors across Brazil to 
emulate Bolsa Escola and PSF. At the most basic level, they provide actors with 
knowledge about their profession’s latest trends.  In this sense, networks operated as 
conduits of information.  But more importantly for a study that focuses on actors’ 
motivations, networks also socialized actors.  When professional networks provided 
space for debate, evaluated policies, and declared them successful or “innovative”, they 
went beyond “information exchange” to place a value on that information.  Interviews 
with politicians and technocrats in Brazil revealed that most actors were embedded in 
various forms of associational life.  These actors often discussed their work with their 
peers; i.e. they referenced whether they were proudly ahead of the curve, quick to notice 
the latest developments, or were embarrassed to be behind their peers and thus a late 
adopter.  Municipal policy makers in both Bolsa Escola and PSF policy domains 
consistently referred to their peers, suggesting that they sought to keep up “with the 
Joneses”, especially when the Joneses were highly regarded innovators.  In framing their 
work in this manner, actors sought the legitimacy to be gained from their colleagues; 
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when individuals were linked to social networks their emulation decisions were driven by 
social norms and other-regarding motivations.  
Social networks mattered in shaping actors’ quest to gain legitimacy.  First, 
professional associations were crucial for most technocrats and a few politicians who 
held close ties to their profession.  These associations were fundamental conduits for 
socialization and information exchange across geographical space.  As Friedkin notes (as 
cited in Kilduff and Tsai 2003:58), professional networks are important because they link 
people with similar functional roles but who might otherwise be isolated and lack peers 
within their jurisdiction.  Second, informal associations such as neighborhood and 
friendship ties also mattered, but these sprouted up in more idiosyncratic and less 
predictable ways.  Differences between education and health policy arenas explain how 
the structure, scope, and density of professional networks can influence emulation 
decisions.  Thus we now turn to uncovering the differences in social network activity, 
both formal and informal, related to Bolsa Escola and PSF emulation.  
As Chapter 4 explains, Bolsa Escola represented a hybrid program that embraced 
both educational achievement and poverty alleviation.  As a result of these 
complementary aims, the program never found a home in a single policy domain.  Some 
cities housed their programs in departments of education, such as Brasília and Belo 
Horizonte; others in departments of public assistance, for example Campinas; yet others 
created new agencies, as in the case of São Paulo; or entered into private-public 
partnerships, as was the case with Salvador.  While the program had clear links to 
education and set goals related to increasing school attendance and decreasing grade 
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repetition, the policy never captured the center of the education sector’s professional 
agenda.  Rather, Bolsa Escola’s main enthusiasts would be general policy practitioners 
interested in innovative public policies, not education specialists.  In general, the 
professional associations in education were lukewarm towards the education grant 
program, and traditional teachers unions were uneasy about losing resources.  For these 
reasons it would take a generalist network of policy practitioners associated with the 
Gestão Pública e Cidadania network to stimulate actors’ desires for emulation.   
Even if professional organizations in the education sector had formally embraced 
Bolsa Escola, there would still be important differences between the education and health 
sectors.  Unlike the field of public health, advocates for progressive socially inclusive 
education had never formed a large-scale social movement during the democratic 
transition.  While university students did join pro-democracy movements, their activities 
would not serve as the backbone for primary and secondary educational reforms.  Nor 
would student groups plant the seeds for long-standing education associations, as was the 
case with the sanitary movement.  Much of the depth and breadth found in today’s health 
sector associations, including organizations such as ABRASCO, CEBES, and 
CONASEMS, date back to early organizing by sanitaristas.  Today, these public health 
associations serve an important role in bringing together influential health policy 
technocrats, creating opportunities for learning, socialization, and informal exchanges.  
The evidence from the event history analysis and case studies also reveals that 
informal networks promoted policy diffusion, albeit in less consistent and more 
idiosyncratic ways.  In the case of PSF, there were strong regional effects that influenced 
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adoption decisions; states furthest from the early adopting region of the northeast were 
least likely to emulate PSF.  In interviews, technocrats also identified which neighboring 
cities were ahead of the curve, and many technocrats who promoted the program said 
they did so after personally visiting innovative programs (for instance Interview Martins 
Alves 2004; Peixinho 2004).  While regional effects did not promote Bolsa Escola 
diffusion, informal relationships did.  Policymakers involved with Bolsa Escola often 
cited learning about the program through colleagues and meetings.  One notable instance 
offered by Mayor Lídice da Mata is illustrative; she first learned about Renda Mínima at 
a meeting where the Mayor of Campinas made a presentation (Interview 2003).  
In these ways, politicians and especially technocrats responsible for social policy 
development were strongly influenced by their informal and professional associations. 
PSF spread quickly because of the health sector’s dense social and professional networks 
which shaped experts’ desire to keep up with new professional norms.  The education 
sector, by contrast, has fewer formal organizations, explaining the relatively slow pace of 
Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima diffusion.  Though informal networks mattered, their 
effects were more haphazard and weaker than those produced through formal 
professional channels.  As the analysis shows, social policy diffusion at the municipal 
level was strongly influenced by two motivational factors: first, actors’ ideological 
commitments and deep-seated desires to enact policies that were consistent with their 
leftist worldviews and second, actors’ quest for professional legitimacy and desire to 
demonstrate to peers that they were keeping up with professional norms.  Each of these 
motivational approaches is treated separately in this study for conceptual clarity.  Yet 
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these motivational factors need not operate in isolation; in fact the case studies reveal that 
at times, ideology and social networks work together and display mutually reinforcing 
effects.  For a select number of politicians and politically appointed technocrats, both 
these motivations operated together and in complementary ways.  The analysis of Bolsa 
Escola and PSF emulation offers clarification in this regard. 
On occasion, like-minded leftist politicians participated in meetings that not only 
introduced them to new social policy ideas but also helped them interpret these policies 
as progressive solutions to social exclusion.  This type of serendipitous event was 
important for Bolsa Escola diffusion; Mayor Lídice da Mata in Salvador met with 
Campinas’ Mayor Magalhães Teixeira at an event and learned about the Renda Mínima 
program (Interview Mata 2004).  Similarly, Belo Horizonte city Councilman Rogério 
Correia said that as a former educator and Workers’ Party representative, he took an 
interest in Cristovam Buarque’s education proposals in Brasília (Interview 2004).   
Partisan meetings created opportunities for social networking among officials who shared 
ideological beliefs.  It also gave mayors a sense of trends in local governance as their 
colleagues presented information on their most innovative practices.  These networking 
events served a similar function as professional network meetings for technocrats, except 
that it was mayors who sought to gain legitimacy and recognition from their peers.  
 In the case of PSF, social networks and ideology worked together in slightly 
different ways; rather than operating among elected officials, health policy technocrats 
and politically appointed health secretaries would find that professional networks could 
assist them in evaluating the merits of the policy in ideological terms.  Many leftist health 
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experts rejected the family health program in the early years of its enactment in Brazil.  It 
was not that they were unfamiliar with it, but rather they experienced cognitive 
dissonance between their ideological commitments to expand universal primary care and 
PSF’s more limited design.  Many leftists wanted universal access for primary health care 
and worried that PSF was a poor program for the poor; i.e. a band-aid approach to 
offering services in areas that lacked basic health infrastructure rather than a full 
coverage program with similar strategies across class lines.  Professional networks, such 
as CEBES, ABRASCO, and CONASEMS, became venues for debating the merits and 
limits of these programs.  And when well-traveled and nationally recognized public 
health experts such as Adib Jatene, David Capistrano and Luis Odorico Andrade 
endorsed the program, the larger community took notice.  Moreover, leftists committed to 
PSF advocated for the program to offer coverage to the entire population, not just in 
selected shanty towns.  Expanded coverage helped convince many committed leftists that 
the program could offer universal primary care.  In these ways, professional social 
networks played a significant role in convincing them that PSF was in line with their 
ideological commitments to progressive health care.    
To summarize, one of the most surprising findings is that the conventional 
political incentives approach, which assumes rationality and emphasizes individuals’ 
pursuit of their political self-interest, failed to explain social policy diffusion in Brazil.  
Many early adopters of these models embraced these programs even though their 
electoral repercussions were far from clear.  The central theoretical finding of this study 
is that ideology and socialized norms drove individuals’ decision-making and their 
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desires to replicate new policy models in Brazil.  Local elected executives often made 
choices based on their own ideological commitments and deeply held beliefs.  
Technocrats and politicians with strong professional ties, on the other hand, consistently 
cited their profession’s norms and their commitment to following the latest trends and 
models.  The speed and extent of policy diffusion were tied to the density of professional 
networks.   
SIMILAR FINDINGS DESPITE THE DIFFERENCES  
This study draws on two diffusion traditions to examine the spread of social 
policies across Brazilian municipalities.  While research on diffusion extends to multiple 
social science disciplines, there is a notable divide between those scholars who employ 
qualitative methods and those who use advanced statistical analysis.  Researchers who 
draw largely on qualitative methods and process tracing tend to embrace more 
constructivist, or interpretative, approaches to diffusion that emphasize emulation, 
learning, “policy transfer,” and norms (see for instance Bennett 1991, 2001; Finnemore 
1996; Weyland 2007; Mossberger 2000).  By contrast, scholars that employ statistical 
analyses with a large number of cases tend to embrace more rationalist assumptions about 
actors’ strategic behavior in making adoption decisions (see for instance Berry and Berry 
1992; Mooney 2001; Simmons and Elkins 2004).  Event history models can also analyze 
broader trends, including the ability to understand the risks or likelihood that a given 
jurisdiction will adopt a policy.   
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While Mahoney and Goertz (2006) suggest that qualitative and quantitative 
research should be undertaken separately because each is marked by its own values, 
assumptions, and presuppositions, this work embraces the view that both methods can be 
complementary to explain policy diffusion processes.  The large-N component of this 
study not only captures diffusion trends in social policy adoption, but also allows for 
greater generalization of causality (King, et. al. 1994).  The event history findings 
provide a probabilistic interpretation of the likelihood that a jurisdiction adopts either 
Bolsa Escola or PSF.  The qualitative case studies offer in-depth analyses of the 
mechanisms that lead to diffusion.  Process tracing also allows for the possibility of 
causal heterogeneity and importantly clarifies policy makers’ motivations for emulating 
Bolsa Escola and PSF.  While both methods produce similar explanations for the 
motivations that drive policymakers’ adoption of these social policies, it is worthwhile to 
explore the differences and similarities between the qualitative and quantitative findings.   
One of the most important distinctions between the two methods employed in this 
dissertation relates to how we understand diffusion processes.  The event history findings 
focus on the likelihood that diffusion will occur; once a jurisdiction has adopted a 
program the city is dropped from the analysis.  The assumption underlying this method is 
that once a policy is implemented, it will remain in place.  For many governments, this 
notion about the nature of public policy is reasonable.  Once a new policy is enacted, it 
can be difficult to reverse course because actors and institutions have vested interests in 
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maintaining the status quo.1  However, as the case studies reveal, the Brazilian public 
policy environment is more unstable; some municipalities make symbolic name changes 
whereas others undergo more serious alterations as policies are suspended or reversed 
altogether when new executives take office.  For instance, the renaming of programs is 
fairly common as politicians seek to place their own stamp on public policy.  In Brasília 
the family health program has been called Saúde em Casa and Programa Saúde da 
Família, and Bolsa Escola has also been Renda Minha and Renda Mínima.   For the most 
part, the renaming of programs by city mayors remains a symbolic gesture that does not 
interfere with the programs’ administration or continuity.  But, a more serious 
phenomenon for diffusion research is policy suspension or reversal.  The case study 
evidence from Brasília reveals that turnover does occur and corresponds with electoral 
shifts from a leftist to a rightist mayor.   
By incorporating two research methods that examine diffusion processes that can 
capture emulation, non-emulation, and reversal, this study is able to uncover the 
importance of ideology in decision-making processes.  Both the large and small-N studies 
offer remarkably consistent findings on the role that ideology plays in social policy 
emulation: Left-of-center politicians are more likely, to adopt Bolsa Escola and PSF; 
while reversal is relatively rare those instances also inform the general findings of the 
importance of mayors’ ideological commitments as only rightlists chose to reverse 
course.  In addition, the case studies of the Buarque and Roriz administrations show that 
                                                 
1 In the study of American politics, incrementalism is a main feature of policymaking, rather than 
wholesale reinvention or reversal (Lindblom 1959; Pierson 1994). 
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ideology also matters when it comes to policy reversal.  In other words, when a rightist 
comes into office and lacks the same ideological predisposition to address social 
inequality, this mayor is more willing to suspend a program he identifies as “leftist.”  In 
this way, the qualitative research, which includes an in-depth analysis of “outlier” cases, 
can contribute to a more nuanced understanding of both diffusion processes as well as the 
role of ideology in motivating politicians’ decisions.  
Given that large- and small-N research draws on different types of data, it is only 
natural that differences in measurement for the theoretical variables of interest could also 
contribute to meaningful insights.  Both qualitative and quantitative approaches test the 
extent to which electoral competition, ideology, and social networks matter in driving 
emulation decisions, but these causal factors are conceptualized slightly differently.  The 
data intensive requirement for the event history analysis necessitate in some instances 
imperfect measures for the theoretical variables of interest.  Assumptions about ideology 
for instance are based on an actor’s partisan affiliation, but their partisanship might not 
truly capture their worldviews.  By contrast, process tracing allows for “thick 
description” that can reveal interpretive accounts such as the meaning an actor ascribes to 
her ideological beliefs.    
The measures of social network connectivity and their effect on stimulating social 
policy emulation serve as a clear example of how both methods draw on slightly different 
measures to test the theoretically driven hypothesis that policymakers who are part of 
networks will seek to ‘keep up with the Joneses.’  Recall, for instance, that the measure 
of formal network connectivity is based on membership and participation data provided 
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by CEBES and the Public Management and Citizenship Program.  The data from the 
Public Management program is of better quality because it includes more information on 
who participated and accounts for annual fluctuations.  In the case of CEBES however, 
administrators had not kept annual databases on membership, but rather continuously 
updated a single list.2  Since staff members emphasized that the geographical distribution 
of members was fairly constant over time, values were simply repeated for every year in 
this study.  Nevertheless this solution to a shortcoming in the data likely leads to a less 
powerful network effect for the PSF model.  The case study analyses enhance 
understanding of socialized norms by allowing subjects to identify which networks 
matter to them.  The interviews also uncover how actors view different associations and 
engage in various professional and informal networks.  In this way the qualitative cases 
show how participation in the Public Management and Citizenship Program and CEBES 
networks mattered for policy makers.  In addition, the case studies also shed light on the 
unique features of civil society activity in the health sector, to explain PSF emulation.  
Debates on the merits of PSF extended beyond CEBES to fora organized by ABRASCO 
and CONASEMS among others, and emphasized the nature of the field’s dense and 
overlapping health associations.   
On the face of it, both the qualitative and quantitative methods examine ideology 
similarly – elected officials and their senior political appointees are classified as leftists, 
centrists, or rightists.  The statistical models reveal that the presence of a leftist mayor has 
a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of Bolsa Escola and PSF emulation.  
                                                 
2 The ABRASCO membership database was managed in a similar manner. 
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Also important is that centrists and rightists behave alike in the large-N study; in other 
words centrists and rightists adopt these policies at similar rates.  But what is it about 
leftists that makes them so eager to emulate these social policies?  As the case studies 
reveal, leftists who adopted these programs shared similar commitments, beliefs, and 
desires to govern in a way that fit their worldview.  They were driven by a dedication to 
address historic social exclusion and reverse decades-old spending priorities that 
benefited the elite and middle-class.  Interestingly, most of the leftists interviewed for this 
study framed their policy choices as driven by their belief that Brazil needed to construct 
“citizenship.”  Pro-poor and equity enhancing policies like Bolsa Escola and PSF were a 
means for expanding those citizenship rights.  Since questions regarding actors’ 
motivations are fundamentally about how they interpret social policy and attribute 
meaning to their actions, research must go beyond the statistical correlates to include 
qualitative approaches that explore individuals’ motivations.   
Lastly, the methodologies employed in this study examine the potential impact 
that electoral competition has on policy diffusion.  Capturing electoral competition is one 
of the most challenging issues for a longitudinal study of Brazilian municipal elections 
because of irregularities of electoral data collection during the early 1990s.3  Thus, the 
case studies provide an opportunity to fill-in information where data is lacking.  At the 
same time, the case studies provide “texture” on the nature of electoral competition for 
the research sites.  For instance, when left-of-center Mayor Lídice da Mata won executive 
                                                 
3 Data for the 1992 mayoral elections are unavailable for most municipalities.  Even data on the city of São 
Paulo is unavailable from the state’s election tribunal. 
 195
office of Salvador in 1992, her rise reflected a brief political opening due to the declining 
influence of the conservative politician Antônio Carlos Magalhães who had dominated 
Bahian politics for decades.4  By 1996, ACM would once again reign supreme in both 
state and municipal politics, and his candidate for office, Antônio Imbassahy, would win 
handily.  In this way knowledge of specific local elections not only elucidates the nature 
of the campaign debates and election, but it also reveals how political contexts sometimes 
reflect broader political dynamics tied to state and national level alliances.  
Scholarship often focuses on a single policy or political phenomenon to explore 
the determinants of policy diffusion (for recent examples see, Brinks and Coppedge 
2006; Mossberger 2000; Orenstein 2003; Simmons and Elkins 2004).  By contrast, one of 
the important features of this project is that it has examined two distinct policies, one 
related to health and the other to education.  There are important theoretical rationales for 
selecting two social policies.  First, this study seeks to avoid the problem of a pro-
innovations bias by examining only those programs that diffuse broadly and rapidly.  
Both policies analyzed in this dissertation diffuse, but do so at dramatically different 
rates; PSF spreads more extensively than Bolsa Escola.  Second, research on public 
policy tends to emphasize differences across issue area, rather than similarity.  
Conventional policy studies highlight the distinct features of each policy domain, 
examining entrenched interests, class conflicts, and the unique actors and institutions 
involved in each sector.  However, it is also possible that distinct policies are driven by 
                                                 
4 Senator Antônio Carlos Magalhães had supported President Collor.  When Collor was impeached on 
corruption charges, ACM who had long been implicated in shady deals himself, lost some political capital. 
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similar causal processes when it comes to emulation.  To explore some of the unique and 
shared features of Bolsa Escola and PSF, this section draws on the analysis presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5, specifically highlighting their inherent qualities including: the degree 
of policy design complexity, policy “flexibility”, and the gendered political appeals of 
these programs.   
 One of the most striking differences between the two social policy issues in this 
study is their degree of complexity.  Bolsa Escola represents a straight-forward and 
simple idea with modest goals to improve educational access.5  Key policy entrepreneurs 
such as Cristovam Buarque made the analogy that Bolsa Escola was just like college-
level grants for needy students, the only difference being that the school grant targets 
needy children.  The simple comparison made it easier for many Brazilians to relate to 
the program, even though the policy’s design seeks to address more complex issues of 
intergenerational poverty, child labor and the opportunity costs of education, and the need 
to induce attitudinal and behavioral changes among parents.  Administratively, 
implementation of Bolsa Escola was also uncomplicated; it merely required the city to 
create a database of beneficiaries with corresponding school attendance information.  
Teachers would need to submit information to the city, but Bolsa Escola did not 
otherwise change the core of their job duties. 
The clear-cut features of Bolsa Escola contrasted dramatically with the complex 
nature of the family health program.  Unlike Bolsa Escola, PSF represented a highly 
                                                 
5 Scholars in various fields have examined how simple or “flexible” ideas make them more likely to 
diffuse. See for instance: Mossberger (2000) on the diffusion of empire zones in the American context and 
Heath and Heath (2007) on why some ideas stick and others do not.   
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sophisticated re-visioning of health care delivery.  The health program encapsulated 
decades of domestic and international debates on how to structure primary health care 
(see Chapter 5).  Not only did it require that municipal health agencies shift resources in 
public health, it also called for many health professionals to embrace the new model.  
Unlike Bolsa Escola, PSF implied a dramatic change in the nature of health workers’ day.  
For instance, many doctors and nurses who had existing civil service employment with 
city governments had to renegotiate contracts.6  To hire community health agents, whose 
job description conflicted with traditional civil servant job contracts, city officials entered 
into partnerships with local non-profit associations.7  The sheer complexity of the 
program’s administration offered a striking contrast to Bolsa Escola.  Many policymakers 
viewed PSF as a “big idea” which involved substantial commitment to reorganize health 
care delivery in Brazil.  For these reasons, it would seem that these two policies reflect 
dramatically different types of social policy.  
These differences in complexity (both ideational and administrative) did have an 
impact on policymakers’ acceptance of these social policies.8  Key policy entrepreneurs 
associated with Bolsa Escola and PSF would experiment with how to frame their policies 
                                                 
6 Most doctors with municipal contacts who worked in the four research sites had contracts with part-time 
shifts.   Thus, in practice many doctors in Brazil work hold two jobs to fill a full-time schedule.  PSF 
however, requires that doctors not only work within a designated territory but that they do so full-time.  
Contract negotiations with municipal health care workers were often a source of conflict between labor 
unions and municipal administrators (Interview M. Souza 2004: Interview Costa 2003; Interview 
D'Agostini 2003; Interview Camara 2004).   
7 One of the job requirements for the ACS is residency in the district in which they work. If a community 
health agent moves, she is subject to job loss.  Thus, administrators often need flexibility in both hiring and 
firing.  One mechanism cities have used to ensure flexibility is to sub-contract work through non-profit 
associations.  For instance, São Paulo established partnerships with fourteen institutions to implement PSF 
throughout the municipality (Sousa 2003: 93).  
8 Several scholars have examined the impact of complex, simple, and flexible ideas on policymaking; see 
especially (Mossberger 2000). 
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to maximize their acceptance.  For instance, Cristovam Buarque had at one point 
described Bolsa Escola as a policy that paid mothers for the work they already do; this 
characterization did not sit well with feminists or conservatives and thus he quickly 
abandoned that description to describe the program as a school scholarship (Interview 
Almira 2003).  In the case of PSF, the framing issue did have substantive implications.  
Did the program represent “primary health” care or “selective primary care?”9  While 
framing issues are important to both social policies, the simplicity behind Bolsa Escola 
was an especially important feature that facilitated its acceptance.10  
Policy flexibility was another element of Bolsa Escola and PSF that a few 
technocrats found to be attractive.  While most cities adopted these programs wholesale 
and made few modifications to their policy design, in a few cities technocrats found ways 
to build upon these policies once they were in place.  Bolsa Escola and PSF could serve 
as the foundation for additional program elements.11  For instance, in Belo Horizonte, 
administrators responsible for Bolsa Escola had previous professional experience in 
public assistance and social work.  While they could have simply created a registry and 
made cash payments to beneficiaries, the staff decided to institute monthly meetings for 
the mothers in the program.  Mothers were invited to select topics for discussion; among 
the issues Bolsa Escola beneficiaries were most eager to address was how to search for 
                                                 
9 I borrow from Cueto (2004) in making this distinction. 
10 Cristovam Buarque himself credits the simplicity of the idea as one of its general appeals (Interview 
2004). 
11 I am grateful to Peter K. Spink who made this observation. 
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employment.  In this way, Bolsa Escola in Belo Horizonte became more than a school 
grant program, namely an outreach and development program for poor mothers as well.    
While the Ministry of Health set clear rules for how the PSF program ought to be 
implemented in order for cities to qualify for federal grants, many cities would enhance 
their PSF program with complementary services or distinct approaches.12  For instance, 
Sobral in the state of Ceará was an early adopter of the family health program.  But one 
of the modifications city officials embraced was the expansion of services to include oral 
hygiene by dentists as part of their system for primary medicine.  In São Paulo, 
administrators affiliated with PSF created a birthing center for women as an alternative to 
hospital deliveries. Sometimes these local experiments with PSF were viewed with 
skepticism by federal health administrators who preferred a unified approach, while at 
other times, new ideas would “trickle-up” and the addition would be embraced by 
national policymakers.   
A central question in diffusion studies is whether adoption decisions truly reflect 
emulation of an existing policy.  Do policymakers adapt an innovative policy before 
implementing it, thus rendering it different?  Or do actors simply apply a “policy label” 
without adopting the specifics of policy design?13  In this study, both Bolsa Escola and 
PSF were largely emulated wholesale by policymakers; few actors tweaked these 
programs before adopting them.  Rather, it was after cities adopted these policies that 
                                                 
12 For instance, the Ministry’s preference for PSF meant that in practice, cities such as Niterói with the 
Programa Médico da Família did not qualify for federal PSF funds.   Later, the Ministry would support 
“similar” programs albeit with reduced levels of funding. 
13 Mossberger defines policy labels as general concepts, with or without some elements of policy design, 
and symbolism (2000:116-117).  For greater discussion of policy labels and diffusion process, see  for  
 200
technocrats would experiment by adding different components.  That Bolsa Escola and 
PSF were perceived to be useful foundations for complementary activity speaks to their 
general appeal.  It can also help explain why technocrats were willing to buy into these 
programs and why these policies may have “stuck” as city administrators established 
vested interests in these programs.   
To summarize, one of the important features of this study is that is brings together 
two different research traditions to uncover actors’ motivations for social policy 
emulation.  Employing distinct approaches in a single study makes up for the inherent 
weaknesses of each method, clarifying the mechanisms that drive diffusion while also 
allowing for greater generalization.  A second analytic characteristic of this dissertation is 
its comparison between two different types of policy issues.  Bolsa Escola is a relatively 
small program with specific aims geared towards a particular constituency.  Programa 
Saúde da Família, on the other hand, has broad goals to redefine an entire class of health 
care services to all families.  These differences alone might suggest these programs are 
not comparable.  However, both social polices also share characteristics that make them 
similarly attractive to administrators seeking to make their mark.  Ultimately, both 
policies appeal to leftist politicians and technocrats who embrace the policies for their 
social justice and citizenship goals.   
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The findings in this study contribute to several research endeavors, including 
disciplinary debates on actors’ motivations in political decision making, theories of 
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policy diffusion, and Brazilian politics. Also important for those with a particular interest 
in poverty alleviation and equity enhancing public policy, this project informs 
practitioners of the mechanisms that enable innovative strategies to diffuse.  
One of the most central debates in social science has been: what motivates 
individuals’ political behavior?  Different disciplinary traditions have emphasized such 
divergent factors as self-interest, socialized norms, or the power of ideas.  While fields 
such as political science and sociology have pursued theory-building exercises based on 
these underlying assumptions, diffusion research which crosses disciplinary divides has 
tended to leave motivations unspecified and untested.  In other words, diffusion 
scholarship in political science has emphasized the importance of rationality and electoral 
competition to explain policymaking while similar research by sociologists has 
emphasized the role of social networks (see for instance, Berry and Berry 1992; 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Granovetter 1973; Walker 1969).  One of this dissertation’s 
main contributions is its conceptual framework, which focuses on individuals’ 
motivations for policy emulation, filling a theoretical lacuna by highlighting actors’ 
motivations in diffusion research.  
In testing three competing explanations for emulation decisions, this research 
reveals that electoral competition fails to explain the diffusion of Bolsa Escola and PSF.  
This finding is particularly noteworthy given that electoral self-interest is one of the basic 
behavioral assumptions in political science. Rather, actors can be driven to emulate 
innovative policies for principled and other-regarding reasons.  This surprising result 
suggests that future research on diffusion should take care to avoid embedding behavioral 
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assumptions.  For this reason, research designs should make sure to assess the 
mechanisms that drive emulation decisions.  While statistical techniques such as event 
history analysis can facilitate generalization for a larger number of cases, case study 
approaches and process tracing are necessary to uncover the mechanisms that drive 
emulation decisions.    
This research project also offers important insights for scholars of Brazilian 
politics.  Most research on social policy in Brazil has emphasized the role of institutions 
or sector-specific features of health and education (see for instance Arretche 2000; 2002; 
2004).  Yet, with greater municipal authority in decision making, diffusion research 
provides a new analytic lens for understanding both the horizontal and vertical processes 
that drive the spread of similar policies across the country.  The replication of social 
policy in Brazil offers a unique opportunity to explore diffusion; it has occurred in a 
country with thousands of local governments that is well-known for its vast contrasts 
rather than similarities.  Policy emulation in Brazil is puzzling precisely because of 
dramatic regional differences; that a mega-city such as São Paulo with elaborate health 
networks, would adopt a health care model which owes its origin to poor small cities in 
the rural northeast, is remarkable.  Similarly, it is surprising that a city like Salvador with 
high rates of poverty and poor educational infrastructure would implement a school-grant 
program developed for wealthy cities with some of the highest rates of human 
development (Martins and Libânio 2005).  The spread of the same policy model across 
such diverse settings is worthy of explanation.  
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Lastly, this study has important implications for those concerned with the practice 
of social policy development in Brazil’s local governments.  Having contrasted two 
policy arenas of central concern to local governments, we see that the motivations that 
drive policy emulation can result in different outcomes.  Not only did policies diffuse at 
different rates, but the likelihood that a policy experienced “longevity” differed as well. 
When ideology was the predominant motivation for policymakers, as was the case with 
Bolsa Escola and Renda Mínima, the programs were much more vulnerable to policy 
reversal once there was a turnover in government.  Municipal Bolsa Escola never became 
a standard model for education reform that encompassed new norms across education and 
public assistance associations.  Rather, supporters of the educational grant program were 
socialized through the generalist Public Management and Citizenship network.  This 
contrasts significantly with programs such as PSF which become defined as the new 
professional standard.  In this case, its diffusion was extensive and the program was much 
more likely to remain in place once implemented.  Within four years of PSF’s earliest 
adoption, associations such as CONASEMS, CEBES, and ABRASCO served as fora for 
programmatic debate.  If we consider “good governance practices” to be those that 
encompass some measure of policy regularity across administrations, then there is reason 
to believe that the existence of a professional society really does matter.  By investing in 
social networks that can cross ideological divides and socialize individuals into shared 
professional norms, advocates of social policy innovation can go far to promote diffusion.   
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FUTURE RESEARCH  
 As is often the case with research endeavors, this dissertation has generated 
several questions for future research to address.  Field research offers many benefits 
including the ability to observe, “soak and poke.”  Thus, some questions sprang up in the 
process of conducting field research, but were set aside for the sake of coherence.  Other 
questions are generated from the findings themselves.  I will address each in turn. 
As this dissertation briefly discusses in Chapters 4 and 5, Bolsa Escola and 
Programa Saúde da Família have important implications for women: as direct 
beneficiaries of the program, as workers, and through the social construction of gender 
relations.  Mothers were the targets of Bolsa Escola grants, women make up the bulk of 
PSF health agents and team members, and these programs have the potential to either 
transform gender relations or reinforce traditional family norms.  An interesting similarity 
across both social policies examined in this study, includes the way in which motherhood 
and “family” served as focal points for organizing social services.  These socially 
“neutral” themes do not challenge mainstream constructions of gender and family values 
in Brazil, which likely enabled their adopters to see them as generally acceptable.14 
The gender politics surrounding Bolsa Escola was particularly explicit in that 
mothers were identified as the most responsible adults in children’s lives; only mothers 
could be trusted to spend their children’s grants to further their education and basic living 
                                                 
14 Innovations are more likely to spread when innovative ideas are compatible with pre-existing values and 
beliefs (Rogers 2003: 240-243).  Mensch et. al (1999) argue that gendered norms can be difficult to change, 
for instance, despite laws banning female circumcision, clitoridectomy remained a common practice in 
Ghana; a diffusion campaign to outlaw the practice was slowly adopted because the policy conflicted with 
cultural norms (as cited in Rogers 2003: 242-243). 
 205
needs.  Fathers were largely dismissed by policymakers as either impractical to work with 
or less likely to fulfill their paternal roles.  Some administrators pointed to pragmatic 
concerns such as the large number of female-headed households and noted potential 
problems that could arise if men fathered children with several women.  A few others 
embraced progressive discourse about empowering women, but these viewpoints were 
rare and largely absent from the public discourse on the program.  Non-specialists and 
politicians were more likely to revert to stereotypes to explain the gendered appeal of 
Bolsa Escola; that fathers might use the grants to drink alcohol, was the most common 
dismissal.  In practice, Bolsa Escola’s political appeal was tied to these traditional social 
norms surrounding motherhood and the prioritization of family.15  
 In some ways, the gendered dimensions of the PSF program were more 
ambiguous.  On the face of it, the PSF program seemed at odds with the broader trends in 
the field of public health to make sex and gender explicit in organizing health services.  
Public health in Brazil has included a focus on women’s health issues; particularly as 
they relate to women’s reproduction, infant, and maternal health.16  In the last decade, 
public education campaigns on domestic violence also shed light on health impacts of 
violence against women.  These larger trends in public health to provide specialized care 
for women and acknowledge gender relations in Brazil were less explicit under the 
                                                 
15 As Chapter 4 explains, Senator Eduardo Suplicy had initially proposed a minimum income for all 
individuals, regardless of marital status and number of dependents. This individualistic approach to social 
policy was rejected by Brazilian policymakers who embrace the idea that social policy ought to be centered 
on vulnerable families with children. 
16 Here I refer to traditional development concerns surrounding family planning and fertility as well as 
international public health goals (GOBI) that include promotion of maternal breast feeding. 
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family health program.  The family,17 rather than the individual, was the “unit” to receive 
attention.  Special attention to girls and women would require that health care 
professionals mainstream gender in their work.  In general, it is possible that an 
integrated family approach can result in better care, as health workers are able to 
contextualize health problems and see patients’ home environment.  But successful 
integration of women’s health depends on the quality of training programs and the 
sensitivity of nurse supervisors.  Yet these concerns were rarely expressed by 
administrators of the program in research sites I visited.  Politically, PSF has a gender-
neutral façade and appeals to traditional constructions of nuclear family life.  The logo 
that accompanies the program in posters, clinics, and brochures includes the image of two 
parents with two children within a house.  Unlike specialized health programs based on 
women’s reproduction or disease-centric care, the PSF image has a broad appeal that 
everyone can relate to while also reinforcing notions of family life embraced by social 
conservatives.   
The gender dimensions of Bolsa Escola and PSF rarely entered into policy 
debates on their merits.18  Social policy experts hardly ever highlighted issues of gender 
norms when discussing these programs and non-governmental feminist advocacy 
organizations seldom commented on the value of these programs for women.  The low 
levels of gendered discourse on social policymaking is surprising because Brazil is home 
                                                 
17 In practice, health teams in the four research sites explain that they view “family” in terms of 
“household”.  The registry of families includes all persons in the same domicile, regardless of relational 
ties.  
18 Street level bureaucrats acknowledged gender and family relations much more so than technocrats or 
politicians. 
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to a women’s movement that made significant strides in pressing for democratization 
(Alvarez 1990; Jacquette and Wolchik 1998) and that has since formed professional non-
governmental organizations to press the women’s rights agenda (Alvarez 1990; 1999).  In 
addition, the country has also made efforts to create spaces for women through the 
institution of a women’s bureaucracy and gender quotas for political parties.  What does 
it take to mainstream gender into social policy debates in Brazil?  This question certainly 
speaks to central research questions in comparative feminist scholarship, including 
studies on feminist policy in the European welfare state, as well as other developing 
countries (see for example Jordan 2006; Mazur 2002).  This question for the Brazilian 
context is for now left unanswered and awaits a future research opportunity. 
Another question outside the scope of this dissertation is whether Bolsa Escola 
and PSF are effective or should diffuse throughout the country.  Both policies have won 
awards for policy “innovation,” yet accolades are generally based on a few case studies.  
It is less clear for instance, if these programs will be effective once installed elsewhere.  
Can an educational cash-grant program produce desired results if implemented in a city 
that lacks other educational resources for school achievement?  Should cities with 
complex health infrastructure, where residents prefer clinician-based services, adopt a 
family health program?  As this dissertation has addressed, many of the cities that have 
adopted these policies did so without undertaking research to determine if these programs 
are indeed appropriate solutions to their city’s social problems.  These issues about policy 
efficacy are important, especially since actors who adopt them assume they will address 
problems of social exclusion, poverty, and inequality.  To answer these questions, social 
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policy researchers would need to conduct policy evaluation research; it is my hope that 
specialists in Brazilian public policy analysis will undertake this kind of investigation in 
the near future.  
Scholars of Brazilian politics may also take to heart that this dissertation’s 
findings have emphasized the importance of ideology in guiding social policy decision-
making at the municipal level.  At the same time, recent politics in Brazil at the national 
level suggests that the role of ideology might matter less than it does for local politicians 
and technocrats.  The re-election of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva after the broad 
extension of conditional cash transfer programs suggests that electoral competition might 
matter more at the national level than at the local level (see Appendix F; Hunter and 
Power 2007).  One possibility is that the electorate is more aware of trends in national 
policy and has difficulty ascribing credit for local policy innovation.  Another possibility 
is that the effects of national social policy can be felt more broadly.  Regardless, this 
difference in national and local policy making has remained outside of the purview of this 
dissertation, which has focused on local policy emulation.  Future research on social 
policy should address whether policymakers’ motivations to enact social policy reform 
differ according to the arena where they work; i.e. do electoral incentives, ideology, and 
socialized norms operate differently at the national level?  This is yet another question for 
future investigation. 
This dissertation has set an agenda for future scholarship on policy diffusion.  As 
I have argued, the findings in this study underscore the need to test actors’ motivations in 
political decision making.  When diffusion research embeds disciplinary and 
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paradigmatic behavioral assumptions about political behavior, scholars run the risk of 
misinterpreting political activity and the mechanisms that drive diffusion.  For these 
reasons, future diffusion research should specify and test assumptions about political 
motivations.  In doing so, diffusion scholarship may shed light on broader political 
science debates on rationality and self-interest.  This project bucks conventional wisdom 
that self-interest, as demonstrated through electoral competition, drives resource 
allocation decision making.  While these findings may be specific to local politics in 
Brazil, it is also possible that similar trends exist elsewhere and for other diffusion 
phenomena.  In order to integrate diffusion studies with larger theory-building exercises 
in political science, future research will need to explore the explanatory power of 
electoral competition, ideology, and social networks for other country studies and 





CITIES IN LARGE-N STUDY 
 
State Municipality 





BA Vitória da Conquista 
BA Teixeira de Freitas 
BA Salvador 















DF Distrito Federal 
ES Vitória 





ES Cachoeiro de Itapemirim 
GO Rio Verde 
GO Luziânia 
GO Goiânia 
GO Aparecida de Goiânia 
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GO Anápolis 
GO Águas Lindas de Goiás 
MA Timon 
MA São Luís 







MG Teófilo Otoni 
MG Sete Lagoas 
MG Santa Luzia 
MG Sabará 
MG Ribeirão das Neves 
MG Pouso Alegre 
MG Poços de Caldas 
MG Patos de Minas 
MG Montes Claros 
MG Juiz de Fora 
MG Ipatinga 
MG Ibirité 
MG Governador Valadares 
MG Divinópolis 
MG Contagem 
MG Conselheiro Lafaiete 
MG Betim 




MS Campo Grande 










PB Santa Rita 
PB João Pessoa 
PB Campinha Grande 









PE Cabo de Santo Agostinho 
PI Teresina 
PI Parnaíba* 
PR São José dos Pinhais 











RJ Volta Redonda 
RJ Teresópolis 
RJ São João de Meriti 
RJ São Gonçalo 
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RJ Duque de Caxias 
RJ Campos dos Goytacazes 
RJ Cabo Frio 
RJ Belford Roxo 
RJ Barra Mansa 




RO Porto Velho 
RO Ji-Paraná 
RR Boa Vista 
RS Viamão* 
RS Uruguaiana 
RS Sapucaia do Sul 
RS São Leopoldo 
RS Santa Maria 
RS Santa Cruz do Sul 
RS Rio Grande 
RS Porto Alegre 
RS Pelotas 
RS Passo Fundo 
RS Novo Hamburgo 
RS Gravataí 























SP São Vicente 
SP São Paulo 
SP São José dos Campos 
SP São José do Rio Preto 
SP São Carlos 
SP São Caetano do Sul* 
SP São Bernanrdo do Campo 
SP Santos 
SP Santo André 
SP Santa Bárbara d'Oeste 
SP Rio Claro 
SP Ribeirão Preto 
SP Ribeirão Pires 
SP Presidente Prudente 




SP Moji das Cruzes 

















SP Franco da Rocha 
SP Francisco Morato 
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SP Franca* 




















* Denotes cities where municipal authorities declined to participate in the phone survey, and thus 




Alves, Rita de Cassia. Administrator, Finance Department in Municipal Department of 
Health, São Paulo, September 17, 2003. 
Almeida, Aide. Administrator in Health Program, UNESCO-Brasília. December 16, 
2003. 
Almeida, Ivonette Santiago de. Administrator, Finance Department with Secretary of 
Health (Federal District). Brasília, December 3, 2003. 
Andrade, Luis Odorico de. President of CONASEMS and Municipal Secretary of Health 
of Sobral (CE), Natal, March 20, 2004.. 
Aguiar, Marcelo. Chief of Staff at Ministry of Education, Brasília, November 24, 2003. 
Araújo, Raimundo Caires. Municipal Secretary of Work and Social Development, 
Salvador, July 2004.  
Augusti, Maria Teresa. President, Instituto Florestan Fernandes. São Paulo, October 27, 
2003. 
Barbosa, Alfonso Celso Renan. Former Coordinator of Bolsa Escola, Municipal 
Department of Education, Belo Horizonte. March 22, 2003.  
Bandeira, Célia. Former Special Secretary for Monitoring (Secretária Extraordinaria de 
Acompanhamento), under Lídice da Mata, Salvador, July 9, 2004. 
Bisol, Jairo. Public Prosecutor, Public Prosecutor’s Office for the Federal District, 
Brasília, May 4, 2004. 
Boa Sorte, Alfredo. President of Sindicato dos Médicos. Salvador, May 31, 2004. 
Borio, Jõao Carlos. Administrator, Municipal Department of Workforce and Social 
Development. São Paulo, September 15, 2003. 
Bruno, Naire. Staff member, Municipal Department of Public Assistance, São Paulo, 
November 13, 2000. 
Buarque, Cristovam. Former Governor of the Federal District, Brasília, April 26, 2004.  
Camara, Gilherme Ribeiro. Representative, Sindicato dos Médicos-MG. Belo Horizonte, 
April 6, 2004. 
Campos, Claúdia Valentina de Arruda. Researcher with Fundação Getúlio Vargas-São 
Paulo consulting group. São Paulo, September 17, 2003. 
Castro, Maria Céres Pimenta Spínola. Former Secretary of Education, Municipal 
Department of Education of Belo Horizonte. Belo Horizonte, February 11, 2004.  
Castro, Laura Alfonso. Bolsa Escola Administrator, Municipal Department of Education, 
Belo Horizonte, March 4, 2004. 
Castro, Marcelo Lúcio Ottoni de. Senate Health Researcher, Brazilian Senate, Brasília, 
May 3, 2004. 
Coelho, Cristina. Administrator of PSF, Municipal Department of Health for Belo 
Horizonte, Belo Horizonte, February 16, 2004. 
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Conceição, Maria José da (Maninha), Former Health Secretary of the Federal District, 
Brasília,December 1, 2003. 
Correia, Rogério. Former City Counselor for Belo Horizonte, Belo Horizonte, March 29, 
2004. 
Costa, Célia Regina. Union Representative, SINDESAÙDE, São Paulo, October 30, 
2003.  
Cunha, Célio da. Program Staff. UNESCO, Brasília, January 22, 2004.  
D’Agostini, Angelo. Union Representative, SINDESAÙDE, São Paulo, October 30, 
2003.  
D’Angelo Francisco. Secretary of Health, Municipal Department of Health for Niterói, 
Natal, March 17, 2004.  
Dimitrov, Pedro.  Senior Advisor to Secretary of Health, Eduardo Jorge Martins Alves. 
São Paulo, November 6, 2003. 
Escorel de Moraes, Sarah Maria.  Professor at Fundação Oswaldo Cruz and Consultant to 
Ministry of Health, Natal, March 2004. 
Elias, Paulo. Professor and Researcher, CEDEC, São Paulo, September 19, 2003. 
Eon, Fábio. Administrator, Communications Department, UNESCO-Brasília. Brasília, 
December 16, 2003.  
Fernandes, Silvio. Secretary of Health, Municipal Department of Health of Londrina. 
Natal, March 19, 2004. 
Fontes, Alexandre. Archivst with Fundação Perseu Abramo, São Paulo, September 18, 
2003. 
Franco, Túlio Batista. Adjunct Secretary, Municipal Department of Health, Belo 
Horizonte, February 12, 2004. 
Freitas, Estanislau de. Administrator, Municipal Department of Workforce and Social 
Development, São Paulo, October 2, 2003. 
Galeano, Paula.  Chief of Staff to Coordinator of Bolsa Escola Federal, Ministry of 
Education, São Paulo ,April 16, 2004. 
Geddes, José. Former State Secretary, State Department of Health of São Paulo, São 
Paulo November 4, 2003. 
Goldbaum, Moisés. Professor and President of ABRASCO, São Paulo, October 27, 2003.  
Gomes, Cid. Mayor of Sobral (Ceará). Sobral, July 8, 2004. 
Gouvea, Isamara. Administrator of PSF, Municipal Department of Health, São Paulo, 
October 1, 2003. 
Guedes, Ana Cláudia. Executive Secretary of CEBES, Rio de Janeiro, October 20, 2003. 
Brazil. 
Ibañez, Antonio. Secretary, Department of Education (Federal District). Brasília, 
December 15, 2003. 
Jatene, Adib. Former Minister, Ministry of Health, São Paulo, October 16, 2003. 
Junkeira, Virgínia. Researcher, State Institute of Health, São Paulo, October 15, 2003. 
Kayano, Jorge. Staff member, PÒLIS Institute. São Paulo, October 18, 2003. 
La Forgia, Gerald M. Program Staff, Health Division, World Bank-Brazil, Brasília, May 
4, 2004.  
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Leitão, Elizabeth Former Director of Bolsa Escola, Municipal Secretary of Education of 
Belo Horizonte, Brasília, January 19, 2004. 
Lima, Lílian Carneiro. Coordinator, Renda Minha, Department of Education of the 
Federal District, Brasília, December 10, 2003. 
Lopes, Conceição Zotta. Bolsa Escola Administrator, Department of Education of the 
Federal District, Brasília, November 20, 2003. 
Lorenzo, Rosicler Aparecida Viegas Di. State Coordinator of Programa Saúde da 
Família, São Paulo, November 18, 2003.  
Machado, Heloisa. Former Director of PSF, Ministry of Health, Brasília, November 21, 
2003.   
Madeira, Wilma. Staff member, Instituto Florestan Fernandes, São Paulo, October 27, 
2003. 
Manfredini, Marco. Chief of Staff, Office of City Counselor Carlos Neder, São Paulo, 
September 24, 2003. 
Mariani, Mônica. Staff member, ABRASCO, Rio de Janeiro, October 20, 2003. 
Mata, Lídice da, Former Mayor of Salvador, Salvador, July 16, 2004. 
Magalhães, Ines. Former Official at Workers’ Party National Headquarters, Brasília, 
January 28, 2004. 
Martins Alves Sobrinho, Jorge Eduardo. Former Secretary of Health in São Paulo, Natal, 
March 19, 2004. 
Mendes, Vera. Professor School of Public Administration, at the Federal University of 
Bahia, Salvador, May 23, 2004. 
Meneses, Milton. Director of PSF in the Federal District, Brasília, January 2004. 
Miura, Hiromi. Administrator, Secretary of Health of the Federal District, Brasília, 
December 9, 2003. 
Nossa, Sonia. Staff member of Programa Saúde da Família, Municipal Department of 
Health, Salvador, June 28, 2004. 
Paixão, Marcia. Coordinator, Municipal Renda Mínima Program, São Paulo, October 9, 
2003. 
Pesaro, Antonio Floriano. Former Coordinator of Bolsa Escola Federal, Ministry of 
Education. São Paulo, April 16, 2004. 
Ribeiro, Teresa. Staff member of the Liderança do PT, Municipal City Council, São 
Paulo, September 12, 2003.  
Rocha, Sonia. Former IPEA Researcher, Rio de Janeiro, October 21, 2003. 
Rodrigues, Almira Correia de Caldas. Professor of Sociology at the National University 
of Brasília and affiliate of Centro Feminista de Estudos e Assessoria (CFEMEA). 
Brasília, December 4, 2003. 
Romero, Luis Carlos Pelizari. Senate Health Researcher, Brazilian Senate, Brasília, May 
3, 2004. 
Santos, Rosa Maria Barros dos. Coordinator, QUALIS-São Paulo, São Paulo, October 14, 
2003. 
Santos, Fausto Perreira. Former Adjunct Secretary of Health in Belo Horizonte, Brasília, 
January 26, 2004. 
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Suassuna, Afra. Director of Basic Healthcare, Ministry of Health, Brasília, December 17, 
2003. 
Schneider, Alessandra. Administrator in Health Program, UNESCO-Brasília. Brasília, 
December 16, 2003. 
Silva, Edimar Gomes da. Chief of Staff, President’s Cabinet of the Municipal City 
Council, São Paulo, October 3, 2003. 
Silva, Joanna. Coordinator, Programa Sáude da Família, Municipal Department of 
Health, São Paulo, October 15, 2003. 
Silva, Maria de Salete. Former Secretary of Administration & Secretary of Education in 
the Lídice da Mata administration, Salvador, June 1, 2004. 
Silveira, Lídia Tobias. Administrator, Municipal Department of Health, São Paulo, 
October 6, 2003.  
Souza, Paulo Renato. Former Minister of Education, São Paulo, April 16, 2004. 
Sousa, Valdomiro. Administrator, Federal Bolsa Escola Program. Ministry of Education 
and Culture, Brasília, November 24, 2003. 
Oliveira, Leandro Valquer JL de. President, SINDSEP-SP, São Paulo, November 10, 
2003. 
Oswaldo, José. Coordinator of the Belo Horizonte Municipal Health Council. Belo 
Horizonte, March 12, 2004. 
Passoni, Armelindo. Administrator, Department of Workforce and Social Development, 
São Paulo, October 2, 2003. 
Pacheco, Marisa. Former Coordinator of Bolsa Escola. Department of Education of the 
Federal District. Brasília, January 27, 2004. 
Pena, Moacir Ricoy. Administrator of Bolsa Escola, Municipal Department of Education. 
Belo Horizonte,March 9, 2004. 
Pochman, Márcio. Secretary, Municipal Department of Workforce and Social 
Development, São Paulo, November 4, 2003. 
Paulics, Veronika. Staff member, PÓLIS Institute, São Paulo, October 8, 2003. 
Queiróz Jorge da Silva, Iêda Zilmara de. Staff member of Programa Saúde da Família, 
Municipal Department of Health, Salvador, June 28, 2004. 
Santos, Fausto Perreira. Former Adjunct Secretary, Municipal Department of Health of 
Belo Horizonte. Brasília, January 26, 2004.   
Santos Filho, Serafim Barbosa. Administrator, PROESF, Ministry of Health, Brasília, 
November 25, 2003.  
Silva, Célio. President, Missão Criança. Brasília, November 25, 2003. 
Soares, Ana Maria da Silva. Staff member of Rede Feminista & Member of the 
Municipal Health Council, Belo Horizonte, March 10, 2004. 
Sousa, Maria Fátima de. Chief of Staff at Ministry of Health, Brasília, December 1, 2003. 
Souza, Maria Aladilce de. President of Sindisaúde-Salvador, Salvador, June 16, 2004. 
Suplicy, Eduardo. Senator, Brazilian Senate. São Paulo, October 31, 2003. 
Turci, Maria. Advisor to the Department of Basic Health, Municipal Department of 
Health, Belo Horizonte, February 16, 2004. 
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Vasconcelos, Sonia. Administrator, Bolsa Escola program, Municipal Department of 
Education, Belo Horizonte, March 4, 2004. 
Vaz, José Carlos. Staff member, PÒLIS Institute. São Paulo, October 8, 2003.  
Woo, William. City Counselor and leader of the PSDB, São Paulo, November 12, 2003.  
 
Focus Groups 
Citizen Representatives to the Belo Horizonte Health Council. Belo Horizonte, February 
16, 2004. 
 
Citizen Representatives to the Salvador Health Council & Affiliates with Pastroral da 
Saúde. Salvador, June 29, 2004. 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C.1 PSF coverage of State’s population over Time (%)  
Region/State 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
NORTH                     
Rondônia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 22.6 27.0 25.7 26.6 25.2 
Acre 0.0 3.8 3.6 3.4 15.4 23.5 42.0 42.6 46.3 49.7 
Amazonas 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 5.1 8.2 22.5 33.5 37.0 
Roraima 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.8 17.7 65.5 70.2 71.2 
Pará 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 2.3 6.2 11.0 15.4 19.7 19.6 
Amapá 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 12.8 18.0 19.4 23.4 
Tocantins 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.5 42.3 35.0 51.2 65.9 70.5 
NORTHEAST                     
Maranhão 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 2.4 8.1 17.6 32.4 41.5 
Piauí 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 7.6 25.0 52.9 68.0 76.5 79.8 
Ceará 5.1 11.6 13.7 13.6 28.2 33.0 37.8 50.4 54.7 55.2 
Rio Grande do Norte 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 4.5 11.8 22.6 48.7 51.4 63.2 
Paraíba 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 4.0 7.1 33.0 64.6 67.6 81.9 
Pernambuco 1.4 3.5 3.5 4.5 11.0 16.0 34.4 44.5 49.3 52.9 
Alagoas 2.6 4.2 4.3 12.2 23.4 30.3 56.8 62.3 64.7 64.2 
Sergipe 0.2 6.2 6.2 6.0 12.3 18.7 42.0 62.1 69.7 70.6 
Bahia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.2 8.4 15.6 21.7 27.2 
CENTRAL WEST                     
Mato Grosso do Sul 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 1.7 3.9 13.2 23.5 35.5 39.1 
Mato Grosso 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 3.1 5.2 21.0 38.3 44.4 48.0 
Goiás 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.7 9.0 25.8 46.9 51.0 52.5 
Distrito Federal 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.1 49.7 21.2 10.3 9.9 6.6 0.0 
SOUTHEAST                     
Espírito Santo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.1 4.2 19.3 29.6 31.3 33.1 
Minas Gerais 0.9 0.2 1.7 11.2 15.4 16.3 22.8 29.6 38.5 47.6 
Rio de Janeiro 0.3 0.3 1.1 1.0 1.5 3.7 9.9 16.8 18.6 19.5 
São Paulo 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 2.3 7.9 10.8 15.8 18.5 
SOUTH                     
Paraná 0.2 1.7 1.7 3.7 6.9 7.7 23.4 32.7 36.3 38.9 
Santa Catarina 5.1 6.5 7.2 7.1 7.0 11.1 25.4 41.7 51.7 56.9 
Rio Grande do Sul 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.8 2.3 2.9 7.1 10.1 14.4 18.7 
TOTAL 0.7 1.6 1.9 3.5 6.6 9.0 17.9 26.4 31.9 35.7 
Provided by the Ministry of Health, Departamento de Atenção Básica. 




Table C.2 PSF coverage of Region’s population over Time (%)  
Region/State 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
NORTH 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 4.9 11.7 15.9 23.8 30.0 31.3 
NORTHEAST 1.4 3.0 3.4 4.2 9.3 13.7 26.4 39.1 45.3 50.5 
CENTRAL WEST 0.2 0.2 0.2 4.6 10.0 9.4 19.8 34.3 39.0 39.9 
SOUTHEAST 0.3 0.9 1.2 3.5 5.0 6.1 12.5 17.4 22.6 26.5 
SOUTH 1.1 2.2 2.3 3.3 5.0 6.4 17.2 25.5 30.7 34.6 
TOTAL 0.74 1.60 1.86 3.51 6.57 8.95 17.87 26.35 31.87 35.69 
Provided by the Ministry of Health, Departamento de Atenção Básica. 
Sources: IBGE – Population Estimates and CAPSI - Sistema de Captação de Dados para Pagamento. 
 














































Phone Interview Protocol: 
 
Research Assistants introduced themselves and the research study.  After identifying the 
municipal official responsible for socio-educative programs for the city, researchers 
asked the following questions: 
 
A. Does your city administer a municipal conditional cash-grant for educational 
purposes? Some cities call these programs, Bolsa Escola or Renda Minima. 
 
If yes: 
1) What is the program called? 
2) When was it instituted? 
3) If respondent cannot recall the year it was enacted, inquire about any legislation 
or decrees that preceded the program’s start.  
4) While department is responsible for the program? 
5) Does the program include conditionality, e.g. regular school attendance?  
6) Please describe the main features of your city’s program.   
 
If no: 
Was there such a program in the past?   
 
B. Is there anything else you would like to share about your city’s socio-educational 
programs? 
 




Table E.1: Structure of the Brazilian Education System 
General 
Title 
Specific Title International 
Classification 













4 years 0-3 
Municipalities 
& Federal 










2nd grade 8 
3rd grade 9 









6th grade 12 
7th grade 13 
8th grade 14 
Higher 
Education 
Undergraduate   Variable 18-24 
Federal 
Government Postgraduate   Variable Variable 




EPILOGUE: NATIONAL POLICY, FROM BOLSA ESCOLA TO BOLSA FAMÍLIA 
 
 Perhaps no other policy in the last ten years has captured the attention of more 
Brazilian policymakers than Bolsa Escola.  The origins of the program are with municipal 
governments, who were the first to design and administer the policy.  But after 
conditional cash-grants for education began receiving national and international attention, 
the federal government took small steps to institute its own program.  A simple idea 
designed by and for local governments caught-on among policymakers in Brazil’s 
national government, who decided to replicate the program at the national level. This 
epilogue, which focuses on federal initiatives, discusses the evolution of socio-
educational social policy policies.  Since the federal government’s earliest forays in this 
area, Bolsa Escola has undergone profound transformation.  The policy has changed 
substantially, in terms of its goals, size and political significance.  In the process, Bolsa 
Escola Federal also experienced a name-change: Bolsa Família.  
 The first federal attempt to support municipal Bolsa Escola efforts was both 
limited and short-lived.  In late 1997, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s 
administration introduced the Programa Renda Mínima Vinculada à Educaçao, to provide 
matching grants to municipalities that instituted their own Bolsa Escola program.  Cities 
with per capita incomes below their states’ averages were eligible for funds.  These 
policy design issues alone would have complicated the program’s expansion, but there 
were other reasons the program got off to a bad start.  Most notably, the federal Renda 
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Mínima program had not instituted controls for oversight of funds and municipal officials 
were accused of corrupt practices by local media.  The opportunities for mismanagement 
of funds were widespread; federal matching dollars were directed to municipal 
governments and many had not established a proper registry of beneficiaries or regular 
payment method through a bank.  In evaluating the policy, economist Sonia Rocha 
quickly identified the program as a policy failure.  One city simply disregarded the 
programmatic objectives and distributed funds as political patronage (Interview Rocha 
2003).  Another problem was that each city established its own criteria for eligibility 
making it became impossible to track beneficiaries, conduct program evaluations, and 
allow for a transparent program with community oversight (Interview Galeano 2004).  
From the point of view of municipalities, the federal government failed to transfer funds 
on a regular basis and families were left without benefits for months; when funds finally 
arrived, one city had officials hand out cash to beneficiaries in the middle of town square 
(Interview Rocha 2003).  Given all these problems, the first national experiment to 
support municipal adoption of Renda Mínima died a quick and quiet death19. 
 In 2001, just prior to the the presidential campaign season, the Cardoso 
government announced a new federal school grant program: Bolsa Escola Federal.  
Administratively, the program represented an extension of the law that created the 
Programa de Renda Mínima Vinculada à Educação (1997) but it differed considerably 
from the previous program in both design and political visibility.  First, Bolsa Escola 
                                                 
19 Rocha noted that at the time, administrators in the federal government downplayed problems with the 
program. But the administrative irregularities were so problematic that the program ended about a year 
after its inception (Interview 2003).   
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Federal sought to bypass municipalities altogether.  Participating municipalities were no 
longer required to provide matching grants to families; family grants would come 
exclusively from the federal government. Nor would local government have the 
responsibility for disbursing funds.  Rather, the federal government would make direct 
deposits into beneficiaries’ bank accounts.  In this iteration, the program targeted families 
whose per capita incomes were below half a minimum wage; the program covered 
children from 6 to 15 years of age and provided each child with 15 reais (up to 90 reais) a 
month. As before, the program operated as conditional cash-transfer so municipalities 
would undertake registering eligible families, based on federal criteria, and monitoring 
school attendance.   
 Unlike the previous program, Bolsa Escola Federal sought to achieve rapid 
adoption throughout the country.  MEC hired 120 staff to ensure nearly all cities would 
adopt the program within a year (Interview Pesaro 2004).  The staff exceeded 
expectations and within the first six months, over 4000 municipalities had registered 
beneficiaries (Interview V. Sousa 2003, Interview Souza 2004).  Although Minister 
Souza attributed the decision to implement a federal Bolsa Escola program to President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Vilmar Faria, his senior social policy advisor (Interview 
Souza 2004), the policy’s timing clearly coincided with his own presidential campaign 
drive to win the PSDB nomination.  The political implications of a federal cash-grant 
program on the eve of Presidential elections were quite clear for political opponents.  
Although the name of the program had been largely associated with the Workers’ Party, 
PSDB officials made efforts to claim the program as their own by citing early 
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experiences in the city of Campinas and emphasizing that the federal program was the 
largest with the greatest coverage.20   
 Bolsa Escola Federal was not the only federal cash-transfer program under the 
Cardoso administration.  Many federal agencies had developed cash-assistance programs, 
subsidies or voucher programs to assist the poor.  For instance, the Ministry of Health 
had a program, Programa Bolsa Alimentação (Nutritional Grant Program) for pregnant 
women, nursing mothers, and children under six years of age who at risk of malnutrition.  
The Ministry of Mines and Energy also had a program, Auxilio Gás21 (Gas Stipend) for 
poor families to purchase household gas cylinders.  In the last year of the Cardoso 
administration, senior technocrats in the office of the President pushed for better policy 
coordination between social assistance programs.  At that point, each ministry had its 
own rolls of beneficiaries and criteria for determining eligibility.  In Cardoso’s last year 
of office, the federal government began steps to move toward a single registry to track 
beneficiaries.  A unified registry would also facilitate governmental administration with 
better oversight of its social services and avoid duplication of benefits.     
 When Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) won the presidential election in 2002, he 
surprised many political observers by introducing eradication of hunger as a major 
priority.  Lula promised to focus his attention on the issues of hunger, malnutrition, and 
extreme poverty and announced a new program that would mark the early years of his 
                                                 
20 On May 23, 2002 the PSDB hosted a meeting “Brasil 2010: Desenvolvimento e Inclusão Social: O 
Brasil no Rumo Certo” in Brasilia.  The agenda for that meeting included a session led by Floriano Pesaro 
entitled, “Bolsa-Escola: Um Programa Tucano de Inclusão Social”  (The Bolsa Escola, a Toucan program 
for social inclusion). The Toucan is the party’s symbol.   
21 Also known as Vale-Gás, this program provided poor families with R$7.50 subsidy per a month. 
 229
social policy agenda: Programa Fome Zero (Zero Hunger Program).  That he had risen 
out of childhood poverty and a humble upbringing, made his quest to alleviate hunger all 
the more captivating for domestic and international audiences.  The goals and scope of 
the program were ambitious from the start.  The policy was also administratively 
complex given that there were numerous local and federal programs already in place to 
address hunger and malnutrition.  Despite considerable fanfare the Fome Zero program, 
which includes both food stamps and in-kind disbursements to needy families, got off to 
a slow start and has been plagued by problems, ranging from administrative 
inefficiencies, local corruption and bureaucratic inexperience (Hunter & Power 
2005:131-132).   
At the same time the Lula administration introduced its signature policy initiative, 
Fome Zero, officials also moved forward with plans to integrate the preexisting federal 
cash grant programs into a single registry.  Under the Lula administration, a minimum-
income program providing cash-grants for the poor would take the name Bolsa Família22 
(Family Grant).  Similar to earlier efforts at the end of the Cardoso administration, the 
Bolsa Família sought to provide beneficiaries with a single stipend unifying disparate 
programs.  As was the case with Fome Zero, Bolsa Família also ran into administrative 
trouble as different ministries vied for control over the program.  Cristovam Buarque, 
who was Minister of Education (2003-2004), firmly defended the need for the Bolsa 
Escola Federal and argued that combining the program with other cash-grants would 
                                                 
22 The Bolsa Família legislation went into effect on January 9, 2004; Law nº 10.836.  
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dilute its educational effects.  Reports that a main feature of the program – the 
requirement for regular school attendance – was being overlooked by the federal 
government generated even more criticism.  It would take several years for the Lula 
government to address the administrative hurdles associated with Bolsa Família and 
implement it on a grand scale.  
 Ironically, even though the Lula administration introduced Fome Zero with 
considerable zeal and sold it as his signature policy, Bolsa Família rose in importance to 
represent his social policy focus.  The Bolsa Família unified four previously distinct 
programmatic objectives (educational stipends to boost school attendance, maternal 
nutrition, food supplements, and a household gas subsidy) into a single conditional cash 
transfer policy.  In 2006, the program benefited 44 million of Brazil’s poorest citizens (11 
million families). This impressive coverage has represented a third of the federal 
government’s spending on social assistance for the poor (Hall 2006:689).   That the 
program would grow so quickly and represent such a large share of public assistance 
spending is somewhat surprising given that the policy has yet to undergo large scale 
evaluation.  
While President Lula and his senior staff’s motivations for adopting Bolsa 
Família fall outside the confines of this dissertation and are therefore unknown, it is clear 
the social policy had significant electoral consequences in the 2006 presidential election.  
President Lula entered the reelection campaign under serious fire.  Key members of his 
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party and senior staff had been implicated in a corruption scandal in June 200523.  Shortly 
thereafter, other allegations of serious malfeasance became widespread news headlines. 
The series of corruption scandals threatened Lula’s reelection prospects and challenged 
the Workers’ Party’s historic claims of “good governance” practices.   What explains 
Lula’s second-round victory in the face of these political challenges?  Hunter and Power 
(2007) argue that a key component of Lula’s electoral victory in 2006 is due to his ability 
to draw on voters from the lowest income and education brackets in the North and 
Northeast.  Given Bolsa Família’s emphasis on targeting resources, it is not surprising 
that these regions, with high levels of poverty and low human development indicators, 
would benefit disproportionately from the conditional cash-grant program.24  The 
political payoff for Lula was clear, as states with the greatest Bolsa Família coverage 
voted overwhelmingly for Lula in the first round of elections.    
                                                 
23 The “Mensalao” scandal detailed a monthly kick-back scheme directed at Members of congress in 
exchange for their votes in favor of President Lula’s legislative agenda. Those implicated in the scandal 
included: Senior Workers Party officials, close Presidential advisors, and congressional representatives. 
24 For instance, the states Marahnão, Piaui, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Pernanbuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, 
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